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ABSTRACT 
This thesis empirically examines the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
sectoral diversification. The core connection between FDI and diversification is the 
inter-industry linkages stimulated by FDI and the resulting introduction and/or 
reallocation of capital and labour in the host economy. Within this framework, this 
thesis seeks to answer the following three questions: i) What is the direct effect of 
FDI on sectoral diversification?, ii) How do domestic labour and capital market 
development moderate this relationship?, and iii) How do multinationals’ motives 
mediate the effect of FDI on sector diversification? 
 
Answers to these questions are sought by extending Imbs and Wacziarg’s (American 
Economic Review, 93 (2003) 63–86) model to include FDI, through using an 
unbalanced panel of 165 countries observed from 1970 to 2007, and through panel 
fixed effects methodology. Four different datasets, obtained from the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and two others from the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), facilitate a rich analysis at the 1-, 2-, 3- and 4-
digit levels of industry classification. Considering the relationship in the short, 
medium and long run, and adopting the Gini coefficient as the baseline indicator of 
diversification constructed using both sectoral employment and value added shares, 
the results are compared across aggregate sectors of the economy, as well as within 
the manufacturing sector. A global sample and different sub-samples—including 
those for developing, developed, low-income, and middle-income countries—enable 
a detailed analysis of the relationship in question. 
 XXI 
 
In response to the first question, mixed evidence is obtained for the direct effect of 
FDI on diversification across the analytical approaches described above. Robust 
results are found at ILO 1-digit aggregation of sectors for developing countries in the 
long run, which suggests that FDI facilitates diversification. However, no such effect 
is observed at the OECD 2-digit data, where the dataset mainly covers industrialised 
nations. Inconclusive results are obtained for the manufacturing sector using UNIDO 
3- and 4-digit data, which leads to the overall conclusion that the direct effect is case-
specific. 
 
The second question unfolds these mixed results by exploring more specific channels 
through which FDI’s benefits may be re-allocated across different sectors. It is 
hypothesised that FDI may help sector diversification in conjunction with flexible 
labour market regulations and a strong financial system within the host economy. 
The central reasoning here is that these factors may facilitate the reallocation of 
factor inputs (i.e., capital and labour) across the domestic sectors. Our findings 
indicate that FDI leads to diversification at ILO 1-digit industry classification, if the 
labour market regulations are flexible enough. On the other hand, financial 
development facilitates diversification in the manufacturing sector at the UNIDO 3- 
and 4-digit classification. No such channel effect is found with the OECD 2-digit 
data. 
 
The third question investigates the role played by the four most mentioned 
multinational motives in sector diversification: natural resource–seeking, market-
seeking, efficiency-seeking, and asset-seeking FDI. The results reveal more insights 
into the manufacturing sector and the result is captured at the 4-digit level data. The 
 XXII 
 
main finding is that developed countries diversify as a result of market-seeking FDI, 
while developing countries diversify as a result of efficiency-seeking FDI. 
Importantly, market-seeking FDI assists diversification through affecting 
employment shares, while efficiency-seeking FDI influences value added shares 
within the manufacturing sector. 
 
Overall, this thesis documents that FDI affects sector diversification, based on the 
flexibility of labour market regulations and the strength of financial development 
within the host economy. The motives of multinationals also play a considerable role 
in the diversification outcomes generated by FDI. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction 
This chapter lays the groundwork for this thesis. It presents the background to the 
research problem and raises some important research questions that have not been 
addressed in the literature to date. In addition, it discusses the evolution of 
multinational corporations (MNCs), the definition of FDI, some facts and figures 
related to global FDI inflows, and a brief note on the data and methodologies 
employed in the thesis. Finally, it presents an overview of the findings. 
 
In countries such as China and India, FDI occupies a considerable place in the 
economy. FDI flows into sectors that are considered rewarding in aspects, but not 
limited to, low cost of production, clientele, learning new technology and so on. FDI 
is often thought to contribute positively to the growth of the local economy through 
capital inflows, employment, infrastructure development, technology transfer, and 
labour training. However, it is also important to stress that backward and forward 
linkages stimulated by FDI with other sectors within the economy play significant 
roles for the production structure of the host country.  
 
To take a simple example, foreign firms producing sports shoes or computers in 
China would need the transportation infrastructure to move goods and inputs from 
factories to ports, and vice versa. The same pattern occurs in Australia’s mining and 
petroleum industries, which relies on the transportation, social security, financial 
services, etc. Other examples are Fiji’s tourism industry that stimulates the food 
sector, and Japan’s automobile industry, which conceives sectors such as electronics 
and motor vehicle accessories industries. 
CHAPTER ONE 
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These suggest that FDI affects the production activity within an economy by drawing 
goods and services from a variety of sectors. Havranek and Irsova (2011) argue that a 
10% point increase in FDI increases the productivity of domestic supplier sectors by 
approximately 9%. This effect can potentially alter the sectoral shares in the 
economy, affecting diversification of the production patterns, given the size and the 
nature of FDI inflows.  
 
On the other hand, the received literature, supported by the empirical work of Imbs 
and Wacziarg (2003), Koren and Tenreyro (2007), Hausmann et al. (2007) and 
UNCTAD (2009c), among others, have found that countries achieving high and 
sustained growth predominantly have diversified economies. Diversified economies 
also benefit from their larger domestic markets through the broadened business base, 
which may increase the competitiveness and productivity of the economy. 
Furthermore, economic diversification is favoured to gain from the economies of 
scale in the short run followed by stable growths in the long-run (Wagner and Deller, 
1998).  
 
Therefore, as a first step, this study investigates the direct effect of FDI on sector 
diversification. It then further explores the ways in which the level of labour and 
capital markets development in the host economy facilitates sector diversification. 
The central reasoning here is that these factors may facilitate the reallocation of 
factor inputs (i.e., capital and labour) across the domestic sectors. Finally, it 
examines whether multinational motives play a role in sector diversification given 
that production and investment decisions of multinationals may matter for sectoral 
shares. 
CHAPTER ONE 
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The thesis extends the model of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) to include FDI, and 
employs panel fixed effects methodology to estimate an unbalanced panel dataset of 
165 countries from 1970 to 2007. Four different datasets, obtained from the ILO 
(2009), the OECD (2009), and the UNIDO (2003a; 2009), facilitate analysis at the 1-
, 2-, 3- and 4-digits industry classifications, respectively, with the latter two covering 
particularly the manufacturing sector. The short-run, medium-run, and long-run 
effects have been examined with annual, five-year average, and cross-sectional 
datasets, respectively. 
 
The results are compared at different levels of disaggregated data across all sectors of 
the economy and within the manufacturing sector. They are also compared across 
country sub-samples of developing, developed, middle-income and low-income 
countries. The Gini coefficient is used as the baseline measure of diversification, and 
Herfindahl index as the alternative measure. They are constructed using the two 
different measures of sector size: employment and value added shares. 
 
This thesis contributes to the strand in the economics literature which studies the 
causes and consequences of sectoral diversification (see Imbs and Wacziarg (2003); 
Koren and Tenreyro (2007)). It also contributes to a recently growing body of work 
which interprets the diversification patterns in the economy as structural change, 
evolution of productivity, and capital and labour re-allocation across sectors (see 
McMillan and Rodrik, 2011). Our specific contribution is to investigate the role of 
multinationals in this process. Put differently, the implications related to injection of 
substantial levels of capital, importation of technology and management know-how, 
labour training, and the resulting changes in production patterns in the real economy 
CHAPTER ONE 
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all stimulated by multinationals are explored based on theoretical foundations drawn 
from a large literature.  
 
Meanwhile, the closest study to this thesis is that of Barry and Kearney (2006), who, 
by using portfolio theory and 26 years of Irish employment data (manufacturing), 
analyse the impact of FDI on diversification in Ireland, with the finding that FDI 
enhances diversification. As Barry and Kearney’s study is a country-based study, it is 
not clear whether their results can be generalised to other countries, as well as 
different levels of development, data disaggregation (i.e., other sectors), the role of 
value added (vs. employment), different time frames (i.e., short-, medium-, and long-
run), and so on. Thus, this thesis fills this huge gap. 
 
The thesis also recognises that perhaps the best data to explore the FDI-
diversification relationship is sectoral level data which trace the changing patterns of 
sectoral employment or output over time. However, sectoral FDI figures for a broad 
section of countries are extremely difficult to obtain, if not impossible. 
Consequently, this thesis follows the well-established study of Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003) by including FDI in a cross-country development-diversification model. 
 
FDI results from the decision of MNCs to move off-shore and invest in other 
countries. Accordingly, the next section highlights the background of this move by 
discussing the evolution of MNCs.  
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1.2. Evolution of MNCs 
The history of FDI goes back to the seventeenth century, with the establishment of 
the British East India and the Dutch East India companies in India. The technological 
change in transportation and communication pushed back the territorial boundaries 
of firms. The nineteenth century saw the invention of steam engines, the laying of 
undersea cables, and the development of railroads and telegraphs, all of which 
opened the borders between countries. This was marked as the age of travel and 
business. Lucrative offers were given to developed countries to invest in developing 
countries. Multinational organisations, such as the Singer sewing machine company, 
Siemens, the Ford Motors and General Motors, established trends to set up 
subsidiaries in other countries. 
 
In the twentieth century, the estimated value of foreign investment, including both 
portfolio and direct investments as a percentage of world output, was very high. With 
new forms of MNCs, FDI increased in the 1960s. However, sudden oil price shocks 
in the 1970s and 1980s caused volatility in FDI earnings (Cohen, 2007). The 
importance of FDI is one of the world’s stylised facts (Brakman and Garretsen, 
2008), though setting up business in a new cultural and legal environment remain a 
challenge for most multinationals. 
 
Aharoni and Ramamurti (2011) identified four generations of MNC evolution, which 
are summarised in Figure 1.1. They argued that MNCs develop in diverse countries, 
in various industries, from small firms to large firms. They further claimed that 
organisations become multinational at an early stage in their evolution process due to 
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global and political changes, including new technologies, changed perceptions of 
MNCs, and favourable government policies.  
 
During the first generation of the multinationals originated in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, MNCs mainly invested in the colonies of their home countries, 
basically FDI flowing from the developed countries (mainly US) into the developing 
countries. This stage mostly involved MNCs from developed countries expanding 
into developing countries (colonies), driven by the motives of obtaining natural 
resources and creating manufacturing industries. The majority of MNCs in this era 
were from the United States (US). 
 
The second generation of the multinationals was between 1950 to 1990, involving 
other developed countries investing outside their borders. At this time, Japan was 
regarded as one of the most powerful economies for overseas investment. Under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, these investments mostly went to the US 
and Europe. This era saw North-to-North investment flow—from developed 
countries to other developed countries. Japan’s outward investment shifted 
production to both developed and developing countries by considering the host 
countries’ competitive edge. For example, they moved their assembly plants to 
export markets (developed countries) and established factories for manufacturing 
components in their low-cost Asian neighbours (developing countries). 
 
Since then, developing countries began to hold a share in global FDI inflows, and, 
today, FDI makes a significant contribution to their economic growth. This marked 
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the third generation in the late 1980s, during which investment flows took place from 
north-to-south—from developed countries into developing countries. 
 
The fourth generation took off in the 1990s with increased economic liberalisation in 
developing countries, brought a new wave of South-to-South investment flows. 
These included countries such as China investing in natural resources in many 
African countries, and India establishing many of its services offshore, such as 
setting up call-centres in the Philippines and other Pacific Islands countries in order 
to take advantage of the different time zones. 
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x Oldest companies: Dutch East India Company 1608–1800, and British East India Company 1608–1858. 
x French, Portuguese and Spanish firms also invested in their colonies. 
x Major motivation: Natural resources, manufactured goods flowing in reverse direction. 
x Major force: Political power of home government. 
x 1900: Rokefeller’s Standard Oil ventured abroad for oil, followed by other US oil companies. 
x US manufacturing firms in search of markets: Singer Sewing Machines, Ford Motor Company. 
x Europe dominated, accounting for 93% of worldwide FDI stock, while the US had only 6%. 
x Industrial Revolution. 
x Two world wars and collapse of empires affected European MNCs. To prevent a third war, this led to the 
introduction of some integrating programmes, such as FDI, from outside the bloc—mainly from the US. 
x US internationalised firms to Western Europe. 
x 1949–1971: Economies of developed nations grew. 
x 1969: First systematic data gathering by UN on MNCs—33.9% from the US, 23.3% from the UK, and the 
rest from Western Europe. 
x UN (1973): 8/10 US-based MNCs. 
 
 
 
x 1950–1990: Japan’s competence in manufacturing labour- and capital-intensive products. Japan’s exports 
grew faster than its gross domestic product (GDP). 
x GATT negotiations: Japan’s access to markets in the US and Europe. 
x Favourable trade balance: Japan increased overseas’ investments. 
x 1985 Plaza Accord caused very strong yen: Japanese firms shifted production. Assembly plants moved to 
export markets (rich countries) and components factories established in low-cost Asian neighbours 
(developing countries). 
 
 
 
x 1989: FDI outflows from Japan reached a peak. 
x FDI grew at rates of 20–30% per annum, more than 4 times as fast as world gross national product. 
x US was no longer dominant source of FDI, but became FDI’s largest recipient, particularly with several 
large investments from Japan. 
x Late 1980s: Triad Phenomenon—third generation of MNCs. 
 
 
 
x 1990s: Economic liberalisation in developing countries. 
x New IT technologies introduced. 
x 1978: China’s economic liberalisation. Main MNCs from Chinese-based countries, such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan. 
x 1990s: After China’s agreement with World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 11 December 2001, Chinese 
firms invested overseas in search of raw materials or markets. 
x 2000: China’s investment included acquisitions in Europe and the US. 
x In 1990s: 
o Former Soviet empires disaggregated and adapted liberal economic policies after the Berlin Wall 
came down in November 1989; 
o Latin American countries privatised state-owned enterprises and de-regulated many industries into 
export-oriented free markets; 
o Ireland, Israel and India opened up economies for competition, foreign trade and inward FDI; 
o Developing countries from net importers of FDI begun investing abroad; 
o 75% of top MNCs from developing countries hailed from Asia; 
o Growing number of small to medium MNCs. In the 1970s, there were only large MNCs; however, 
in the 2000s, there were small to medium MNCs. 
 
Source: Aharoni and Ramamurti (2011) 
Figure 1.1: Four Generations of MNC Evolution 
Generation 1: ‘Colonial Power’ FDI: Product of Developed Countries 
North-to-North FDI Generation 2: ‘Japan: The Miracle Economy’ 
Generation 3: ‘Triad Phenomenon’ North-to-South FDI 
South-to-South FDI Generation 4: ‘Born Globals’ 
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1.3. Definition of FDI 
A country receives capital in various ways, including international debts, bank loans, 
bonds, portfolio investment and FDI. Among these, FDI is the most favoured for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it does not exhibit much of volatility and pro-cyclical 
patterns (Ozturk, 2007). Secondly, it is not affected by changes in foreign exchange, 
as are other capital inflows. Thirdly, and most importantly, FDI can benefit the host 
country both directly and indirectly, through generating employment; productivity 
enhancement; transfer of technological, managerial and organisational knowledge; 
and other productivity and efficiency spillovers to local businesses in various 
dimensions, inclusive of the economic and social aspects. 
 
In addition, Razin and Sadka’s (2007) analysis of the choice between FDI over 
portfolio investment revealed that FDI allows for more control and information rights 
over firms in the investing economy. Bearing this, foreign investors have a tendency 
opt for FDI, rather than portfolio investment. Billington (1999) even claimed that 
FDI is preferable to exports due to issues such as trade barriers and the transportation 
costs associated with trade. Instead of exporting goods, a subsidiary is established in 
the host country to cater for the market needs.  
 
It is important to understand precisely what the term ‘FDI’ means. In principle, FDI 
refers to a foreign entity either creating or expanding a subsidiary in another country. 
This does not only relate to the transfer of resources, but also to the transfer of 
ownership from the parent company to its subsidiary that allows some degree of 
control over the subsidiary. FDI involves the presence of the investing party in the 
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host country. This is the primary feature that differentiates FDI from other types of 
capital inflows.  
 
The formal definition of ‘FDI’ has been provided by two renowned international 
institutions. According to IMF’s (1993) Balance of Payments Manual, also known as 
BPM5, FDI is the ‘lasting interest of a direct investor in an enterprise outside his or 
her country and the investor owns at least 10 percent of equity and has an effective 
voice in the management of the enterprise’. Another closer definition of FDI in the 
OECD’s (1996) Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, also 
known as BD3, is, ‘a foreign investor either owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary 
shares or voting power of an enterprise, or owns less than 10 percent of the ordinary 
shares or voting power of an enterprise, but still holds an active voice in 
management’. Active voice through management contracts, franchise, lease and 
licensing and so on that permits the investor in decision-making of the enterprise.  
 
One of the highlights of the Survey of Implementation of Methodological Standards 
for Direct Investment (SIMSDI) report was that 90% of the 61 countries surveyed did 
not use the 10% ownership criteria as per the BPM5 definition (2001). Examples of 
these countries include Chile, Italy and Turkey, among others.  
 
This thesis uses the definition of FDI from the World Bank (2009) database, in which 
FDI is defined as ‘the net inflows [new investment inflows less disinvestment] to 
acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor’. This includes the 
sum of the following components: equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and long-
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run and short-run intra-company loans (between parent and affiliate enterprises). 
This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows minus disinvestment) in the 
reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by GDP (FDI/GDP). 
 
1.4. Facts and Figures about the Global FDI Inflows 
Figure 1.2 shows the global trend of FDI inflows ($US billions) from 1980 to 2010, 
while Figure 1.3 shows the same group of countries for FDI/GDP. These figures 
show that high-income (developed) countries are the highest recipients of FDI 
inflows. However, it also shows an increase in FDI inflows to low- and middle-
income (developing) countries. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s accelerated the world FDI inflows to reach their first peak in 
2000, and an all-time high in 2007. The fall of FDI inflows after 2007 was due to the 
global financial crisis. The 2008 financial crisis, compared to other crises, such as the 
1929 Wall Street crash, was worse due to its effect beyond the financial sector to the 
real economy. Tighter credit conditions weakened the capability of firms to invest in 
overseas projects, and heightened risk in business, which discouraged investor 
confidence in business expansion (UNCTAD, 2009a). According to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2009b), both FDI 
inflows of developed countries fell in 2008 by 29% to $962 billion.  
  
Developed countries were the worst affected by the recession in 2008, while the 
transitional and developing economies only began to feel its effect after one year. 
Further, while the manufacturing sector was the most affected by the crisis, primary 
and services sectors faced better FDI prospects (UNCTAD, 2009b).  
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FDI inflows rebounded in 2010 to reach $1.24 trillion, with a 5% increase 
(UNCTAD, 2012). While world output and trade bounced back to pre-crisis levels, 
FDI inflows remained 15% below the pre-crisis average and almost 37% below the 
2007 peak (ibid.). It was predicted by UNCTAD (2010) and reported in UNCTAD 
(2012) that despite the global economic uproar, FDI flows in 2011 surpassed the pre-
crisis average at $1.5 trillion but still is 23% under their 2007 peak. UNCTAD 
(2012) further predicts weaker FDI growth in 2012 reaching approximately $1.6 
trillion and their projections (conditional to no macroeconomic shocks) for 2013 and 
2014 are $1.8 trillion and $1.9 trillion respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Constructed from World Bank (2011) Database 
Figure 1.2: FDI Inflows, Global and by Groups of Economies, 1970–2010 (USD 
Billions) 
 
Source: Constructed from WDI (2011) Database 
Figure 1.3: FDI Inflows by Geographical Region, 1970–2007 (USD Billions) 
FDI Inflows, Global and by Groups of Economies, 1970–2010 
FDI Inflows by Geographical Region, 1970–2010  
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Figure 1.3 demonstrates that, while Europe and the Central Asian (ECA) region is 
the highest recipient of global FDI inflows, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains the 
lowest. The East Asian and Pacific (EAP) and North American (NA) regions follow 
the ECA region. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region also shows an 
increase in FDI levels in 2000. The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region 
tends to experience decline in FDI inflows, but gains stability in the early 2000s. On 
the other hand, as illustrated in Figure 1.4, within developing countries, relative to 
their GDPs, the EAP region is the highest recipient of FDI inflows, followed by the 
ECA and LAC regions. 
 
Source: Constructed from WDI (2011) Database 
Figure 1.4: FDI Inflows for Developing Countries by Region (FDI/GDP), 1970–2007 
 
1.5. This Thesis 
This thesis includes eight chapters. Chapter 1 sets the research background, 
highlights the three main research questions, and provides an overview of FDI and 
the entire thesis.  
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provide a thorough literature review. Chapter 2 identifies the 
pathways to inter-sectoral linkages via FDI. Specifically, the chapter presents the 
position of inter-sectoral linkages within the FDI literature, and provides some 
empirical insights. The consensus on FDI’s effects is pointed out at the micro-level, 
through vertical spillover effects, which are also known as backward and forward 
linkages. Backward linkages are more pronounced empirically than forward linkages. 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on diversification. It begins with the origins of 
diversification and goes on to discuss the theories of specialisation and 
diversification, and later, the resurgence of diversification in economics literature. 
Specialisation theory is founded on economies of scale through division of labour, 
while diversification rests on three arguments—portfolio argument, volatility and 
growth argument, and resource curse argument. This chapter also clarifies the 
dilemma on the practice of specialisation and/or diversification theories in real world 
application in economics, whereby diversification is viewed as the ‘long-run 
envelope of the region’s short-run efforts’ of specialisation (Wagner and Deller, 
1998: p.52). In other words, specialisation actually breeds diversification (Sykes, 
1950). 
  
Chapter 4 links together the FDI and sector diversification literatures, and explores 
more precisely how FDI influences sector diversification through the linkages effect 
in the host economy. Further, this chapter highlights the role of the facilitating 
channels—that is, the levels of labour and capital market development -- which 
stimulate factor reallocation across sectors. Finally, the most frequently mentioned 
four motives of FDI—natural resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking 
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and asset-seeking—are also used to relate to sector diversification as a result of FDI 
as a separate channel of influence. 
 
Chapter 5 seeks to answer the question: what is the direct effect of FDI on sector 
diversification? Given the econometric framework adopted, the key finding from this 
chapter is that evidence of sector diversification is found only in developing 
countries in the long run. This result is found to be robust at the ILO 1-digit 
aggregated data level, that is, once all sectors of the economy are considered. There 
is no evidence of the direct effect of FDI on sector diversification in developed 
countries, also confirmed by the OECD 2-digit data. The results from the 
manufacturing sector at UNIDO 3- and 4-digit data are mixed, leading to the overall 
conclusion that the direct impact is rather case-specific.  
 
These inclusive results, particularly from the manufacturing sector, resulted in the 
hypothesis that labour market regulations and financial development can influence 
on sector diversification through FDI. Accordingly, the next question in chapter 6 
explores the aforementioned channels and finds that developed countries diversify 
within the manufacturing sector through the channel of strong financial markets. On 
the other hand, developing countries diversify through the channel of less rigid 
labour market regulations at the ILO 1-digit aggregated data. Again, no significant 
result was obtained for the OECD 2-digit data. Within the manufacturing sectors, 
there was evidence of sector diversification through the channel of strong financial 
market development.   
 
CHAPTER ONE 
16 
 
Chapter 7 does not treat FDI as homogenous, but argues that specific motives of 
multinationals affect their production and investment decisions, which subsequently 
affect sectoral shares, hence diversification. Indeed, the findings from this chapter 
develop strong insights into the manufacturing sector. The key finding is that, within 
the manufacturing sector, developed countries diversify as a result of market-seeking 
FDI, whereas developed countries diversify as a result of efficiency-seeking FDI. 
However, market-seeking FDI affects the employment sectoral shares and the latter, 
value added shares. 
 
Finally, Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, provides a summary from chapter 2 to 7. 
It begins by revisiting the motivations for the research, and reviewing the underlying 
theories of FDI and sector diversification, which are then merged. It reviews the 
research approach and its relevance to the study, reviews the key findings, discusses 
the relationship of these findings to the theory, and makes concluding comments 
based on the analysis and interpretations of the results. Policy implications are also 
drawn from the findings of this study with recommendations to some future work in 
this area. 
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CHAPTER 2: FDI AND SECTORAL LINKAGES 
2.1.   Introduction 
It is conceivable that FDI can affect the host country’s sector diversification. The 
inter-industry linkages generated by FDI are likely to be the primary factor that 
underlies this relationship. However, before advancing further into the underlying 
theory of the FDI-diversification connection, it is important to understand the depth 
of the FDI’s impact on inter-industry linkages and the settings under which this 
effect materialises. 
 
The FDI-linkages literature falls under the broad subject matter of FDI’s impact on 
the host country. This chapter begins, first, with a discussion on the macro-level 
impacts on the host economy. However, the inter-sectoral linkages effect, the core of 
the FDI-diversification relationship, is likely to be embedded in the micro-level 
spillover effects on local firms. Therefore, the next discussion elaborates on the 
micro-level impacts that lead horizontal and vertical spillovers. The discussions 
provide theoretical and empirical insights into inter-sectoral linkages, and highlight 
the measures of linkages, determinants of linkages, benefits from linkages, and 
eventually, the formation of local industry development through linkages. 
 
2.2.   Macro-level Impacts 
Before discussing FDI’s micro-level impacts, it is worthwhile to briefly mention its 
much-explored macro-level effects on the host economy. Economic, political and 
social effects are three categories of the macro-level impacts of FDI identified by 
Moosa (2002). According to Moosa, the economic effects have implications for 
CHAPTER TWO 
18 
 
economic variables such as the host country’s output, balance of payments, 
employment, and international trade.  Further, the question of national sovereignty—
whether the host country is controlled by the host country’s prime minister or the 
chief executive officer of a giant multinational—is a part of the political effects 
discourse. An MNC enclave is an issue relating to social effects. In MNC enclave 
environments, training and employment can only be offered to highly educated locals 
and skilled workers. The higher positions in the MNCs are held by foreigners, which 
may put the locals at a disadvantage. Social effects, to some extent, include the 
cultural effects of MNCs on their local communities. Moosa (2002) has argued that 
wider cultural and social differences between FDI-investing and recipient countries 
determine the level of these social and cultural impacts. For example, Australian FDI 
in New Zealand will have a smaller social and cultural impact compared to 
Australian FDI in Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. 
 
Estrin and Meyer (2011) point out that theoretically the commonly believed positive 
economic effects of FDI are channelled through the above-mentioned 
macroeconomic variables: additional capital inflows, improved balance of payments, 
and reduced unemployment. However, at the same time, these economic aggregates 
can also experience some counter-effects, thereby leaving the net effects of FDI to be 
empirically unestablished. For instance, Estrin and Meyer (2011) argue that while 
FDI brings capital into the host economy, returns on this capital may be repatriated 
back to investor’s home country through profit remittance. In addition, in case of any 
disinvestments, the cost of the discontinued projects is likely to be borne by the host 
country. Furthermore, while FDI helps to create new job opportunities for locals 
(Dunning, 1993; Blomström et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998), crowding-out 
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effects (due to the superior technology of foreign firms) can have adverse effects on 
employment, especially for labour-intensive firms. From a management know-how 
point of view, it is also believed that supervisors from the home countries of foreign 
firms can better control the quality and output of their production in the host country 
(Lipsey, 2004). 
 
Another widely-explored macro-level impact of FDI is that on economic growth. 
Iamsiraroj (2009) found that while FDI generally has a positive relationship with 
economic growth, there are several studies showing negative or insignificant 
relationships. These mixed results regarding the FDI-growth relationship are 
potentially due to a number of reasons, including the heterogeneity of the countries 
and MNCs investigated (Cohen, 2007, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001), data and 
sample problems (Chakraborty and Basu, 2002; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004; Li 
and Liu, 2005; Asheghian, 2009), as well as the endogeneity between the two 
variables (Carkovic and Levine, 2005). 
 
In addition, in recent studies, it has been argued that the positive impact of FDI on 
economic growth depends on the absorptive capacity of the host country, which is 
represented at the human capital level (i.e., schooling), as well as the level of 
financial markets, trade openness, and so on (see Alfaro et al., 2004a). Further, it also 
depends on the form the FDI takes, such as the type of FDI, the sectors in question, 
the scale and duration of FDI, the location of businesses and other secondary effects 
(Gardiner, 2000). 
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Further, FDI is also argued to increase domestic investment (Khawar, 2005; Mody 
and Murshid, 2005), but this effect is also not empirically established, at least at the 
macro level (Durham, 2004). Many capital inflows might also have adverse effects 
on exchange rates, which could result in increased cost of international borrowing, 
again leading to crowding out of local businesses. 
 
From the above discussion, the macro-level impacts of FDI seem to be debatable. 
However, as will be discussed in the following section, the micro-level impacts, 
when evaluated at the inter-industry level, provide strong empirical evidence of 
positive effects from FDI via the inter-sectoral linkages channel, which is 
fundamental to the FDI-diversification relationship. 
 
2.3.   Micro-level Impacts 
The micro-level impacts of FDI are primarily the indirect benefits that spill over to 
local firms and industries. According to Görg and Strobl (2001), spillover effects are 
often augmented in local firms’ efficiency or productivity. Moosa (2002) states that 
these micro-levels effects take root via two channels: horizontal and vertical 
spillovers. Considering these micro-level impacts is crucial in order to be able to link 
FDI with sectoral diversification. 
 
Du et al. (2011) define horizontal spillovers (also known as intra-industry spillovers) 
as increase in the total productivity of domestic firms by foreign firms within the 
same sector, while vertical spillovers (also known as inter-industry spillovers) are 
defined as increase in total productivity of domestic firms by foreign firms in the 
upstream (backward linkage) or downstream sectors (forward linkages). Intra-
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industry spillover will be used interchangeably for horizontal spillover in this thesis, 
while inter-industry spillover will be used interchangeably for vertical spillover. 
 
As summarised by Alfaro et al. (2004b), the empirical evidence of FDI and spillovers 
has been revealed in three generations of papers. The first generation is comprised of 
primarily cross-sectional studies at the intra-industry level, and found little support 
for positive externalities on local firms in the same sector (Meyer and Sinani, 2009).  
 
The second generation of research, also at the intra-industry level, used panel 
datasets, correcting the issue of identification problems in cross-sectional studies. 
Because cross-sectional studies only capture the long-run effects and fail to control 
for time-invariant factors and sector-specific effects across sectors/firms, they 
resulted in biased estimates of the spillover coefficients. Overall, they provide 
evidence of mixed results. On average, horizontal spillover or intra-industry level 
effects on local firms were found to be insignificant, or in some cases negative, due 
to competition effects within the same industry. Görg and Greenaway (2004, p.190) 
highlight that the first and second generation researchers were looking in the ‘wrong 
place, with wrong lenses’.  
 
However, the third generation of papers, which considered the vertical spillovers—
the inter-industry effects on domestic firms—revealed empirical evidence of positive 
effects through the channel of ‘linkage effects’ (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). More 
theoretical and empirical discussions on horizontal and vertical spillover are 
presented in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 respectively. 
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2.3.1.   Horizontal Spillovers 
Horizontal spillovers occur through the knowledge and technology transfer from 
foreign firms to local firms and eventually helps to increase the productivity of the 
local firms within the same industry. MNCs transfer knowledge to local firms by 
providing managerial skills and labour training (de Mello, 1997; 1999). Technology 
transfer takes place either by demonstration effect, where domestic firms observe and 
learn from foreign firms, or by labour mobility, where labour with expertise from 
foreign firms moves to domestic firms (Caves, 1982; Helleiner, 1989; de Mello and 
Sinclair, 1995, Caves, 1996, Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
 
Spillover studies were pioneered by Caves (1974) in Australia, followed by other key 
papers by Globerman (1979) for Canada; Blomström and Persson (1983) for Mexico; 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) for Morocco; Sjöholm (1999) for Indonesia; Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) for Venezuela; Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for the Czech 
Republic, and Konings (2001) for Poland and Bulgaria.  
 
The earlier studies, for instance, those by Caves (1974), Globerman (1979) and 
Blomström and Persson (1983), claim spillovers to have positive effects on local 
firms. However, the latter studies, in particular, the most frequently cited studies by 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Haddad and Harrison (1993) reveal only limited 
evidence for horizontal spillover effects from FDI. For instance, while Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) found robust effects only for small enterprises (those with less than 
50 employees), Haddad and Harrison (1993) found partial positive spillovers for 
joint ventures.  
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Jindra et al. (2009) argue that the total spillover effects within the same industry 
depend on the capacity of local firms to absorb benefits from foreign firms, 
especially in terms of human capital and technological gaps. In addition, the level of 
ownership and motives for investment also play crucial roles in FDI’s spillover 
effects on local firms (Driffield and Love, 2007). 
 
Using a meta-analytic approach focusing on 21 studies, Görg and Strobl (2001) 
confirmed these mixed results. They found that, on average, cross-sectional studies 
reported higher coefficients for this effect than panel studies did. They explain that 
the over-statement of these coefficients may be due to the fact that cross-sectional 
studies do not account for time-invariant factors or sector-specific effects. They 
argue that these cross-sectional studies reveal that FDI results in higher productivity 
in the local sector, whereas the MNCs may be investing in a higher productivity 
sector that the cross-sectional studies fail to control for, thereby resulting in the over-
statement of these positive effects. 
 
An updated meta-analysis by Meyer and Sinani (2009) that included 66 empirical 
studies found that the majority of horizontal spillover are based on individual 
countries and largely at the firm-level, with only a few at the industry level. On 
average, horizontal spillover studies find statistically insignificant results, and in 
some cases negative effects, owing to market-stealing effects. The earlier cross-
sectional studies are exceptional cases of positive spillover effects, but these have 
been suggested to over-state their results. Hence, the empirical evidence of FDI’s 
spillover effects within the same industry is inconclusive. 
CHAPTER TWO 
24 
 
However, a new generation of research on inter-industry FDI-spillover effects, 
discussed in the following section, has brought new insights to FDI-spillover studies. 
Of these, Javorcik’s (2004) study is considered to be the most influential on the 
subject of vertical spillovers. Using a firm-level unbalanced annual dataset on the 
Lithuanian manufacturing sector, Javorcik finds a significant positive effect for 
vertical spillovers (backward linkages) and an insignificant effect for horizontal 
spillover from FDI.  
 
2.3.2.   Vertical Spillovers 
Vertical spillover is the inter-industry spillover, also referred to as backward and 
forward linkages in the FDI literature. The definition of linkages varies between 
studies. For example, Altenburg (2000) defines linkages as transactions between 
MNC subsidiaries and local stakeholders, including both business and non-business 
bodies. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2004) identified six exchange relations 
creating a linkage effect between FDI and local entities: supplier linkage, marketing 
linkage, research and development linkage, labour linkage, subcontracting linkage, 
and financial linkage. Moreover, Giroud and Scott-Kennel (2009) cluster these 
linkages into three main groups: ‘first, supply chain (vertical) linkages with either 
suppliers (backward or downstream) or customers/agents (forward or upstream); 
second, collaborative (relational or horizontal) linkages with other firms, such as 
alliances, partnerships (e.g., technology sharing, agreements, management contracts 
and co-production agreements) or competitors; and third, institutional linkages with 
governments, research institutes, industry organisation and universities’. 
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The FDI-linkages literature primarily focuses on backward and forward linkages, 
which are widely discussed in the literature of the disciplines of international 
business and economics. The concept of backward linkage was founded by the work 
of Hirschman (1958), but was formally conceptualised in theory by Rodríguez-Clare 
(1996). Extending the framework of backward linkage, forward linkage was 
modelled by the work of Markusen and Venables (1999). Forward linkage occurs 
when MNCs are suppliers of higher quality inputs at lower prices to local firms, 
whereas backward linkage occurs when foreign firms buy inputs from local firms. 
According to Lipsey (2004), both backward and forward linkages assist in the 
development of local industries. An example of backward linkage is a foreign 
investor from Japan investing in a garment manufacturing firm in Bangladesh and 
buying raw cotton from local Bangladeshi firms. An example of forward linkage is a 
local firm in Scotland buying timber from a Chinese firm to manufacture furniture in 
Scotland. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Rodríguez-Clare (1996) was the first to formally conceptualise 
linkages and introduce a formal theory in the FDI literature. She argues that without 
a formal concept of linkages, it is difficult to know what it actually meant. With a 
two-country model, her study finds that the strength of linkages is subject to three 
conditions: i) intensive use of intermediate goods for the goods produced by the 
multinationals, ii) in case of high communication costs between the home and host 
country, and iii) production of similar variety of intermediate goods by the home and 
host countries. Matouschek and Venables (2005) have confirmed the theoretical 
underlying factors highlighted by Rodríguez-Clare (1996) using simulation analysis 
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on 10 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development financed projects. They 
emphasise that these linkages have higher welfare gains. They explain that:  
… “investment projects interact with other industries in the host economy, 
either by inputs locally or by selling their own product to local downstream 
firms; they can create sectoral-linkages. The expansion of upstream and 
downstream industries feedbacks to the project’s own industry, leading to a 
further expansion of local industry” (p. 573). 
 
Linkages can deepen through the feedback effects resulting from FDI. Kippenberg’s 
(2005) study on sectoral linkages of FDI firms in the Czech Republic demonstrated 
that FDI, through the channel of linkages and feedback effects, transforms the 
industrial structure of the host economy, resulting in a strong impact on the sectoral 
composition of the local economy. Using 2-digit level of data disaggregation, he did 
not find any evidence of a significant effect of FDI. However, when broken down by 
sector, it showed that FDI in the labour-intensive sectors was significant, due to the 
Czech Republic’s endowment of skilled labour and established manufacturing 
industry. Capital-intensive sectors, on the other hand, were affected by trade. He 
concluded that the less possibility to substitute the foreign goods with local goods, 
the larger is the positive initial production effects. Hence, Kippenberg claimed that 
‘domestic firms, whose emergence is kick-started by FDI, may themselves generate 
feedback effects’ (p. 253). His finding also highlights the importance of the level of 
data disaggregation in studying the impact of FDI on the outcomes of interest. 
 
All these studies illustrate that FDI linkages have a concrete theoretical foundation. 
A natural question to ask is how to measure linkages. Not surprisingly, the literature 
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has developed several linkage measures predicated on its theory. While the measures 
of linkages do not contribute much to the main arguments in this thesis, it is still 
useful to mention a few widely-used measures in the next section to give the reader 
an idea of what variables are considered to capture linkages as an index. 
 
2.4.   Linkages Measures 
There are a number of linkages measures used in the literature. The standard measure 
of horizontal spillovers is basically an index that captures the fraction of the total 
output produced by all foreign firms for given industry and year. This measure was 
used in the initial spillover studies, which mainly captured the intra-industry effects, 
including Javorcik’s (2004) study on inter-industry spillover. While this measure was 
designed to capture output, other measures are constructed on employment shares 
(see Haskel et al., 2009) or capital shares (see Djankov and Hoekman, 2000). Görg 
and Strobl (2001) claim that spillover estimates are likely to be lesser for capital 
shares relative to employment and output shares. 
 
In the vertical spillovers studies, the first linkage measure, named the ‘linkage 
coefficient’, was introduced by Rodriguez-Clare (1996). The linkage coefficient is 
the ratio of employment generated in upstream industries to the direct labour hired by 
the firm. A higher linkage coefficient of an MNC relative to a local firm indicates 
that the MNC has a positive linkage effect. Other measures include that of: (i)  
Alfaro et al. (2004b) using the ratio of inputs bought by local firms to total labour 
hired by the firm; (ii) Javorcik’s (2004) input-output (I-O) coefficient of the 
multinationals’ host country, which has become one of the standard and widely-used 
measures of linkages and is calculated as the proportion of output supplied by 
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domestic firms to foreign firms; (iii) Barrios’ et al. (2011) I-O coefficient for the 
home country of the multinational. There are other various linkage measures 
highlighted in the literature whose effectiveness is highly disputable empirically. 
However, the I-O table based on the host country is the most widely used measure to 
calculate vertical linkages.  
 
Using some of the above-mentioned measures of linkages, empirical studies have 
been carried out, and the results are discussed in the following section that explicitly 
explains the formation of linkages and teases out the factors that influence them. 
 
2.5.   Formation of Linkages 
There are fewer vertical spillover studies than horizontal spillover studies because 
the former require complex datasets to analyse the inter-industry effects and such 
datasets are not easily available (Estrin and Meyer, 2011). Only a handful of studies 
did not find evidence of positive vertical spillover effects on local firms. For 
example, Stewart (1976) found that domestic firms have higher backward and 
forward linkages than foreign firms. He argued this may be due to the fact that the 
fiscal incentives designed to attract foreign firms discourage linkage effects (tax 
exemptions on profits derived from exports), or the industries in which FDI takes 
place do not establish linkages with local firms. 
 
However, in general, vertical spillover studies have found positive effects on the 
productivity of local firms (Havranek and Irsova, 2011). Lall’s (1980) study based on 
two truck manufacturing firms in India, Ashok Leyland (AL) and the Tata 
Engineering & Locomotive Company (TELCO), was one of the first case studies on 
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linkages. Out of 36 suppliers interviewed, 14 supplied only to AL, 10 supplied only 
to TELCO and 12 to both AL and TELCO and the remaining automotive companies, 
This study revealed a dense network of foreign affiliates with local suppliers in a 
developing country like India.  
 
In addition, World Bank’s (2003) study on Latvia revealed that on average, 47% of 
intermediate inputs were sourced from local Latvian suppliers by foreign firms. 
Congruent with these findings, Javorcik’s (2004) study on Lithuania found that a one 
standard deviation increase in FDI in sourcing sector increased the output of each 
Lithuanian firm in supplying sector by 15%. She also highlighted evidence of 
negative forward linkage, probably due to the limited ability of local firms to use the 
highly technological content of inputs from foreign firms. Other factors involved 
could be the higher cost of inputs from foreign firms compared to those from local 
firms or a lack of familiarity on the part of local firms with the foreign suppliers and 
their products.  
 
One of the first cross-country studies on linkages is that of Bitzer et al. (2008), who 
compared 17 OECD countries with CEEC countries using industry-level data, 
considering both horizontal and vertical linkages. While they found strong evidence 
of backward linkages for all OECD countries, this effect was much higher for CEEC 
countries. They argue that the results differ between the OECD and CEEC countries 
due to heterogeneity within these groups of economies. An increase in FDI stock in 
supplying sectors by 10% increases the productivity for OECD countries by 
approximately 0.25%. This study did not find any evidence of forward linkages for 
either the CEEC or the OECD country groups. This may be due to local firms not 
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being able to completely use higher-quality inputs manufactured by the 
multinationals. This finding is in line with those of Javorcik (2004), where vertical 
linkages benefitted transition economies than industrialised countries and forward 
linkages was not found to have a significant contribution.  
 
Other studies confirming positive vertical spillover effects are those of Brown (1998) 
on Singapore; Altomonte and Resmini (2001) for Poland; Schoors and Tol (2002) for 
Hungary; Harris and Robinson (2004) for UK; Scott-Kennel (2007) for New 
Zealand; Giroud (2007) for Malaysia and Vietnam; Reganati and Sica (2007) for 
Italy; Blalock and Gertler (2008) and  Suyanto et al. (2012) for Indonesia; Girma et 
al. (2008) for UK; Iguchi (2008) for Malaysia and Crespo et al. (2009) for Portugal. 
 
Using a meta-analytic approach involving 47 countries, Havranek and Irsova (2011) 
bring together the empirical studies to draw conclusions beyond the individual 
country specific studies and substantiate the robust evidence of vertical spillover 
effects from FDI. Their study is theoretically founded on the predictions of 
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and benchmarked on the empirical findings of Javorcik 
(2004). They conclude that 90% of the estimates of vertical spillovers come from 
firm-level panel data studies. In addition, positive spillover effects are robust in 
supplier sectors (backward linkages), small in customer sectors (forward linkages), 
and non-existent within the same sector (horizontal spillovers). They found that a 
10% point increase in FDI increases the productivity of domestic supplier sectors by 
approximately 9%. 
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From the above discussion it can be inferred that a consensus has been reached 
regarding the positive effects of vertical spillover of FDI on local firms’ productivity, 
both theoretically and empirically. This consensus of positive inter-industry studies is 
consistent with Kugler (2006) that horizontal spillover studies viewed foreign firms 
as competitors to local firms because they operate within the same sector. This is 
referred to as the ‘competition effect’, and could be the reason for foreign firms not 
being willing to share their business knowledge and technology with local firms 
within the same industry. In contrast, he argues that in the inter-industry studies, 
foreign firms have a supplier/customer relationship with local firms. This 
relationship is called the ‘linkage effect’, where foreign firms are willing to share 
their business technology and know-how with their local suppliers of inputs and 
customers. He further claims that FDI substitutes domestic investment through intra-
industry competition effects within a sector, but complements it across sectors 
through the inter-industry backward and forward linkage effect. 
 
2.6.   Determinants and Benefits of Linkages 
A discussion on the determinants of linkages is useful to allow an understanding of 
the factors that significantly influence sectoral linkages as a result of FDI. Because it 
is believed that sectoral linkages result in sector diversification, it can also be 
inferred that the factors that influence sectoral linkages, at least to some extent, may 
also influence sector diversification. Since the literature on sectoral linkages finds 
significant positive spillover effects only with backward linkages, and very little 
evidence for forward linkages, the discussion of determinants is limited to backward 
linkages in this thesis. 
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According to UNCTAD (2001b), these determinants include, but are not limited to, 
local sourcing of inputs; the investment motives and strategies of MNCs; the 
technology, market positions and degree of autonomy of MNCs; the age and size of 
foreign firms; the mode of establishment; nature of the industry in which the foreign 
investment takes place and preferential trade agreements. The main arguments for 
each of these determinants will be discussed with reinforcing empirical evidence, 
where it is available. 
 
To begin with, Rodriguez-Clare (1996) concludes that the intensive use of inputs 
sourced locally by foreign firms strengthens linkages. Local sourcing of inputs for 
MNCs is subject to a number of factors including quality, cost, and the 
trustworthiness and flexibility of local suppliers comparative to that of international 
suppliers (UNCTAD, 2001b). Second, local market-oriented MNCs create greater 
inter-sectoral relationships with domestic firms compared to export-oriented firms 
(Altenburg, 2000) because the input requirements, especially in terms of quality, are 
not as stringent for firms serving the local market. Linkages depend on many factors, 
including the factor endowments of a specific country.  
 
Third, the use of technology by firms and their market positions also determines their 
linkages with local suppliers (UNCTAD, 2001b). A multinational producing 
standardised products may import their inputs, whereas MNCs that produce 
specialised products using advanced technology produce their inputs in-house 
(UNCTAD, 2001b). In addition, greater autonomy allows greater linkages with local 
suppliers. 
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Fourth, local purchases of inputs increase with the age of the MNC (McAleese and 
McDonald, 1978). Andersson and Forsgren (1996) also claim that ‘degree of 
embeddedness’ of foreign firms in the local economy is a function of time. Görg and 
Ruane’s (2000) study confirmed this factor empirically using data from Ireland’s 
electronics industry for which they found that initially the indigenous Irish firms 
sourced locally more than the foreign firms, but over time as they become more 
familiar with the local environment and suppliers, linkages increase. Similarly, 
Blomström and Kokko (1997) found that at the country level, European MNCs 
purchase locally more than US or Japanese MNCs, perhaps because they are more 
mature and have already established their supplier networks.  
 
In addition, it has also been argued that the size of MNCs affects the strength of 
linkages in the host countries. For example, again considering Görg and Ruane’s 
(2000) study on Ireland, it was found that large multinationals created fewer linkages 
with local firms, probably because local suppliers were not able to meet the quantity 
and quality requirements of large MNCs. 
 
Fifth, UNCTAD (2000, 2001b) reported that different types of FDI projects have 
different effects on sectoral linkages. Greenfield projects are less likely to source 
locally than mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures (Toth and Semjen, 1999; 
World Bank, 2003; Javorcik, 2004) because the former require time and effort to 
develop contacts with local suppliers, whereas the latter have ready-made supplier 
contacts in those of the partnership/acquired firm. 
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Sixth, sectoral linkage potential also varies by industry (UNCTAD, 2001b). For 
example, primary industry has limited local industry linkages; manufacturing 
industry offers a broader range of linkages, while the service industry has the 
potential to be a linkage industry (UNCTAD, 2001b). Suyanto et al. (2012) on the 
other hand, differentiated the FDI spillover effects between a labour-intensive 
industry (garment manufacturing) and capital-intensive industry (electronic 
manufacturing) using the 4-digit disaggregated firm-level data from Indonesia. They 
found that the garment industry contributed positively to backward linkages, whereas 
the electronics industry had a negative effect, which they explained by suggesting 
that the electronics industry may be sourcing its inputs mainly from overseas.  
 
Last but not least, preferential trade agreements of host countries impact the sourcing 
patterns of foreign affiliates (Javorcik et al., 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007). For 
example, Javorcik and Spatareanu’s (2005b) study on Romania provides evidence 
that the signed Association Agreement between Romania and the European Union 
(EU) offered American multinationals the benefit of sourcing inputs locally due to 
lower tariffs, rather than purchasing from the US or Canada.  
 
Overall, using a meta-analytic approach, Havranek and Irsova’s (2011) study 
concludes that greater vertical spillover effect is experienced in countries with: 
under-developed financial systems and open to international trade; wide home-host 
country distance where foreign firms’ technology slightly outweighs to that of local 
firms; joint venture affiliates and in the manufacturing sector. 
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Linkages offer benefits to foreign affiliates, domestic suppliers, and the economy as 
a whole (UNCTAD, 2001a). Foreign affiliates can reduce their cost of production 
from local procurement in the host countries, gain from technologically advanced 
suppliers. Domestic suppliers gain through an increase in their output and 
employment through exchange of knowledge and skills between the linked firms 
(Blomström and Kokko, 1997, UNCTAD, 2001b). For the host economy as a whole, 
Lall (1980, p.204) argues that ‘such linkages are essential to the functioning of any 
normal industrial market, and that they can stimulate the development of linked 
activities and industrial diversification [particularly] in LDCs [Less Developed 
Countries]’. In a nutshell, Markusen and Venables (1999, p.335) claim this industrial 
diversification from FDI as ‘catalyst for industrial development’. The importance of 
diversification is presented in the next chapter. 
 
2.7.   Chapter Summary 
The macro-level impacts of FDI on the host economy remain to be established. At 
the micro-level, the impact of FDI is often augmented in the productivity of local 
firms. On average, horizontal (intra-industry) spillovers do not have a significant 
impact, or may even have negative impact, on the productivity of local firms. On the 
contrary, there is robust empirical evidence supporting a positive impact of vertical 
(inter-industry) spillovers on local firms. This inter-industry spillover, through the 
channel of linkages, contributes significantly to the productivity of local firms, which 
eventually contributes to the development of local sectors of the host economy. 
These FDI-dependent linkages channels are also likely to result in sector 
diversification; however, this remains to be empirically explored. The next chapter 
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presents the literature on sector diversification and aims to highlight its importance 
with some empirical evidence. 
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CHAPTER 3: DIVERSIFICATION  
3.1.   Introduction 
This chapter discusses the underlying theories of diversification, beginning with the 
definition of the concept of diversification and a discussion of its origins in the 
economics literature. The chapter also discusses diversification’s counter theory—
specialisation—and argues that diversification and specialisation are equally 
important for a country’s economic development. In addition, the chapter emphasises 
that diversification and specialisation do not occur in the absence of each other. In 
fact, the diversification literature argues that specialisation actually breeds 
diversification. On the contrary, some prominent studies, such as those of Imbs and 
Wacziarg (2003), Klinger and Lederman (2004) and Koren and Tenreyro (2007), 
reveal that after certain point of diversification, a country begins to experience 
sectoral specialisation. 
 
3.2.   Definition 
There are various definitions and interpretations of the concept of diversification. In 
the economics literature, ‘diversification’ refers to engagement of a given economic 
unit in different economic activities (predominantly production), rather than 
specialising in a few (Hare, 2011). The activities may be used in reference to entities 
at various disaggregation levels, including firms, industries and countries. There are 
two ways in which sector diversification can take place in an economy. The first is 
when a new sector is introduced in the economy—that is, through discovery of a new 
sector (Klinger and Lederman, 2004). The second is when production takes place 
more evenly across a given set of sectors (Berthelemy and Chauvin, 2000). 
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3.3.   The Origins of Diversification 
A discussion of the historical development of the term ‘diversification’ would 
provide a snapshot of how the concept has developed over time and where it is 
currently positioned in the economics literature. Hammouda et al. (2006) provide an 
overview of the historical development of the concept, mentioning that the term 
originated in the eighteenth century. Diversification during this time was defined in 
context of geographical diversification of industries in cities.   
 
Initial work on diversification was carried out by McLaughlin (1930) during the 
global crisis in the 1930s. He found that cities with concentrated industries were 
highly affected by the inter-war crisis. During this time, the debate about the falling 
prices of Latin American countries’ raw materials such as coffee became a particular 
concern and many of these countries began to experience a major crisis as a result of 
the price falls.  
 
Singer (1950) and Prebisch (1950) suggest that due to the decline in terms of trade in 
primary goods, developing countries should make effort to diversify their economies; 
that is, instead of being overly dependent on their primary sector, they should 
develop their own manufacturing industries1. They justify their suggestion by the 
observation that the increase in income increases the demand for manufactured goods 
more than the demand for primary goods.  
 
                                                 
1 Also referred to as the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis, this thesis was developed independently by 
economists Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). 
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In the late 1930s, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
intervened to improve the situation in Latin America and originated the idea of 
import-substitution strategies, which became the dominant paradigm of growth and 
development in Latin American countries. Import-substitution strategies were 
instigated in many developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s to protect ‘infant’ 
industries, which can foster diversification of their industrial base. The motive was to 
eliminate poverty in low-income economies, which were mainly supported by 
agricultural and mineral industries. 
 
According to Hammouda et al. (2006), another crisis towards the end of the 1970s, as 
well as the failure of import-substitution strategies, put diversification to question. 
Import-substitution strategies failed not because they engaged in new industries, but 
because the nurturing of these industries required extensive capital and expertise that 
domestic economies began to lack due of the absence of international trade (Bruton, 
1998; Grabowski, 1994). The discouraged learning environment due to absence of 
international trade brought about by import-substitution strategies was largely 
responsible for the strategies’ failure (ibid.). Further, Grabowski (1994) argues that 
small economies were most affected by this restrictive learning environment. 
 
Though the practice of diversification became cynical in this period, its resurgence in 
recent literature has highlighted its advantages, drawing out the lessons from 
successful diversification experiences of policies implemented three decades ago in 
country sub-regions (Hammouda et al., 2006). 
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Specialisation theory runs counter to the theory of diversification, but scholars note 
that both specialisation and diversification are needed for a country’s economic 
growth. Interestingly, many scholars suggest that specialisation generates 
diversification. The following section provides insights into this discourse. 
 
3.4.   Specialisation Breeds Diversification 
As mentioned, it is believed that specialisation and diversification do not occur 
independently of each other (Wagner and Deller, 1998). Ricardo (1817) and 
Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933) and Samuelson (1948) implanted specialisation 
theories in the economic literature. According to Smith’s (1776) articulation on 
division of labour in Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model of international 
trade, country specialisation gained widespread acceptance due to its low production 
costs for large quantities of output. Ricardo states that countries should specialise to 
heighten their economic well-being through comparative advantage on their 
production instead to diversify. Conversely, Ohlin’s (1933) theory concerns resource 
endowment. He claimed that countries should specialise in products for which they 
possess resource endowment to give them a competitive edge over others. The 
objective of specialisation is to achieve economies of scale, create higher 
productivity, and engage in trade gains.  
 
As previously noted, the paradigm of specialisation is contrary to the theory of 
diversification. By definition, ‘specialisation’ is the production and export of a 
limited range of goods to which the country holds a comparative advantage. Parallel 
to diversification, specialisation occurs at various levels, including at company, 
regional and country levels: company-level specialisation takes place through 
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division of labour and gain from economies of scale; regional-level specialisation 
occurs when certain areas of a country are known for producing a certain kind of 
product; and country-level or international specialisation occurs when a country 
bestowed with a competitive advantage produces large quantities of output at a lower 
cost than others—for example, tea in Sri Lanka, garment manufacturing in 
Bangladesh and electronics in Japan. In this case, the main industry attracts its 
subsidiary industries, which subsequently begins producing goods and services. 
 
Sykes (1950) and Diamond and Simon (1990) argue that specialisation generates 
diversification after a certain point. Sykes (1950) suggests that this occurs in the 
following three ways: (1) by attracting industries subsidiary to the main industry that 
later make products for other industries; (2) by employing the growing working 
population that the main industry is not able to absorb; and (3) by creating demands 
for industrial and social services. 
 
Consistent with the standard trade theory, sector specialisation gained more 
prominence than sector diversification in the economics literature. This was mostly 
due to the lower cost of production through economies of scale. However, the new 
trade theory is driven by diversification of goods. Krugman’s (1979) rationalisation 
of trade between similar countries is based on two key assumptions. The first 
assumption is that consumers love variety, i.e., prefer a diverse range to choose from 
and, second, that production favours economies of scale. A simple product example 
of these assumptions is a consumer’s preference for a computer—having the choice 
between a desktop computer, netbook or laptop, each of which is produced in large 
quantities via economies of scale. 
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Diversification also arises from Engel effects (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003). Engel 
effects are changes in consumer demand resulting from an increase in their income. 
As income increases, consumer demand increases for a variety of the existing goods 
available. To import this variety from international markets, high trading and 
transportation costs are involved. Therefore, the implication is the diversity of goods 
locally, especially in closed economies. 
  
In summary, conventional trade theory supports specialisation whereas new trade 
theory emphasises the need for diversification. Specialisation brings about increasing 
returns to scale, while diversification minimises the impact of risk associated with a 
particular sector. Wagner and Deller (1998, p.542) view diversification as a ‘long-
run envelope of the region’s short-run efforts’. ‘Short-run efforts’ are the growth 
achieved through specialisation’s comparative advantage theory. Their findings are 
in agreement with Malizia and Ke’s (1993), who confirm that diversification is not 
the non-existence of specialisation but, rather, occurrence of multiple specialisations. 
 
3.5.   Importance of Diversification 
Three main factors highlight the importance of diversification. The first is the 
portfolio argument, which advocates the need for alternative sectors to minimise 
idiosyncratic risk on economic sectors. The second is the volatility and growth 
argument, which explains the need for diversified economies to reduce volatility in 
economic growth. Finally, the resource curse argument explicitly argues that 
economic diversification occur in countries with rich natural resources, particularly 
the oil-producing countries, because high earnings from oil do not make these 
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countries feel the need to expand into any other sectors, especially into 
manufacturing, which can be a source of employment for many people.  
 
3.5.1.   Portfolio Argument 
The importance of diversification in economic literature is borrowed from the 
portfolio arguments of Markowitz (1959) and Sharpe (1970). They claim that a 
diversified portfolio is less vulnerable to idiosyncratic risks, which is specific to a 
firm, sector, market, or country and can be minimised through diversification. To 
reduce this risk, investors invest in a diversified portfolio consisting of different asset 
types so that any market event does not have same impact all at once. 
 
In a similar vein, every economic activity carries some level of risk, with no sector-
specific insurance available to recover the cost of damage. To reduce sector-specific 
risks, a country is encouraged to diversify its economic activities through economic 
diversification. Every country at some point undergoes a crisis that affects a 
particular sector more than another. For example, a natural disaster can influence the 
agriculture sector significantly, while a financial or economic crisis can affect the 
manufacturing or services sectors heavily.  
 
If a country has diversified sectors and a crisis has hit a particular sector, for 
instance, that country can still sustain its growth by falling back on other sectors such 
as agriculture and services. Therefore, it is important for a country to diversify its 
economic sectors rather than to have only a few concentrated sectors (Mayer, 1996). 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997, p.745) argue that diversification does not completely 
protect against a loss but reduces its impact by diversifying the risk involved. 
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However, they warn that over-diversification can also be problematic because it 
begins to yield diminishing returns. There is a maximum extent of diversification, 
known as ‘optimal diversification’. 
 
3.5.2.   Volatility and Growth Argument 
It is argued that diversification helps to stabilise the growth patterns of a country. 
Lucas (1988) reports that developed countries tend to have very stable growth over 
long periods whereas developing countries experience difficult periods along their 
developmental path. He explains that, in the early stages of development, a country 
has less capital and therefore has limited sector development. This is the reason why 
low-income countries encounter greater volatility in their growth rates. Conversely, 
economies with large capital stock have more savings from which they can open 
more sectors, resulting in a diversified number of sectors.  
 
In line with Lucas’ (1988) study, Koren and Tenreyro (2007) have also found that 
low-income countries specialise in fewer and highly volatile sectors. With the 
development of a country, its production structure moves to less volatile sectors. 
Further, poor countries experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks. 
With development, country-specific macroeconomic shocks are less volatile.  
 
The received literature, also supported by the empirical work of Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003), Hausmann et al. (2007) and UNCTAD (2009c), has found that countries 
achieving high and sustained growth predominantly have diversified economies and 
are endowed with good economic governance and most, though not all have large 
and dynamic manufacturing sectors. The manufacturing sector is considered 
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important for jobs and output and, as noted in Chapter 2, it creates greater linkages 
with others sectors of the economy, hence resulting in sector diversification. 
 
The growth and volatility argument also holds for a country’s exports. Export 
diversification stabilises the exports of a country. Prices of goods suffer volatile 
market prices and unsteady exports earnings. Unstable exports are often a sign of a 
high-risk economy, which discourages investments by risk-averse firms. 
Consequently, macroeconomic stability is shaken, which adversely affects the long-
term economic growth of the economy. 
 
A number of studies have been carried out to explore the relationship shared by 
export diversification and economic growth. For instance, Al-Marhubi (2000), 
Agosin (2007) and Lederman and Maloney (2009) analyse the issue at a cross-
country level. Gutierrez de Pineres and Ferrantino’s (1997) and Herzer and Nowak-
Lehmann’s (2006) works on Chile have found a positive relationship between export 
diversification and economic growth. There is also evidence of structural change in 
economies due to export diversification. For instance, Hesse (2008) found that 
Malaysia and Thailand transformed from countries with resource-based sectors to 
those with higher value added sectors. The export diversification literature is huge in 
itself and because this thesis is based on the production diversification, therefore, 
export diversification studies are considered to be beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
3.5.3.   Resource Curse Argument 
One of the processes of sector diversification is the shift in the structure of the 
economy from primary-resource-based industries to either manufacturing or 
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services-based industries. It is argued that resource-rich economies have difficulty in 
economic diversification (Gelb, 2010). Such countries are said to suffer from a 
‘resource curse’. Lerderman and Nabli (2009) explain that when natural resources 
are a significant share of GDP, this results in a negative correlation with the growth 
of other sectors of the economy. The Arab countries are an example of economies 
with a resource curse. Oil earns Arab countries a lucrative return in terms of its 
revenues. For instance, of the 22 member countries of the League of Arab States, 11 
are oil exporters, who on average contribute 50% to their respective country’s GDP 
and 80% to government revenues (IMF, 2009).  
 
Salti’s (2009) study also finds evidence of similar statistics from the oil industry, 
where oil constituted almost 86% of the total government revenue in 2006. Due to 
the huge return from oil, the oil producing/exporting countries neglect to improve 
their infrastructure and become more dependent on extractive industries over time 
(Elbadawi, 2009). The significant profits from oil exports overshadow the 
development and growth of other economic sectors, particularly the manufacturing 
sectors. Thus, diversification does not take place in any other sectors of the economy, 
leaving such economies with stagnant GDPs over years. A sudden price change of a 
natural resource like oil in the market results in higher volatility in the country’s 
economic growth. Though exports of these resources obtain significant returns, they 
tend to provide fewer employment opportunities to locals than secondary industries 
like manufacturing. 
 
Gelb (2010) highlights Korea, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and 
Mexico as examples of transformed economies (from primary-based sectors to 
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industrial-based sectors) and above all, China is mentioned as the most prominent as 
a result of the upgrade of their export mix through the rapid growth of South–South 
trade. Less diversified economies run a history of growth instabilities. However, 
Gelb (2010) argues that some countries are even successful in diversifying within 
primary-based industries such as horticulture and floriculture, as these include to 
some extent some value added chains.  
 
Zhang (2003) argues that on an aggregate level, economic diversification in its 
simplest form is measured as either the share of manufacturing in GDP or the share 
of manufacturing goods in merchandise exports. Zhang stresses that primary-based 
economies suffer low economic diversification and a high level of vulnerability. The 
logic behind such intuition is the world price fluctuations of primary commodities, 
exposure to shocks and the capacity of the economy to recover from these shocks 
(Guillaumont, 1999). In addition, Romer (1986) argues that manufacturing has 
greater scope for economies of scale and external economies; however, the key factor 
is that manufacturing industries involve the use of intermediate goods that add value 
to the final good (Romer, 1990). Further, Pezzy (1992) claims that depletion of 
mineral resources could be an added factor for the instability in the market. 
 
In summary, manufacturing and services-dominated economies are likely to be more 
diversified relative to the primary-resource-based economies for the above-
mentioned reasons. 
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3.6.   Measures of Diversification 
While the benefits of sector diversification have been thoroughly highlighted, it is 
crucial to also mention its measures. Hammouda et al. (2009) mention a number of 
measures of diversification. According to them, concentration ratios like the Ogive, 
entropy, Hirschman and aggregate specialisation indices are commonly used as 
measures of diversification. Other diversification measures commonly used in the 
export diversification literature include the cumulative export function, traditionality 
index, and absolute deviation of the country commodity share. They argue that the 
choice of measure depends on the definition of diversification. 
 
In their study, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) use the Gini coefficient as their baseline 
measure and the Herfindahl index, coefficient of variation of sector shares, 
maximum-minimum spread, log-variance of sector shares, share of the biggest sector 
in employment, mean-median spread and interquartile range as alternative measures 
to check their results for robustness. They argue that one of the most common 
measures of sectoral and regionals concentration is Gini coefficient in the economic 
geography literature. Following their study, this thesis also uses the Gini coefficient 
as the baseline measure, and the Herfindahl index as an alternative measure of 
concentration. 
 
Of the two mostly used measure of diversification, the Gini coefficient is derived 
from the Lorenz curve. Gini coefficient is typically used to demonstrate the income 
distribution. Krugman’s (1991) work on “locational ginis" has set the trend of using 
Gini coefficient as a standard measure of industry concentration in the economic 
geography literature. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where, 0 indicate total 
CHAPTER THREE 
49 
 
equality and 1 indicate total inequality in the distribution. Lower Gini coefficients 
indicate diversification. The Gini coefficient measure captures the degree of 
heterogeneity of countries across the regions and structural gap of industries for a 
region from the average of industrial base of the other regions (Beine and Coulombe, 
2004). Therefore, Gini coefficient is mostly used in the space unit. 
 
On the other hand, Herfindahl index, also known as the Hirschman index, is mostly 
used in industrial organisation context such as measuring the firm size in relation to 
the overall industry and indicating competition level among them. The Herfindahl 
index, similar to Gini coefficient, represents total equality at 0 and total inequality at 
1 in the distribution. One of the highlighted differences between Gini and Herfindahl 
measures is that while Gini coefficient places relatively more weight on small firms, 
the Herfindahl index puts major weight on larger firms (Haaland et al., 1988; 
Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000). This could be one of the possible reasons for them to 
generate different results.  
 
While much has been discussed about sector diversification theoretically, it is useful 
to highlight the extent to which it has been explored empirically, especially with 
regard to the factors that significantly influence sector diversification. 
 
3.7.   Empirical Studies on Sector Diversification 
Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) is the pioneering work on sector diversification. 
Exploring the impact of economic development on diversification, Imbs and 
Wacziarg find a U-shaped relationship between income per capita and 
diversification. That is, countries diversify in the initial stages of development and 
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specialise in the later stages. In addition, they highlight that countries that are open to 
international trade specialise at lower levels of income per capita, while closed 
economies also specialise but at a higher level of per capita income. A number of 
studies on export diversification patterns also find a hump-shaped pattern in 
agreement with the findings of Imbs and Wacziarg (see Cadot et al., 2011). 
 
Further, the empirical investigation by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) found that GDP 
growth is volatile for poor countries because poor countries specialise in few and 
more volatile sectors. Further, they argue that as a country develops, their production 
structure moves to less volatile sectors, and the volatility of the country-specific 
macroeconomic shocks reduce with development. Consistent to the findings of Imbs 
and Wacziarg (2003), they find sectoral diversification at the early stages of 
development followed by concentration at the later stage.  
 
Another factor that explains diversification is the democratic status of the country. In 
search of the reason for growth reversal in some countries, Cuberes and 
Jerzmanowski (2009), using a dataset of 181 countries and 29 manufacturing 
categories for the period 1963–2003, found that democracy and diversification 
shared a positive relationship in the manufacturing sectors. The rationale for this 
outcome was that non-democracies had high barriers to entry, which did not allow 
easy entry of new firms into such countries.  
 
Further, Hammouda et al. (2009) formulated a model on the determinants of 
diversification in 18 African countries and tested this at continental, sub-regional and 
country levels. Their results were most significant at the continental level, which 
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suggests that diversification is significantly determined by higher investment, 
increased per capita income, trade openness, good governance and less conflict. 
According to the OECD and United Nations (2011), diversification is not easy for 
African countries because of their typical over-specialisation in certain sectors, 
which makes it challenging to the transfer of existing developed systems and 
expertise to other sectors. 
 
Moreover, the linkage effect from FDI, discussed in Chapter 2, also fosters economic 
diversification (Estrin and Meyer, 2011; Kaplinsky, 2011). Further, using portfolio 
theory and 26 years of Irish manufacturing employment data for local and foreign 
firms, at various level of aggregation from 1974–1999, Barry and Kearney (2006) 
reveal empirically that FDI diversifies Ireland’s manufacturing sector. They identify 
two channels of diversification via FDI: ‘directly through the introduction of new 
foreign sectors and indirectly through spillovers and linkages leading to growth in 
some of the local sectors’ (Barry and Kearney, 2006, p.395).  
 
Wagner and Deller (1998) argue that while the conventional way to conceptualise 
and measure diversification has been either to consider the re-allocation of 
employment across sectors or an economy consisting of a number of different 
sectors, however, in any case, inter-sectoral linkages should also be captured to 
conceptualise diversification. They provide empirical evidence of this for 50 states of 
US using I-O model and reveal that diversity, when measured by capturing inter-
sectoral linkage effects, makes a significant contribution to economic growth and 
stability. 
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It should be noted from this section that there are very few empirical research studies 
on sector diversification using output data. Generally, there are more empirical 
studies available on export diversification than on product diversification. As already 
noted, export diversification is a stand-alone literature and its discussions are beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
3.8.   Chapter Summary 
Diversification can be defined and measured in various ways depending on the 
context of each study. The origin of diversification dates back to the eighteenth 
century and it gained wide prominence, especially in Latin America through import-
substitution strategies between the 1940s and 1970s due to a fall in the prices of raw 
materials. However, the failure of import-substitution strategies in the 1970s called 
into question the concept of diversification. Economists began a discourse on 
specialisation, which is the counter theory to diversification. Specialisation was 
highly acknowledged in practice by businesses due to the lower costs of production 
of large quantities of output. However, the resurgence of diversification made it clear 
that both specialisation and diversification are important for a country’s economic 
growth. Wagner and Deller (1998, p.542) view diversification as a ‘long-run 
envelope of … short-run efforts’. Diversification has been favoured due to portfolio, 
volatility-growth and resource curse arguments.  
 
It is noted that factors such as income per capita, trade openness, democracy and FDI 
affect sector diversification. Only one study has been found on the impact of FDI on 
sector diversification. As this study, by Barry and Kearney (2006), is a country-based 
study about Ireland, it is not clear whether it can be generalised to other countries.  
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The next chapter considers FDI and the diversification literature and presents the 
main theoretical framework for this thesis regarding the impact of FDI on sector 
diversification. 
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CHAPTER 4: FDI AND SECTOR DIVERSIFICATION 
4.1.   Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis form the basis of discussions on the channels that help 
FDI contribute to sector diversification. This chapter merges the two preceding 
chapters and provides a theoretical framework within which FDI affects sector 
diversification. It further highlights two channels—flexible labour markets and well-
developed financial markets—that can facilitate sector diversification through 
stimulating factor re-allocation across sectors. Finally, it illustrates the four motives 
of multinationals—which seek natural resources, markets, efficiency, and assets—
and explores which of these foster greater linkages within the local economy. Based 
on all theoretical discussions, the chapters formulate hypotheses to test in the 
empirical analysis, which starts from the next chapter. 
 
4.2.   FDI and Sector Diversification 
Diversification in this thesis is conceptualised as the re-allocation of employment and 
value added across the sectors and is measured using the Gini coefficient and the 
Herfindahl index. FDI is considered as one of the most important levers for sector 
diversification. The channel that is believed to bridge FDI and sector diversification 
is the inter-sectoral linkages effect from FDI that was defined and explained as the 
vertical spillover effect in Chapter 2. Barry and Kearney (2006) argue that FDI 
diversifies the economy by way of either introducing new sectors, which is a direct 
effect, or through the FDI-induced spillovers and linkages effect, which is the 
indirect effect. It was noted in Chapter 3 through the use of several country examples 
that FDI has introduced a new sector to many countries through the channel of self-
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discovery. In addition, Chapter 2, through a discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence, demonstrated the indirect effects through the linkages effect as a 
result of FDI. In both the direct and indirect channels, FDI does not transpire in a 
vacuum but forms an apparent link with other sectors of the economy for buying 
(backward linkages) or selling (forward linkages) of the inputs through the vertical 
spillovers on local firms.  
 
As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, MNCs, in both creation and deepening effects, 
generate manifold associations with other sectors of the economy through the 
linkages channel. The ‘creation effect’ is the process in which a foreign firm invests 
in a new sector of the economy, and through the linkages effect, creates new 
supporting or related sectors in the host economy. The ‘deepening effect’ is the 
process in which a foreign firm invests in an existing sector of the economy, and as a 
result of the linkages effect, the existing supporting or related FDI sectors expand. 
For example, as more investment takes place in the tourism industry, demand for 
food supply increases. There is an increased expectation of supply from the food and 
agriculture sector, hence the sector expands and deepens through increased output. 
Not only will this increase output in food and agriculture but also in hotel sector; 
thus, both the intermediate and final good sectors grow. This linkages effect is the 
core of FDI–diversification relationship.  
 
The literature on FDI and sectoral linkages discussed in Chapter 2 highlighted that 
forward linkages are empirically less evident than backward linkages. Therefore, the 
linkages are empirically proven to be established between foreign firms and the 
suppliers that increase the productivity of local firms (World Bank, 2003; Javorcik, 
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2004). The rise in local firms’ productivity eventually leads to local industry 
development in the local economy through the linkages effect (Markusen and 
Venables, 1999). Also reflecting on Wagner and Deller’s (1998) alternative 
conceptualisation of diversification, it can be hypothesised that FDI enhances sector 
diversification in an economy through its linkage effect channel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Creation and Deepening Effects of FDI on Sectors 
 
4.2.1.   Data Disaggregation 
Chapters 2 and 3 also noted that the impact of FDI can be revealed more significantly 
at the inter-industry level, rather than the aggregate level (see Kippenberg, 2005; 
Suyanto et al., 2012). On the other hand, one of the ways to define diversification is 
the redistribution of the factors of production across sectors of the economy through 
the re-allocation effect (e.g., movement of labour from one sector to another without 
drawing additional labour from the unemployment pool of the economy). Given that 
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labour, and to some extent capital, are sector-specific, this re-allocation can be 
detected better at a greater degree of sectoral disaggregation (see also Pack and 
Paxson 1999). Therefore, it is hypothesised that sectoral diversification as a result 
of FDI is likely to be found at disaggregated data. 
 
4.2.2.   Across All Sectors versus Manufacturing Sector 
Chapter 2 highlighted that the manufacturing sector generates more inter-sectoral 
linkages compared to primary and tertiary industries (UNCTAD, 2001b). In a similar 
vein, Park and Chan (1989) argue that tertiary sectors depend on the manufacturing 
sector as a source of a significant amount of total inputs that formed inter-sectoral 
linkages effect. Further, it was noted in Chapter 2 that even the linkages effect within 
the manufacturing sector varies by sector (see Kippenberg, 2005; Suyanto et al., 
2012). Labour-intensive sectors contribute more to sectoral linkage than the capital-
intensive sectors do. A further example was given of the garment versus the 
electronics sector and the latter was said to be creating fewer linkages. This result 
was explained by the electronic sector importing its inputs rather than sourcing them 
locally. If it is a sector that exports significantly, then the linkages are fewer. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that the manufacturing sector might exhibit a higher 
effect of FDI on sector diversification than other sectors. 
 
4.2.3.   Short, Medium and Long-Run Effects 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that inter-sectoral linkages are a function of time because it 
takes time for foreign investors to become familiar with local suppliers and establish 
business linkages (see McAleese and McDonald, 1978; Andersson and Forsgren, 
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1996; Gӧrg and Ruane, 2000). In addition, it takes time for suppliers to produce the 
expected quality and quantity required by the foreign firms. Often, foreign firms 
establish training programmes for supplier firms to improve on quality of inputs and 
through this medium, foreign technologies are transferred to the local economy in 
which suppliers are not viewed as competitors to the investing firms. Rather, they 
complement each other through the linkages effect. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that the effects of FDI on sector diversification may not have a significant effect on 
the host countries in the short run, rather can be viewed as a medium or long-run 
effect.  
 
4.2.4.   Across Diversification Measures 
It was highlighted in Chapter 3 that the Gini coefficient and the Herfindahl index 
may capture different aspects of diversification. The Gini coefficient has been widely 
used in geographical space unit, while the Herfindahl index in the industrial 
organisational context such as for measuring the firm size in relation to the overall 
industry and indicating the competition level among firms.  
 
In addition, the Gini coefficient places relatively more weightage on smaller firms 
while the Herfindahl index on larger firms (Haaland et al., 1988; Midelfart-Knarvik 
et al., 2000). These can result in both measures giving different results.  
 
However, the empirical work of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) on sector diversification 
using a number of measures (see section 3.6) found that all the diversification 
measures are highly correlated among each other, including the Gini coefficient and 
the Herfindahl index; hence, no one measure can be favoured more than the other. 
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Their study confirmed robust results across all the diversification measures in their 
study. It must be noted, however, that their focus was on the relationship between the 
level of development and diversification.  
 
In our context, depending on the size of the majority of sectors which FDI flows into 
(or facilitates allocation into/from), i.e., large vs. small sectors, the impact on 
diversification may show up differently across the Gini and Herfindahl measures. 
Thus, it is not clear how the effects of FDI on sector diversification would differ 
across the Gini coefficient and the Herfindahl index.   
 
4.2.5.   Employment versus Value Added Shares 
Both the Gini coefficient and the Herfindahl index can be computed by using 
employment and value added shares of the sectors. FDI may not result in same effect 
on employment and value added shares as noted in the study of Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003). The extent to which employment and value added are affected by FDI is 
likely to depend on the motive of the FDI and on the context (developing or 
developed) of the host country in which it takes place. For example, labour-intensive 
sectors receive more FDI from efficiency-seeking FDI and this type of FDI mainly 
flows in low-labour-cost countries (mostly the developing countries). See more 
discussions on this in section 4.4. Therefore, it is hypothesised that FDI’s effect on 
employment shares and value added shares are conditional to the motives of FDI.  
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4.2.6.   Across Country Sub-Groups 
Chapter 2 highlighted that the linkages effect is likely to be greater in developed 
countries because of strong and established supplier-buyer sectors. Conversely, in 
developing countries suppliers are relatively weak, hence less linkages and sector 
diversification. This is the reason why developing countries are encouraged via a 
linkage/supplier development programme to strengthen the supplier base (UNCTAD, 
2001b). However, it was also noted in Chapter 3 that developed economies are 
already diversified, and as a result, their capital and labour re-allocation may be 
already at the optimal levels. This suggests that, similar to the convergence idea, 
diversification is relatively more likely in developing countries.  
 
As noted in the preceding sub-section, the type of FDI and the channels that diversify 
sectors in the developed or developing countries cannot be ignored in the end. For 
instance, different countries, based on their factor endowments and comparative 
advantage, receive a particular type of FDI, which reflects in the motives of the FDI 
and this determines the effects of FDI on sector diversification. Market-seeking and 
asset-seeking multinationals have an impact on sector diversification in developed 
countries; whereas, efficiency-seeking FDI may affect developing countries. Natural-
resource-seeking FDI may impact only countries with rich natural resources but these 
types of industries do not relate a great deal to other sectors of the economy where 
local firms’ productivity is enhanced. Taken together, we hypothesise that the 
effects of FDI on sector diversification are likely to differ across developing and 
developed countries, and this effect is likely to be moderated by the motives of the 
multinationals and the factors that facilitate FDI to diversify the sectors. 
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As emphasised earlier, in order for the sectoral linkages to take place, it is a pre-
requisite for the supplier sectors to be well established as per the expectations of the 
MNCs in terms of quality, quantity and speed of delivery of inputs. In order to 
develop supplier sectors, local businesses may need some channels that could 
facilitate the new entrepreneurs or improve the businesses of existing entrepreneurs 
in the economy. These include adequate labour supply and additional capital to 
expand their businesses. This thesis re-emphasises that sectoral linkages are created 
and deepened by local supplier developments and greater sectoral linkages. 
Therefore, the two possible facilitating channels for local supplier sector 
development that could help the local businesses grow and strengthen their links with 
the foreign firms are flexible labour markets and strong financial markets of the host 
economy. We discuss these two issues in the next section. 
 
 4.3.   The Facilitating Channels 
FDI-induced demand of inputs may bring out some re-distribution among the sectors 
of the economy. According to Haskel and Slaughter (2001), the movement of factors 
of production between sectors provides a mechanism that absorbs the changes in the 
relative demand and supply of those factors. The economy’s response to FDI’s input 
demand is likely to reallocate the factors of production between sectors.  
 
There are two ways labour and value added can reallocated across the sectors. One of 
the ways is to draw additional labour and capital from the idle pools of labour and 
capital. The other way is when labour and capital moves from one sector to the other 
(i.e. from inefficient to efficient sectors or from declining to expanding sectors). The 
core idea behind this channel acting as a mediator between FDI and diversification is 
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that impediments of labour and capital movement could be due to rigid labour market 
regulations and under-developed financial markets in the host economy. Flexible 
labour and well-developed capital markets can allow the free movement of labour 
and capital, respectively, from one sector to another, hence facilitating sector 
diversification.  
 
4.3.1.   Flexible Labour Markets 
According to Freeman (1993), there are two contradictory views on labour market 
regulations: ‘institutionalist’ and ‘distortionist’. The institutionalist view is that 
labour protection laws safeguard employees from problems such as low payment, 
weak bargaining power and inadequate insurance against job loss. The distortionist 
view argues that strict labour regulations makes labour cost high, discourages hiring 
more workers, involves high costs in resolving disputes through unions, and means 
the economy is unable to adjust to economic shocks or any changes to any 
macroeconomic conditions. This thesis focuses on the distortionist view on the 
labour market regulations. 
 
Labour Mobility: The first question to ask here is: why does labour move across 
sectors, and how does FDI mediate this process? McMillan and Rodrik (2011) argue 
that structural change means labour needs to adjust, i.e., it moves from one sector to 
another through reallocation process, mainly from inefficient sectors to efficient 
sectors of the economy. Thus, according to McMillan and Rodrik (2011), one of the 
key channels that facilities structural change is this re-allocation process in the labour 
markets.  
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Apart from the reasons that labour moves from inefficient sectors to efficient sectors 
and declining sectors to expanding sectors, labour also shifts from one sector to 
another as a result of FDI. One of the reasons for labour mobility could be the 
mismatch of skills with the current jobs of employees (Greenway et al., 2000). In 
addition, to retain their staff, foreign companies pay their employees more than the 
local firms do. Therefore, the entry of foreign firms into the market makes it 
attractive for local employees to move to work for the foreign firms. Moreover, the 
competition from foreign firms makes the local firms become either more productive 
or shut down. Finally, technology transmission through foreign firms may also 
displace the labour. Therefore, workers are likely to move to other firms either intra- 
or inter-industry as a result of FDI. 
 
Pack and Paxson (1999) find that inter-industry mobility takes place in sectors 
‘closer’ to their sector of origin, where workers can make use of their skills. They 
provide the example of a textile industry worker who may be of more value to the 
garment industry, but less suitable in the production of transportation equipment. 
They define ‘closer industries’ as where workers are more likely to move to or from 
one industry to another in the following cases: (i) receiving a large share of inputs 
(forward linkages); (ii) supplying a large share of inputs (backward linkages); or (iii) 
two industries that use very similar intermediate inputs (horizontal). They provide 
further examples of the these cases in the context of metal sector, i.e., labour’s move 
from basic metal sector into the metal products sector with his or her learned 
knowledge of the properties of metals can increase the productivity of the metal 
processing sector.  
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Therefore, Pack and Paxson’s (1999) hint that worker mobility is observed more 
often to be inter-sectoral. They argue that the shifts of workers are not random but 
well explained by linkages in the goods market. This is because hiring workers from 
linked industries means that there is no need for any further employee training.  
 
Other policies may also induce labour movements. For instance, Wacziarg and 
Wallack (2004) explore the extent to which trade liberalisation is followed by inter-
sectoral labour shifts. In the trade context, it is mostly moving resources to sectors in 
which the country has a comparative advantage. Their study found small effects of 
trade induced inter-sectoral labour shifts. In particular, they found the results to be 
insignificant and negative across the broad economic sectors at 1-digit data. Though 
little evidence was found at the 3-digit level, this result was not found to be robust. 
The 4-digit manufacturing data gave mixed results because of measurement error. 
They explain that trade liberalisation affects aggregate trade, but fewer actions occur 
at the sectoral level. In addition, they argue that labour shifts across countries differ 
as a result of trade liberalisation and mostly depend on the scope and depth of 
reform.  
 
Labour Market Regulations: There are broad interpretations of flexible labour 
markets. Nickell (1997) highlighted the three areas of flexible labour market: (i) 
employment protection, (ii) labour standards, and (iii) labour policy. Labour market 
regulation is one of the fundamental aspects of the labour market flexibility (see 
Lazear, 1990, Siebert, 1997). It is conjectured that countries with rigid labour 
regulations have under-developed supplier sectors, hence weaker linkages with the 
foreign firms. One of the things to take into consideration is that if a country has very 
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rigid labour regulations, local firms are discouraged from starting new businesses or 
even expanding their existing businesses that can supply inputs to MNCs, due to the 
high cost of doing business in the highly regulated labour market (Robson, 2003). 
For example, in countries with heavy labour regulations, the probability of a person 
below the age of 44, starting a new business is low because they fear the cost 
involved with hiring employees (Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008).  
 
In addition, in countries with rigid labour markets there is also a high cost involved 
in labour dismissal (Eslava et al., 2004); therefore, businesses cannot easily reduce or 
remove unproductive labour. Moreover, businesses also incur high costs and time to 
resolve labour disputes due to the involvement of employee unions (Ahsan and 
Pagés, 2009), who follow formal procedures. Further, countries with rigid labour 
regulations have limitations on the working hours of labourers (maximum and 
minimum hours of work), increased maternity leave, and the increased minimum 
wage of over-time workers (Paes de Barros and Corseuil, 2004). Hence, highly 
regulated labour markets can be an impediment for local suppliers to start a new 
business or expand their existing businesses due to the high costs associated with the 
hiring and firing of the employees.  
 
Countries with rigid labour regulations have also larger informal sectors and higher 
unemployment (Djankov and Ramalho, 2009). It is argued that linkages are weak 
between foreign firms and local suppliers in the informal sector (Verick, 2006). 
According to Verick (2006), foreign firms deal with suppliers in the formal sector 
mostly to reduce any risks and uncertainties in business or possibly because of 
foreign investment regulations of the host country. Verick highlights further that 
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foreign firms may deal with firms in informal sector only if they want to lower their 
business costs.  
 
Given this background, rigid labour market regulations make the labour reallocation 
process challenging (Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2007). Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(2007) argue that the absence of free labour movement from one sector to another 
affects the productivity of sectors that require the urgent replacement of labour or 
more labour for production. Therefore, it is hypothesised from the above discussion 
that through flexible labour markets, FDI is likely to diversify the sectors in the host 
economies. This effect can emerge at a more disaggregated level given Pack and 
Paxson’s (1999) argument on inter-industry movement of labour in sectors being 
similar to their origin sector. This effect is also expected to be highly applicable to 
labour-intensive sectors and particularly the developing countries, which attracts 
labour-intensive investments due to competitive edge on low labour cost.  
 
A final note is on the measurement of labour market flexibility. Broadly accepted 
measures of flexible labour market regulations are from the OECD (Employment 
Protection Index), Botero et al. (2004) (Employment Laws Index [ELI]), the World 
Bank: Doing Business Database (Rigidity of Employment Index [REI], updated on 
Botero et al.’s [2004] ELI), and Gwartney et al.’s (2011a) Labour Market 
Regulations (LMR) index, which is a sub-index of the Economic Freedom of the 
World [EFW] index. Most of these measures are available at the cross-country level, 
except for the LMR index, which is available in panel format across country and time 
for a longer time frame than the rest of the indicators. For this reason, this thesis 
employs this index for the empirical analysis. LMR index is calculated from the 
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indices of five indicators: minimum wage; flexibility in hiring and firing; collective 
bargaining; incentives from unemployment benefits; and conscription.  
 
 4.3.2.   Well-Developed Financial Markets 
Among many absorption capacities of the host economy on the FDI- linkages in the 
literature (for example, human capital, technology and supplier base), one of the 
capabilities that has recently gained attention is well-established financial markets. 
Well-developed financial markets play a crucial role in inter-sectoral linkages 
between MNCs and local industry. Recent works have highlighted that local firms 
lack capital to start business that can supply to MNCs (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 
2005b; Alfaro et al., 2010). According to Ang (2009), there are channels through 
which a stronger financial development attracts more FDI inflows: (i) local 
businesses lacking funds to buy new assets and hire more skilled labour could seek 
funding from available credit facilities (Omran and Bolbol, 2003; Alfaro et al., 
2004a); (ii) foreign firms can expand on their business in the local economy through 
new initiatives (Hermes and Lensink, 2003); and (iii) efficient financial systems 
facilitate FDI to create backward linkages, which helps local suppliers in efficient 
production (Alfaro et al., 2004a; Ang, 2009).  
 
Ang (2009) finds in the context of Thailand, FDI has negative direct effects on 
output but its indirect effects through well-established financial markets have a 
statistically significant positive effect. A 1% point increase in FDI decreases total 
output approximately by 0.239–0.307% whereas, through its interaction with 
financial development, the total output increases by 0.102–0.143% in Thailand. 
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Therefore, the implication from this finding is the importance of well-established 
financial markets of the host economy to realise the benefits from FDI.  
 
In addition, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005b) found that in Czech Republic, 
multinationals source on average, only 48.3% of inputs from local enterprises due to 
a lack of funding for local firms to become suppliers of inputs for foreign firms. 
Countries with well-established local financial system can fund their local firms to 
expand and meet the foreign firm input requirements in quality and quantity. With 
more funding opportunities, local suppliers can start their own businesses and 
increase the variety of new inputs, and as a result, this encourages greater linkages 
with local firms by the foreign firms.  
 
FDI also enhances faster growth in countries with relatively well-established 
financial markets (Alfaro et al., 2004b; Alfaro et al., 2009; Ang, 2009; Alfaro et al., 
2010). Alfaro et al. (2010) find that well-developed financial markets enable FDI to 
enhance economic growth via backward linkages. Therefore, the level of financial 
development in the host country affects its ability to absorb the benefits of FDI, and 
in this way financial development is likely enter the sectoral diversification equation 
through the interaction with FDI.  
 
Taken together, it is hypothesised that through well-developed financial markets, 
FDI diversifies the sectors in the host economies. Other things being equal, this 
effect might be more significant for developed countries as they have stronger 
financial markets than developing countries.  
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It is a possibility that FDI, when treated homogenously, may not be able to capture 
its effects on sector diversification because aggregate FDI may mask the variation 
across different FDI motives. Since the multinationals invest in the host country with 
a motive and not all types of FDI link up with the local industries at same levels, 
there is a possibility that their effects on sector diversification will vary according to 
the motives for their investment. The following sub-section highlights the motives of 
MNCs and provides an in-depth discussion on the extent each of the identified 
motives form linkages between foreign and local firms.  
 
4.4.   The Role of MNC Motives 
Scott-Kennel (2007) argues that in order to properly analyse its impact on the host 
economy, FDI cannot be treated as homogenous. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) 
claim the use of aggregated data in FDI studies does not help studies to reach 
consensus in the results. They assert that these aggregations are not clear because of 
differences between resource-, market- and efficiency-seeking FDI, that is, the 
MNCs’ motives, and these aggregated data do not consider the economic 
environment of host countries. Remember again that sectoral FDI figures for a broad 
section of countries are extremely difficult to obtain, if not impossible, for a cross-
country, sector-level analysis. 
 
Cohen (2007) identifies four different forms of FDI. The first is resource-seeking 
FDI, which was very common in the second half of the nineteenth century, in which 
foreign enterprises extracted resources like minerals, oil, gold, copper and harvested 
tropical commodities like bananas, coffee and rubber from countries that had an 
abundance of these. Their objective was not to sell these within the local economy 
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but export the resources to the North to be used as raw materials. The second is 
market-seeking FDI, in which foreign firms establish subsidiaries to expand their 
clientele into another country. The third is efficiency-seeking FDI, which reduces per 
unit costs of production by investing in labour-intensive, standardised technology 
and low-wage countries. The fourth is asset-seeking FDI that obtains some or all of 
the assets of a foreign company to enhance the purchasing company’s 
competitiveness either through increased synergy or less competition. The objective 
of asset-seeking FDI is to acquire assets that have the potential to reinforce the 
overall competitive position of the acquiring company or weaken that of competitors 
through wiping off the competitor, broadening its production line, upgrading 
technology and preventing another competitor from acquiring the purchased assets.  
 
The said motives of FDI are further divided into two broad categories: asset-
exploiting and asset-augmenting FDI. The first three motives (natural resource-, 
market- and efficiency-seeking) are asset-exploiting FDI that generates economic 
rent from existing MNCs assets. Asset-seeking is asset-augmenting FDI, in which 
firms seek to add on to their existing assets. The following section discusses each of 
the four FDI motives in detail and the extent to which MNCs with different motives 
relate to the local firms of the host economy.  
 
The literature on the motives of FDI goes back to Narula and Dunning’s (2000) 
framework of investment development path (IDP). The IDP is framed by the 
ownership, locational and internalising (OLI) variables, which Dunning’s ‘eclectic 
model’ uses to explain FDI: ownership advantages (O) of the investing firm 
(copyright, trademark or other technological advantages, and increasing returns to 
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scale of some management process), locational attractions (L) of the investment site 
(availability of natural resources or inexpensive labour, tariffs or other governmental 
incentives for local production); and a perceived benefit from internalising (I) the 
overseas production, as opposed to either exporting from home or co-production 
such as via licensing or joint ventures. 
 
Dunning (1981) introduced the IDP theory, which thereafter has been refined by 
himself and others (Narula, 1996; Dunning, 1997; Narula and Dunning, 2000), that 
explains the relationship between level of development and net FDI of a country that 
evolves through five stages from being recipient to becoming source of net FDI. 
 
According to Criscuolo et al. (2005), the motives for FDI developed between the 
1970s and the early 2000s, emphasising that due to simple cross-border structures of 
the organisations, mainly resource- or market-seeking motivations were 
predominant, with minimal engagement of multinationals in efficiency- or asset-
seeking FDI. However, over the last three decades, even small foreign firms have 
embarked on cross-border efficiency-seeking activities, with overall MNCs widely 
involving in several motivations simultaneously (Criscuolo et al., 2005).  
 
4.4.1.   Natural Resource-Seeking FDI 
The FDI flows in 1800s and early 1900s were mainly from the industrialised 
countries to most developing countries in exploration of cheap and reliable supply of 
natural resources (Dunning, 1993, pp.110–124). Hence, developing countries 
received a great deal of natural resource-seeking FDI. Under this type of FDI, the 
locational factor is not a significant factor of FDI inflows. A country’s scarce natural 
CHAPTER FOUR 
72 
 
resource puts the country to an absolute advantage to a bargaining position. The 
marginal cost of the extraction of natural resource is almost zero for both parties 
(government and investors). With a natural resource-seeking motive, there is less 
bargaining position difference between the developed and developing countries. It 
involves generally lower value added activity, unless on extractive industries, and 
has low capital expenditure on plants and equipment.  
 
MNCs rarely engage in the complete internalisation of raw materials markets, 
preferring instead to conclude long-run contractual agreements with suppliers or 
purchase their inputs at arms-length prices’ (Narula and Dunning, 2000, p.151). 
Natural resource-seeking FDI takes place in countries with limited L advantages with 
natural resource endowments. Such countries overall receive very little inward and 
almost no outward FDI. There are few domestic firms with O advantages.  
 
According to Narula and Dunning (2000), countries with limited L advantages 
mostly attract natural resource-seeking FDI as there are no other attractive features to 
lure the investors. Therefore, not much value added and backward–forward linkage 
occurs in this case. Further Narula and Dunning (p.278) explain that this is due to 
‘continous production processes and capital intensity of operations’ in natural 
resource-seeking FDI, particularly in extractive sectors. Natural resource-seeking 
FDI essentially flows into natural resource endowed countries, for example, oil, 
minerals, raw materials and agricultural products. Therefore, it is hypothesised from 
this discussion that natural resource-seeking FDI incurs limited backward and 
forward linkages, and hence results in limited sector diversification.  
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4.4.2.   Market-Seeking FDI 
Barriers to exporting from home countries often gives rise to these firms investing in 
the market countries or where there is potential opportunity for investors to achieve 
economies of scale in their production (Narula and Dunning, 2000). This type of FDI 
seeks to reach large local or even regional markets, which includes neighbouring 
countries (e.g. Pacific, Asia and so on).  
 
The requirement for this type of FDI is a considerable population and the capacity of 
the market to cater for the expected demands from the investors in timely manner 
(Narula, 2001). This is like ‘follow the leader’ to a large market that already supports 
competitors and with new entries of investors, the market is still able to efficiently 
support their demands (ibid.). India and China’s automobile markets are examples of 
countries obtaining market-seeking FDI. In addition, large markets raise demand a 
variety for products that is likely to result in sector diversification. 
 
In addition, UNCTAD (2001b) reports that market-oriented FDI causes greater 
linkages than export-seeking firms because export-oriented firms have standard 
quality requirements of inputs that may be preferred to be imported (Altenburg, 
2000; UNCTAD, 2001b). 
 
Market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI enhances the vertical forward integration 
and allows further value-adding (Narula, 2001).  Narula explains that this is because 
these market-seeking and efficiency-seeking countries begin to take advantage of the 
L advantages, eventually through which, the bargaining position of the host country’s 
government strengthens. Both these types of FDI involve higher integration within 
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the MNC, more investment commitment and greater degree of embeddedness 
(Dunning and Narula, 2004). Therefore, it is hypothesised that market-seeking FDI, 
which is considered to be market-oriented as compared to export-oriented 
investment, creating greater sectoral linkages in the host economy, and hence results 
in sector diversification. 
 
4.4.3.   Efficiency-Seeking FDI 
According to Narula (2001) efficiency-seeking FDI remained an ambiguous concept 
in developing countries because for a long time, MNCs have engaged in ‘export-
oriented resource-seeking investment, which is de facto, efficiency-seeking FDI’ 
(p.11). Moreover, efficiency-seeking FDI is considered new motive type for locating 
different manufacturing activities in different locations that would help achieve 
economies of scale (Narula and Dunning, 2000).  
 
Commonly found in European and Asian regions, efficiency-seeking FDI does not 
occur at first instance, but occurs after the investors would undertake either natural 
resource-seeking or market-seeking investments, then only the investor over time, 
gains confidence to consolidate their production process to that country; hence, more 
of a follow-on form of investment (International Finance Corporation, 2010).   
 
Efficiency-seeking FDI mostly flows to developing countries, especially in countries 
with low-labour costs. The key point from diversification point of view is that, as it 
was mentioned in Chapter 2, these labour-intensive sectors create greater sectoral 
linkages (see Kippenberg, 2005; Suyanto et al., 2012). In addition, it has been argued 
earlier in this thesis that export-oriented foreign investments result in fewer linkages 
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effect than the market-oriented investments in the host economy.  However, because 
of country contexts, that is, export-oriented investments mainly are efficiency-
seeking FDI, which occurs in the developing countries; consequently, the magnitude 
of its effect of sectoral linkages (diversification) is greater than the market-seeking 
FDI, which mostly takes place in the developed countries.    
 
While efficiency-seeking FDI takes actual production to the host country, this also 
automatically affects the value added shares.  However, this may not be the case, for 
instance, for market-seeking FDI as it seeks large markets to sell products in the local 
markets, hence, is likely to affect employment shares than value added shares 
because market-seeking FDI do not necessarily take the production process to the 
host country.  
 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that efficiency-seeking FDI, arising from low-labour 
costs, experiences sectoral linkages, and hence is likely to result in sector 
diversification, especially when measured based on value added shares.  
 
It is important to note that it is not the motives of FDI (efficiency- or market-seeking) 
that dictates the magnitude of diversification, but the country context (developing or 
developed) in which this occurs. It is also predicted that this effect will be essentially 
experienced by the manufacturing sector, which according to the discussed literature 
diffuses greater linkages. Therefore, in considering the effects of FDI on value added 
shares, country’s income group (i.e., whether developing or developed) as well as the 
level of data disaggregation (i.e., broader sectors vs. manufacturing) are important. 
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4.4.4.   Asset-Seeking FDI  
Asset-seeking FDI is probably the fastest growing of the four motives for overseas 
investment and mostly flows into industrialised countries (Dunning, 1994). One of 
the common requirements of asset-seeking is host country’s certain threshold level of 
FDI and agglomeration of related activities are plays an important role, whereby 
firms via FDI endeavour on both tangible and intangible assets that are unobtainable 
at home country (Narula, 2001).  Compared to other above discussed motives of FDI, 
asset-seeking motive does not exploit, but, augment assets of the host country. 
Alternatively, this motive weakens the position of competing firms through newly 
acquired assets (Dunning, 1993). In addition, asset-seeking investments do not have 
a direct association with the local buying or selling, hence almost no linkages with 
local firms. Therefore, it is hypothesised that asset-seeking FDI promotes the 
agglomeration effect, and hence is likely to reduce the diversification opportunities.  
 
Before wrapping up this discussion, it must be noted that not all FDI motives offer 
the same linkages effect to the host economy. For instance, resource-seeking 
investments are by nature capital intensive, hence relative to market-seeking or 
efficiency-seeking investments, generates fewer linkages (Lall and Narula, 2004). 
Narula and Dunning conclude that linkages effects accrue from market- or 
efficiency-seeking investments (Narula and Dunning, 2000, p.163).  
 
4.5.   Chapter Summary 
This chapter merged the FDI and diversification literature and identified the channels 
through which FDI influences sector diversification. The FDI literature argues that 
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the FDI is an agent to inter-sectoral/industry linkages and this linkages effect has 
diversifying effect on the economy. Other papers acknowledged this through 
claiming that FDI stimulates local industry development (Markusen and Venables, 
1999; Gardiner, 2000; UNCTAD, 2001b) and the mechanism which they refer to is 
the backward and forward linkages with local firms and industries. While FDI 
through its vertical linkages spillover channel is claimed to lead to sector 
diversification, this remains an untested hypothesis empirically across a broad cross-
section of countries.  
 
In addition, this chapter highlighted that the labour and capital market development 
also facilitates sector diversification by facilitating re-allocation of factor inputs.  
Finally, by disaggregating FDI by multinational motives into four, this chapter 
further highlighted the extent to which each of these motives form linkages with the 
domestic firms in the host economy. The next chapter is the first empirical chapter 
that explores the direct effect of FDI on sector diversification. 
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CHAPTER 5: DOES FDI AFFECT SECTOR DIVERSIFICATION? 
5.1.   Introduction 
Chapter 3 outlined the importance of sector diversification in the economy. 
Originating from the portfolio argument, sector diversification protects the economy 
from deleterious effects in times of sector-specific shocks. In addition, a diversified 
economy is able to meet the customer demand for variety (i.e., Engel effects). 
Overall, the literature suggests that a diversified economy can handle better volatile 
economic aggregates. Although specialisation may help achieve economic growth 
through economies of scale in the short run, diversification helps to stabilise 
economic growth in the long run (Wagner and Deller, 1998). 
 
Although diversification is frequently mentioned at the policy level, there have not 
been many empirical studies in this area. As noted in Chapter 2, the broad theoretical 
perception of many scholars is that FDI stimulates local sectors of the host economy, 
facilitating linkages. This concept is also illustrated by the FDI linkage models 
presented in Chapter 2. However, the consequent impact of FDI on sector 
diversification still requires empirical testing on a large number of country groups. 
 
There are limited studies on sector diversification, as noted in Chapter 3. A few 
prominent studies have examined the effects of income per capita (see Imbs and 
Wacziarg, 2003); FDI for Ireland (see Barry and Kearney, 2006) and democracy (see 
Cuberes and Jerzmanowski, 2009). It is not clear whether Barry and Kearney’s 
(2006) study, being country-specific, can be generalised any further to the world 
sample or any particular country sub-groups. Therefore, this chapter fills this gap in 
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the literature.by exploring FDI’s effect of sector diversification on a relatively large 
number of countries to draw some general conclusions on the said relationship.   
 
This chapter analyses data from 165 developed and developing countries (an 
unbalanced panel) over the 38-year period between 1970 and 2007. The model and 
dataset2 used in this chapter basically extends the work of Imbs and Wacziarg 
(2003). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the effect of FDI on sector diversification and to 
empirically explore the direction of this effect on a relatively large number of 
countries using cross-sectional and panel datasets, respectively. A further analysis is 
carried out by splitting the world sample into groups by income, that is, developed 
versus developing countries, and middle-income versus low-income countries.   
 
This chapter further explores the effects of FDI on sector diversification in different 
sectors compared with the manufacturing sector. The reason for this comparison is 
that from the literature review in Chapter 2, it was observed that FDI forms linkages 
more broadly in the manufacturing sector than in all the other sectors of the 
economy, hence, exploring whether the same observation applies to the effects of 
FDI on sector diversification.  
 
In addition, as pointed out in Chapter 2, since sectoral linkages take time (McAleese 
and McDonald, 1978; Anderson and Forsgren, 1996) sector diversification is also 
                                                 
2 In this thesis, the dataset constructed by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) has been re-constructed using 
more years and countries. For the time period and countries for which the data were constructed by 
Imbs and Wacziarg, the mean and standard deviation of the relevant indices in our construction almost 
match one-to-one. 
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expected not to have an immediate effect. Therefore, this effect is also explored 
using the data at annual, 5-year average and cross-sectional intervals to estimate the 
short-, medium- and long-run relationship, respectively. Further, it was highlighted 
in Chapter 4 that the inter-industry linkage effect is captured at a more disaggregated 
level of data (Pack and Paxson, 1999; Wacziarg and Wallack, 2004; Kippenberg, 
2005; Suyanto et al., 2012); hence, assuming the same for sector diversification, this 
chapter also explores the relationship between FDI and sector diversification at 
various levels of data disaggregation, that is, at 1-, 2-, 3- and 4-digit levels, using 
different data sets (ILO, UNIDO and OECD).  
 
According to Imbs and Wacziarg’s (2003) study, income per capita has a robust U-
shaped relationship across different measures of diversification and sector size. This 
chapter uses two different measures of diversification (the Gini coefficient and the 
Herfindahl index) and two different measures of sector size (employment and value 
added).  
 
Our baseline estimation methodology is panel fixed effects. This captures the within-
country variation over time eliminating time-invariant country-specific 
characteristics. We employ a restrictive specification by controlling for common 
shocks across countries, as well as country-specific time trend. Especially the latter 
addresses spurious effects that may arise due to trending in the data and eliminates 
the long-term associations between the right-hand side and the left-hand side 
variables. 
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The key findings of this chapter are that there is significant evidence of sector 
diversification both across sectors and within the manufacturing sector. Robust 
findings at the 1-digit aggregated data level revealed sector diversification resulting 
from FDI only in the developing countries. Within the manufacturing sector, it was 
found that low-income countries diversified in the short run (reflected in value added 
shares), while the middle-income countries diversified in the long run (reflected in 
employment shares). Hence, the results remain inconclusive, particularly within the 
manufacturing sector. No evidence of sector diversification in developed countries 
was noted in this chapter.  
 
However, the effect of FDI on sector diversification was not captured in the same 
way across all the disaggregated data levels. In addition, the effect of FDI on 
employment shares and value added shares had dissimilar results across all datasets. 
Different datasets revealed different time spans for significant sector diversification. 
The two measures of diversification, the Gini coefficient and the Herfindahl index, 
did not offer consistent results in all cases. Hence, from the outset, there was no 
consistent pattern across all explorations. While these results are not surprising given 
that we explore different dimensions of the FDI-diversification relationship, they 
lead us to conclude that the relationship is case-specific. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 presents the empirical model 
and the estimation method. Section 5.3 provides details of the data. Section 5.4 
presents a discussion of the empirical results, followed by the concluding summary 
in Section 5.5. 
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5.2.   Econometric Model and Estimation Method 
Extending Imbs and Wacziarg’s (2003) model to include FDI and other controls, this 
chapter employs an unbalanced panel of 165 countries covering the period 1970 to 
2007. Initially, data were collected from 1955 onwards, for 196 countries; however, 
FDI data were only available from 1970 onwards. Dependent territories were 
dropped from the sample.  
 
This study takes a panel study approach. A panel study approach has three 
advantages. First, it allows the variation to be analysed within different units over 
time. Second, in the case of missing observations for some periods, the estimates 
remain unbiased. Third, the panel study approach addresses the problem of omitted 
variable bias that may arise from time invariant factors such as location, area, 
landlocked or island country, and political and institutional factors. Since the sample 
in this research includes most of the countries of the world for which the necessary 
data were available, random effects estimation is not formally pursued. The OLS 
method is used to analyse the cross-sectional data econometrically using Equation 
5.2 (see Section 5.2.2. for a discussion on endogeneity). 
 
Thus, the estimating equation is: 
 
Equation 5.1: Panel Data Model 
divit = α + β1 fdiit-1 + β2 ln_initial_pcapit + β3 findevit-1 + β4 gcfit-1 + β5 tradeit-1 + γt + 
μi + δ + εit; 
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where, div is the diversification measure (Gini coefficient or Herfindahl index), for 
country i in period t. The main variable of interest on the right hand side is FDI, 
represented by fdi. Other factors (control variables) mentioned in the literature that 
could influence sector diversification and are controlled for in Equation 5.1 are initial 
level of GDP per capita, that is, development ln_initial_pcap, financial development 
findev, domestic investment, for which gross capital formation gcf  is used as a 
proxy, and trade openness trade. The sources of these factors and the respective 
literature are discussed in Section 5.3.3. As FDI, they are treated as pre-determined, 
and their lagged values are included in the model. In addition, the μ values denote a 
full set of country dummies that capture time invariant country-specific effects. γ  
values denote a full set of time effects that capture common shocks in the 
diversification measures of all countries.  δ  denotes a country-specific time trend, 
which de-trends the time pattern of data for each country.  ε  is an error term that 
captures all the other omitted factors, for all i and t. Additional details on all 
variables used in Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are provided in Sections 5.3.2. and 5.3.3.  
 
The long-run model (for the cross-sectional dataset) adopts the initial values of the 
control variables on the right-hand side. 
  
Equation 5.2: Cross-Sectional Model 
divi = α + β1fdii + β2ln_initial_pcapi + β3initial_findevi + β4initial_gcfi + β5 
initial_tradei + εit; 
where all variables are described as in Equation (1), except for the initial values of 
the control variables.  
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5.2.1.   Different Samples 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the world sample of countries is split into 
different groups by income as each income group may be associated with different 
types of heterogeneities. It is conjectured that results can vary within these sub-
groups owing to their placement in different stages of evolution on MNCs as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Countries are broadly sub-grouped as developing and 
developed countries, where developing countries are further sub-divided into low-
income and middle-income country groups to determine if any variation is found in 
the results.  
 
Using the World Bank Atlas method, the World Bank (2009) classifies economies 
based on the Gross National Income per capita: low-income, $995 or less; middle-
income, $996–$12,195; and high-income, $12,196 or more. However, this 
classification does not mean that the economies in one sub-group experience a 
similar level of development; hence, initial income per capita is still controlled for in 
the model. 
 
5.2.2.   Endogeneity 
Like in every economic relationship, there is a possibility of reverse causation from 
diversification to FDI in our context; that is, a country with higher levels of 
diversification may attract more FDI. MNCs that are at the investment feasibility 
stage may expect at least a few sectors to be present, such as input supplying sectors, 
transportation, education and other services (for instance, a well-established financial 
sector). It must be noted that our panel specification is quite restrictive with the level 
of development and other time-invariant as well as country-specific trending 
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relationships controlled for on the right-hand side. Moreover, FDI is treated as a pre-
determined variable by adopting lagged FDI in the regression, all of which are 
expected to mitigate the problem which may otherwise arise. Given these, it is 
unclear whether our results are still marred by endogeneity. For instance, in the FDI 
literature, contrary to what is argued above, there is no mention of the notion that 
MNCs seek to invest in diversified economies (consider, for instance, natural-
resource seeking FDI). While MNCs might consider the presence of certain sectors 
in the host economy that could support their operations, the required level of 
diversification here is unclear. On the other hand, it has been argued that, in the long 
run, it is the backward and forward sectoral linkages facilitated by FDI that govern 
the FDI-diversification relationship, rather than the reverse. Despite all these 
arguments, we do not contend that our results are strictly causal, and it is plausible to 
take some caution (especially cross-sectional results) for a causal interpretation of the 
coefficients.  
 
On a related note, an instrumental variable estimation with excludable instruments, 
or exploiting other identification method (e.g., quasi-natural experiment, difference-
in-difference, or regression discontinuity), could have facilitated a causal relationship 
between FDI and diversification. We recognize this drawback in our analysis.3  
 
                                                 
3 Quite some time after this analysis had been undertaken, the candidate has come across Harding and 
Javorcik’s (2011) study which uses existence of investment promotions agencies as an instrumental 
variable for FDI. This appears to be a compelling shifter to facilitate a strictly causal relationship in 
our case, pending more detailed considerations about excludability, selectivity, and so on. We leave it 
to future research to employ this variable in the FDI-diversification relationship. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
86 
 
5.2.3.   Multicollinearity 
The correlation matrix in Table 5.1 did not detect any multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables in the model. In addition, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
index (less than 10 in Table 5.2) also confirms the absence of multicollinearity in the 
model.  
 
Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables – Annual Data 
 
  fdi ln_initial_pcap findev gcf trade 
fdi 1.0000     
  4451     
ln_initial_pcap 0.0356 1.0000    
  4434 4434    
findev 0.0646 0.5820 1.0000   
  4239 4229 4239   
gcf 0.1557 0.2198 0.1774 1.0000  
  4259 4244 4085 4259  
trade 0.3465 0.1629 0.0598 0.3171*** 1.0000 
  4345 4330 4174 4246 4345 
Note: The correlation matrix is presented from the annual dataset only and all  
significant at 1% level. The number of observations is in italics.   
 
 
Table 5.2: VIF Result (Gini) 
 
Annual ILO 1-digit OECD 2-digit UNIDO 3-digit UNIDO 4-digit 
Variables Emp  Emp Val Emp Val Emp Val 
fdi 1.14  1.25 1.28 1.02 1.17 1.25 1.17 
ln_initial_pcap 1.44  1.58 1.26 1.50 1.53 1.67 1.69 
findev 1.47  1.52 1.27 1.50 1.49 1.70 1.72 
gcf 1.10  1.11 1.06 1.13 1.15 1.32 1.18 
trade  1.14  1.28 1.32 1.14 1.27 1.22 1.24 
Note: Emp is employment shares and Val is value added shares.  
 
This study first identifies the unconditional relationship between diversification and 
FDI using scatter plots. Next, world FDI–diversification trends are illustrated 
graphically, allowing for inferences on this relationship to be drawn. Finally, the 
visual interpretations from all the graphs are tested econometrically. However, before 
discussing these results, it is important to provide an overview on data used in this 
study.  
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5.3.   Data 
5.3.1.   Diversification 
The dependent variable is diversification, which is measured using the Gini 
coefficient and the Herfindahl index. The Gini coefficient is used as the baseline 
measure of diversification throughout the three questions of this thesis, while the 
Herfindahl index is used as the alternative measure.  
 
5.3.1.1.   Definition of Diversification 
Sector diversification could be perceived in two ways, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 and 
discussed in Chapter 3. One of these ways is through the creation of a new sector in 
the economy. The other is the process in which existing sectors of the economy grow 
and re-allocate employment and the value added across the sectors. The latter is used 
to define diversification in this thesis, and it is argued that the re-allocation of 
employment and value added occurs through the FDI linkage channel. 
 
Sector Diversification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Creating and Deepening Effect of FDI on Sector Diversification 
 
 
Creation effect on 
new sectors 
Drawing input 
from idle 
resource pool 
Deepening effect on 
existing sectors 
Re-allocating 
resource to 
productive or 
expanding sectors 
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5.3.1.2.   Data Source 
Consistent with the research design of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), this study also 
uses data from the ILO (ILO, 2009), OECD (OECD, 2009), UNIDO (UNIDO, 
2003a) and UNIDO (2009) to explore the relationship between FDI and sector 
diversification over time. The ILO data covers employment shares across nine 
sectors at the most aggregated l-digit level from 1970 to 2007.  
 
OECD (OECD, 2009), which covers 17 sectors at a 2-digit data disaggregation level, 
in mostly developed nations. Employment shares data range from 1985–2007, and 
value added data range from 1970–2007. This dataset serves three purposes: (1) it is 
used to verify results at another level of disaggregation, the 2-digit level, in all 
sectors; (2) it conducts a robustness check on alternatively sourced data covering all 
sectors, as in the ILO dataset; and (3) it captures the effect on high-income countries.  
 
UNIDO (2003a) data are available for both employment and value added shares, 
covering only 28 manufacturing sectors from 1970 to 2000 at a 3-digit data 
disaggregated level. It serves three purposes for this study. One of the purposes is to 
do a comparative study of the FDI and sector diversification effect within the 
manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector is selected because, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2, FDI creates broader linkages in this sector, compared with the primary 
and tertiary sectors. Another purpose is that the UNIDO (2003a) dataset offers the 
advantage of using value added shares which enables comparing the results with 
employment shares. In addition, it allows the effects to be captured at the 3-digit 
disaggregated data level. ILO (2009) and UNIDO (2003a) data are available on 183 
and 175 countries, respectively.  
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The inclusion of UNIDO (2009) dataset allows the robustness check of the results for 
the manufacturing sector to be completed from an alternative source, using an 
extended number of years at another level of disaggregated data, the 4-digit level. It 
is also used for the robustness check of the results for employment and value added 
shares. Table 5.3 provides a summary of diversification data.  
 
Table 5.3: Summary of Diversification Data 
Note: Emp is employment shares and Val is value added shares.  
 
 
5.3.1.3.   Measures of Diversification 
Using the formulas provided in Table 5.4, the Gini coefficient and the Herfindahl 
indices are calculated and used as diversification measures in this study.  
 
 
Table 5.4: Formulas Used to Calculate Dispersion Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1.3.1.   Gini Coefficient 
The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve, which is used to demonstrate 
the income distribution. Krugman’s (1991) work on ‘locational Ginis’ has set the 
Source 
(Data disaggregation) 
Year ISIC 
rev. 
Sector  
size 
Sectors No. of  
sectors 
Countries 
ILO (2009) 
(1-digit) 
1970–2007 2 Emp All sectors 9 68 
 
OECD (2009)  
(2-digit) 
1985–2007 
1970–2007 
2 Emp 
Val 
All sectors 17 
 
27 
29 
UNIDO (2003a) 
(3-digit) 
1970–2000 
1970–2000 
2 Emp 
Val 
Only manufacturing 28 148 
132 
UNIDO (2009) 
(4-digit) 
1977–2007 
1977–2007 
2 Emp 
Val 
Only manufacturing 81 98 
83 
Diversification 
Measures  
Formula 
Gini coefficient   
Herfindahl index x12+x22+...+xn2 where x is the sector share in total 
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trend of using the Gini coefficient as a standard measure of industry concentration in 
the economic geography literature. The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 
indicates total equality, and 1 indicates total inequality in the distribution. Lower 
Gini coefficients indicate diversification. The Gini measure captures the degree of 
heterogeneity of countries across the regions and structural gap of industries for a 
region from the average of industrial base of the other regions (Beine and Coulombe, 
2004) 
 
5.3.1.3.2.   Herfindahl Index 
The Herfindahl index is also known as the Hirschman index. While the Gini 
coefficient is mostly used in the geographical space unit, the Herfindahl index is 
mostly used in the industrial organisation context, for example for measuring firm 
size in relation to the overall industry and for measuring competition level among 
firms. The Herfindahl index is interpreted similarly to the Gini coefficient, and 
represents total equality at 0 and total inequality at 1 in the distribution.  
 
From the formulas in Table 5.4, it can be inferred that both indices measure different 
aspects of dispersion, which could have a possible effect on the outcomes. One of the 
highlighted differences between the Gini and Herfindahl measures is that while the 
Gini coefficient places relatively more weight on small firms, the Herfindahl index 
places more weight on larger firms (Haaland et al., 1988, Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 
2000). This could be one of the possible reasons for these measures giving different 
results. However, since a high correlation between the two measures displayed in the 
correlation matrix in Table 5.5 does not give any initial reason to favour one against 
the other, hence a consistent result can be expected between the two. This outcome is 
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also shown empirically in Imbs and Wacziarg’s (2003) study. It must also be noted, 
however, that depending on the size of the majority of sectors which FDI flows into 
(or facilitates allocation into/from), i.e., large vs. small sectors, FDI’s impact on 
diversification may show up differently across the Gini and Herfindahl measures. 
Thus, following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), we use the Gini coefficient as the 
baseline measure, but keep a close eye on the Herfindahl index as well.  
 
Table 5.5: Correlation Matrix (Annual) for the Gini and Herfindahl Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The correlation matrix from the annual dataset is presented only.  
 
5.3.1.4.   Measures of Sector Size 
Employment and value added shares are used to measure the size of the sectors, and 
results are compared between these measures. Data on these are from UNIDO 
(2003a; 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 Employment Value added  
 Obs Gini Herfindahl Obs Gini Herfindahl 
ILO 1-digit 
Gini 901 1.0000      
Herfindahl 901 0.7848*** 1.0000    
OECD 2-digit  
Gini 331 1.0000   460 1.0000  
Herfindahl 331 0.8370*** 1.0000 460 0.6770*** 1.0000 
U323 3-digit  
Gini 2250 1.0000  2139 1.0000  
Herfindahl 2250 0.7218*** 1.0000 2139 0.6985*** 1.0000 
U924 4-digit  
Gini 819 1.0000  759 1.0000  
Herfindahl 819 0.7899*** 1.0000 759 0.2007*** 1.0000 
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5.3.1.5.   Sectoral Coverage 
Table 5.6 shows sector coverage for each of the data sources. 
Table 5.6: Sectoral Coverage 
A.  ILO (2003)—ISIC 2—1-digit classification (9 Sectors)   
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
2 Mining and quarrying 
3 Manufacturing 
4 Electricity, gas and water supply 
5 Construction 
6 Wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels 
7 Transport, storage and communication 
8 Financing, insurance, real estate and business services 
9 Community, social and personal services 
 
B.  UNIDO (2003a)—ISIC 2—3-digit classification (27 Sectors)  
300 Total manufacturing  
311 Food products 
313 Beverages 
314 Tobacco 
321 Textiles 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 
323 Leather products 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 
331 Wood products, except furniture 
332 Furniture, except metal 
341 Paper and products 
342 Printing and publishing 
351 Industrial chemicals 
352 Other chemicals 
353 Petroleum refineries 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 
355 Rubber products 
356 Plastic products 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 
362 Glass and products 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 
371 Iron and steel 
372 Non–ferrous metals 
381 Fabricated metal products 
382 Machinery, except electrical 
383 Machinery, electric 
384 Transport equipment 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 
390 Other manufactured products 
 
 
C. OECD (2009)—ISIC 2—2-digit classification (17 Sectors) 
1. Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
2. Fishing 
3. Mining and quarrying 
4. Manufacturing 
5. Electricity, gas and water supply 
6. Construction 
7. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and household goods 
8. Hotels and restaurants 
9. Transport, storage and communication 
10. Financial intermediation 
11. Real estate, renting and business activities 
12. Public administration and defence; compulsory 
social security 
13. Education 
14. Health and social work 
15. Other community, social and personal services 
activities 
16. Private households with employed person 
17. Extra-territorial organisations and bodies 
 
D.  UNIDO (2009)—ISIC 2—4-digit classification (81 Sectors)  
3111 Slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat 
3112  Manufacture of dairy products 
3113 Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables 
3114  Canning, preserving and processing of fish, 
crustacean and similar foods 
3115  Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 
3116  Grain mill products 
3117  Manufacture of bakery products 
3118  Sugar factories and refineries 
3119 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar 
 confectionery 
3121  Manufacture of food products, not elsewhere 
 classified 
3122  Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 
3131  Distilling, rectifying and blending spirits 
3132  Wine industries 
3133  Malt liquors and malt 
3134  Soft drinks and carbonated waters industries 
3140  Tobacco manufactures 
3211  Spinning, weaving and finishing textiles 
3212  Manufacture of made-up textile goods except 
wearing apparel 
3213  Knitting mills 
3214  Manufacture of carpets and rugs 
3215  Cordage, rope and twine industries 
3219  Manufacture of textiles, not elsewhere classified 
3220  Manufacture of wearing apparel, except footwear 
3231  Tanneries and leather finishing 
3232  Fur dressing and dyeing industries 
3233  Manufacture of products of leather and leather 
substitutes, except footwear and wearing apparel 
3240  Manufacture of footwear, except vulcanised or 
moulded rubber or plastic footwear 
3311  Sawmills, planing and other wood mills 
3312  Manufacture of wooden and cane containers and 
small cane ware 
3319  Manufacture of wood and cork products, not 
elsewhere classified 
3320  Manufacture of furniture and fixtures, except 
primarily of metal 
3411  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 
3412  Manufacture of containers and boxes of paper and 
 paperboard 
3419  Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard articles, 
 not elsewhere classified 
3420  Printing, publishing and allied industries 
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3511  Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals except 
fertilisers 
3512  Manufacture of fertilisers and pesticides 
3513  Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials 
and man-made fibres except glass 
3521  Manufacture of paints, varnishes and lacquers 
3522  Manufacture of drugs and medicines 
3523  Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations, 
perfumes, cosmetics and other toilet preparations 
3529  Manufacture of chemical products, not elsewhere 
classified 
3530  Petroleum refineries 
3540  Manufacture of miscellaneous products of 
petroleum and coal 
3551  Tyre and tube industries 
3559  Manufacture of rubber products, not elsewhere 
classified 
3560  Manufacture of plastic products, not elsewhere 
classified 
3610  Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware 
3620  Manufacture of glass and glass products 
3691  Manufacture of structural clay products 
3692 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 
3699  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products, not 
elsewhere classified 
3710  Iron and steel basic industries 
3720  Non-ferrous metal basic industries 
3811  Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general 
hardware 
3812 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of 
metal 
3813  Manufacture of structural metal products 
3819  Manufacture of fabricated metal products except 
machinery and equipment, not elsewhere classified 
3821  Manufacture of engines and turbines 
3822  Manufacture of agricultural machinery and 
equipment 
3823  Manufacture of metal and wood working 
machinery 
3824  Manufacture of special industrial machinery and 
equipment except metal and wood working 
machinery 
3825  Manufacture of office, computing and accounting 
machinery 
3829  Machinery and equipment except electrical, not 
elsewhere classified 
3831  Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery and 
apparatus 
3832  Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment and apparatus 
3833  Manufacture of electrical appliances and 
housewares 
3839  Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies, 
not elsewhere classified 
3841  Ship building and repairing 
3842  Manufacture of railroad equipment 
3843  Manufacture of motor vehicles 
3844  Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 
3845  Manufacture of aircraft 
3849  Manufacture of transport equipment, not elsewhere 
classified 
3851  Manufacture of professional and scientific, and 
measuring and controlling equipment, not 
elsewhere classified 
3852  Manufacture of photographic and optical goods 
3853  Manufacture of watches and clocks 
3901  Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 
3902  Manufacture of musical instruments 
3903  Manufacture of sporting and athletic goods  
3909  Manufacturing sectors, not elsewhere classified 
 
Source: ILO (2009), OECD (2009), UNIDO (2003a) and UNIDO (2009) 
 
 
5.3.2.   FDI 
A brief summary of all explanatory variables is provided in Table 5.7. FDI is the 
main variable of interest in this thesis. FDI data are sourced from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2009). FDI flows into an 
economy to ‘acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in 
an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-run capital and short-run capital, 
as shown in the balance of payments’ (World Bank, 2009).  
 
Choi (2009) and Li (2009) have presented a contradictory view on the two FDI 
inflow variables, and they have supported their views with empirical findings. Choi 
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(2009) demonstrated that FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP (FDI/GDP) should be 
opted against FDI inflows in dollar values, because FDI/GDP reduces the effect of 
outliers on the results. Choi verifies his argument by re-estimating Li and Resnick’s 
(2003) model on FDI and democracy. He claims that when measured in dollar terms, 
FDI does not consider the economic size of each country; consequently, a country 
such as China becomes an obvious outlier, which influences the sign of the 
coefficients. Since FDI/GDP considers heterogeneity of economies, it is the preferred 
choice of World Bank economists (Choi, 2009). In addition, Choi claims that 
FDI/GDP presents a more holistic view. Conversely, Gujarati (2003, p.28) asserts 
that in a heterogeneous sample, ‘the size or scale effect must be taken into account so 
as not to mix apples with oranges’.  
 
In addition, Choi (2009) counters Li’s (2009) idea of using FDI in dollar value by 
taking the natural logarithm of FDI, because FDI values can be positive, negative and 
even zero. The natural logarithm of zero and negative values cannot be taken; 
therefore, only positive values are accounted for causing positive skewness of the 
data. As a result, it is not possible to capture the true effects, leading to spurious and 
misleading results.  Therefore, in this thesis, we adopt FDI/GDP as the FDI measure. 
 
There is a theoretical understanding from Chapter 4 that FDI diversifies the host 
economy through its backward and forward sectoral linkage channel. This study tests 
this hypothesis empirically. Consequently, a negative coefficient for diversification is 
expected for this variable. 
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5.3.3.   Other Controls 
Initial GDP per capita, financial development, domestic investment and trade 
openness are used as the control variables throughout all the analyses in this thesis. 
Except the initial log GDP per capita, all controls are measured as a ratio to GDP. 
 
5.3.3.1.   Initial GDP Per Capita 
Real GDP per capita is the market value of total output of final goods and services in 
the economy in a year at base year price. These data are sourced from the Penn 
World Tables version 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009), and is measured in US dollars at 
2005 constant prices. Real GDP per capita is real GDP divided by population. 
Following the standard approach in the literature, real GDP per capita is transformed 
using natural logarithm to obtain a better fit to the model and address positive 
skewness in the data.  
 
It is widely accepted that real GDP per capita is a measure of the development level 
of a country. While it is shown that GDP per capita affects diversification (see Imbs 
and Wacziarg, 2003), conversely, diversification also affects the country’s GDP per 
capita; for instance, diversified economies are found to experience stable economic 
growth (see Koren and Tenreyro, 2007). Hence, to address this reverse causality 
between GDP per capita and diversification, initial GDP per capita is employed in 
the models. In the annual dataset, initial value is calculated as the ratio of a country’s 
GDP per capita to US GDP per capita. For 5-year average dataset, the value of the 
initial year in the 5-year period is used. The initial year for cross-sectional data is 
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1970. In cases where the 1970 value is missing, the first available year value is used 
instead. 
 
5.3.3.2.   Financial Development 
Another variable controlled in the model is financial development. Alfaro et al. 
(2010) have argued that countries with well-established financial markets have 
greater backward linkages. To meet the input requirements of foreign firms, local 
suppliers may require additional capital to expand their businesses. Their study 
claimed that countries with well-established financial markets have greater lending 
capacity to local suppliers that assists in their sector development; hence, they have 
greater FDI linkages with local firms. This is also assumed in the case of sector 
diversification. Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is used 
to measure the development of a country’s financial markets, and these data are also 
sourced from the World Bank (2009). Credit facilities include loans, purchase of 
non-equity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivables (ibid., 2009). 
 
5.3.3.3.   Domestic Investment 
Similar to FDI, domestic investment can also increase sector diversification through 
upstream and downstream sectoral linkages. Therefore, the model controls for this 
factor as well. Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP is used to measure 
domestic investment. These data are also sourced from the World Bank (2009), and 
is defined as the ‘cost of additions to the fixed assets added to net changes in the 
economy’s inventory level. Fixed assets include land improvements such as fences, 
ditches and drains; plant, machinery and equipment purchases; the construction of 
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roads, railways, schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and 
commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to 
meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and ‘work in 
progress’’.  
 
5.3.3.4.   Trade Openness 
Trade openness is the ‘sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as 
a percentage of GDP’ (World Bank, 2009). Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) discuss the 
results of the trade-induced labour movement at the ILO 1-digit aggregated and 
UNIDO 3-digit disaggregated data levels. Although they did not find any positive 
effects at the most aggregated 1-digit level of data, some positive evidence was 
reflected in the manufacturing datasets. Therefore, trade openness is also used as a 
control variable in the model, with the data sourced from the World Bank (2009).  
 
5.3.3.5.   Common Time Effects and Country-Specific Time Trend 
Common time effects are considered in the model to control for any unexpected 
variation in the data that affect all countries, such as crises, oil price fluctuations and 
political instability. In addition, the model controls for country-specific time trends 
that eliminates the long-term associations between the dependent variable and 
independent variables.  
 
5.3.3.6.   Democracy 
Democracy is measured using Polity 2 score from the Polity IV database from 
Marshall and Jaggers (2009). It is indexed as a democracy index score minus the 
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autocracy index score. It assumes values from –10 to 10, where -10 is high autocracy 
and 10 is high democracy. Democracy is used for the robustness check of the results 
in this thesis.  
 
Table 5.7: Summary of Explanatory Variables 
 
 
5.3.4.   Geographical Coverage 
Initially, data were collected on the 196 countries listed in Table 5.8 for the period 
1955–2007. The following 15 countries were excluded from this list because they are 
dependent territories of another country (in parentheses): 
1. American Samoa (US) 
2. Aruba (Netherlands) 
3. Bermuda (UK) 
4. Cayman Islands (UK) 
5. Hong Kong (China) 
6. Macau (China) 
7. Taiwan (China) 
8. Cook Islands (New Zealand) 
9. Montserrat (UK) 
10. Netherlands Antilles (Netherlands) 
11. New Caledonia (France) 
12. Niue (New Zealand) 
13. Northern Mariana Islands (US) 
14. Puerto Rico (US) 
15. Saint Pierre and Miquelon (France)  
Variable Description Source 
fdi Net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP 
(Lagged) 
World Bank (2009) 
ln_initial_pcap Initial natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
[US$] (Lagged) 
Heston et al. (2009) 
findev Domestic credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP (Lagged) 
World Bank (2009) 
gcf Gross capital formation as a percentage of 
GDP (Lagged) 
World Bank (2009) 
trade Trade as a percentage of GDP (Lagged) World Bank (2009) 
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The following 14 countries with no FDI data were also excluded from this study:  
1. Cuba 
2. Czechoslovakia 
3. Ethiopia and Eritrea  
4. Germany (Eastern Part) 
5. Germany, Federal Republic 
6. Guadeloupe 
7. Iraq 
8. Marshall Islands 
9. Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) 
10. Palau 
11. Qatar 
12. San Marino 
13. Saint Vincent 
14. United Arab Emirates  
15. USSR  
16. Yugoslavia 
 
 
In addition, some outlier countries with extreme negative and positive values, whose 
activities may not belong to the diversification sphere were identified in the 
scatterplots in Section 5.3.7 and excluded from this study to 10% FDI/GDP (see next 
section for more).  
 
Table 5.8: List of 196 Countries 
Afghanistanfh Czech Republicdgh Lao People's Dem. Rep.fgh Saint Kitts and Nevisefgh 
Albaniah Czechoslovakiab Latviagh Saint Luciaeg 
Algeria Dem. Rep. Congofgh Lebanonfgh Saint Pierre and Miquelona 
American Samoaa Denmarkcd Lesothoh Samoacgh 
Angolacefgh Dominicacefg Libyan gh San Marinob 
Antigua and Barbudaefgh Dominican Republiccgh Lithuaniafh Sao Tome and Principeefgh 
Argentinac Ecuadorc Luxembourgdgh Saudi Arabiagh 
Armeniafgh Egyptc Madagascar Senegal 
Arubaa El Salvadorc Malawi Serbiagh 
Australiacd Equatorial Guineagh Malaysiac Seychellesgh 
Austriacd Eritreagh Maldivesefgh Sierra Leonegh 
Azerbaijanfh Estoniagh Malta Singaporec 
Bahamascg Ethiopiacgh Marshall Islandsb Slovakiad 
Bahraincfh Ethiopia and Eritreab Mauritaniagh Slovenia 
Bangladeshc Fiji Mauritius Solomon Islandsfgh 
Barbadoscgh Finlandcd Mexicocd Somalia 
Belarusc Francedg Moldovafgh South Africa 
Belgiumcdg Gabon Mongolia Spaincd 
Belizecgh Gambiah Montserrata Sri Lankac 
Bening Georgiaefgh Moroccoc St. Vincent and the Grenadinesb 
Bermudaa Germanycdh Mozambiqueh Sudangh 
Bhutangh Germany (Eastern) b Myanmarb Surinamecfh 
Boliviac Germany, Fed. Repb Namibia Swazilandg 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ghana Nepal Swedencd 
Botswanac Greececd Netherlandscd Switzerlanddgh 
Brazilc Grenadacfh Netherlands Antillesa Syrian Arab Republiccgh 
Brunei Darussalamefgh Guadeloupeb New Caledoniaa Tajikistangh 
Bulgariagh Guatemalac New Zealandcd Thailandc 
Burkina Fasoh Guyanagh Nicaragua The f. Yugosl. Rep. of Macedonia 
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Burundigh Haitigh Nigere Togogh 
Cambodiafgh Hondurasc Nigeriac Tongacgh 
Cameroon Hungarydgh Niue Trinidad and Tobagoc 
Canadacd Icelandd Northern Mariana Islandsa Tunisiac 
Cape Verdeh India Norwaycd Turkeycd 
Cayman Islandsa Indonesiac Omangh Turkmenistanefgh 
Central African Republicgh Iran c Pakistanc Uganda 
Chilec Iraqbgh Palaub Ukrainefh 
Chinah Irelandcdgh Panamac United Arab Emiratesbgh 
China (Hong Kong) a Israelcgh Papua New Guineagh United Kingdomd 
China (Macao) a Italycd Paraguaycgh United Republic of Tanzaniac 
China (Taiwan) a Jamaicach Peruc United States of Americacd 
Colombia Japancd Philippinesc Uruguayc 
Congo Repgh  Jordan Polanddgh USSR (Former) b 
Cook Islandsa Kazakhstanefgh Portugalcd Venezuela c 
Costa Ricac Kenyah Puerto Ricoa Vietnamefgh 
Côte d'Ivoire Kiribatiefgh Qatarb Yemenfh 
Croatiagh Korea, Republic ofcd Romaniag Yugoslaviab 
Cubab Kuwaitc Russian Federation Zambia 
Cyprus Kyrgyzstanfh Rwandagh Zimbabwe 
a Dependent territories excluded from data set 
b No FDI data available—excluded from data set 
c In ILO data set 
d In OECD data set, except the following, which are missing: 
1. France—no employment data 
2. Spain—no employment data 
3. Switzerland—no employment data 
4. United Kingdom—no value added data 
5. United States of America—no employment data 
e Not in U323e data set 
f Not in U323v data set 
g Not in U924e data set 
h Not in U924v data set 
  
 
 
5.3.5.   Measuring Short-, Medium- and Long-Run Effects 
Following the standard practice in cross-country econometric analysis, annual dataset 
is interpreted to capture the short-run relationship between FDI and sector 
diversification. Likewise, results with 5-year average and cross-sectional data are 
interpreted to be of medium- and long-run, respectively. 
 
5.3.6.   Scatterplots and Influential Analysis 
Scatterplots are an important part of analysis, since outliers can affect the magnitude 
and sign of the coefficients, producing spurious results. The locally weighted scatter 
plot smoothing (lowess) modelling method is used in this study, and the outputs are 
displayed in Figure 5.2. The advantage of using lowess is that it is a simple and 
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flexible method of handling complex modelling. In addition, it is a non-parametric 
method that can fit the model without any specification.  
 
In Figure 5.2, the first two graphs (left hand side) in each dataset panel are for 
employment shares (the Gini coefficient followed by the Herfindahl index), and the 
last two graphs (right hand side) are for value added shares (Gini coefficient 
followed by Herfindahl index). It was noted that ILO 1-digit data did not have data 
on value added shares.  
 
Despite the smooth distribution that FDI/GDP may produce, this study still found 
some extreme values even in FDI/GDP using the lowess scatterplots. For example, 
countries such as Suriname and Luxemburg have extreme FDI values. Suriname has 
experienced mostly negative FDI over the years. According to UNCTAD (2010), 
Negative FDI inflows indicate that ‘at least one of the three components of FDI 
(equity capital, reinvested earnings or intra-company loans) is negative and not 
compensated by positive amounts of the remaining components’ (UNCTAD, 2010). 
These are also known as where the disinvestments are more than new invested 
capital (ibid.).  
 
Conversely, countries such as Luxembourg and Belgium have large positive figures 
for FDI because, as mentioned, these countries ‘serve mainly as financial 
intermediaries, offering very favourable conditions, such as tax exemptions for 
holding companies and corporate headquarters’ (UNCTAD, 2010). The issue of 
outliers has to be addressed in case it influences the results. Hence, a simple 
unconditional OLS analysis was carried out with and without outliers and the results 
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are compared in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. The results show that the quadratic relationship 
between FDI and sector diversification is influenced by the outliers. When the 
identified outliers in Figure 5.2 are removed and the lowess plots re-drawn, there is 
still evidence of some outlying observations in Figure 5.3.  
 
According to Wilcox and Keselman (2003), skewness issues in the distribution can 
be dealt with by simple transformations; however, they suggest that for outliers, the 
trimming technique might be a better approach. According to them, trimming is a 
method, which they argue to be efficient in eliminating outliers.  According to 
Wilcox (1998), the criteria of trimming determine its effectiveness. Different studies 
have claimed different percentage of trimming from each tail of the distribution. For 
example Rocke et al. (1982) claimed 20–25%, Othman et al. (2004) 15% and 
Keselman et al. (2004) 10–15%.   
 
Another approach is not to trim a fixed amount of the data but only the outliers. 
Hence, this study uses a trimming method which is strictly grounded in the FDI 
activities, hence limits the observations to 10% of FDI/GDP. When limited to 10% 
FDI/GDP (see Figure 5.4), all of the datasets except the OECD dataset demonstrate a 
negative relationship between FDI and diversification, implying sector 
diversification. The OECD countries demonstrate a U-shaped relationship. The 
descriptive statistics of all variables used in the model are shown in Table 5.11. 
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Figure 5.2: Cross-Sectional Lowess Plots 
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Figure 5.3: Lowess Plots after Removal of Outliers in Figure 5.2 
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Figure 5.4: Lowess Plots Within 10% FDI/GDP (Gini) 
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Table 5.9: Outlier (Luxemburg) Effect on UNIDO 3-Digit Employment Herfindahl 
Results using OLS Unconditional Model (Cross-Sectional) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1denotes  
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. fdi_sq is the quadratic of fdi. 
 
Table 5.10: Outlier (Luxemburg and Belgium) Effect on OECD 2-Digit Employment 
Gini Results using OLS Unconditional Model (Annual) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes  
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. fdi_sq is the quadratic of fdi. 
 
Table 5.11: Descriptive Statistics (Annual) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
 
All countries 
(squared) 
All countries  
(linear) 
Without outlier  
(squared) 
Without outlier  
(linear) 
fdi 0.510* 0.029*** 0.366 0.391** 
 (1.77) (3.10) (1.08) (2.46) 
fdi_sq –0.001*  0.000  
 (–1.69)  (0.12)  
Constant 14.273*** 15.503*** 14.538*** 14.484*** 
 (13.29) (17.04) (13.33) (15.05) 
Observations 148 148 147 147 
R-squared 0.021 0.006 0.021 0.021 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables 
 
All countries 
(squared) 
All countries  
(linear) 
Without outliers 
(squared) 
Without 
outliers 
(linear) 
fdi –0.052*** –0.021*** –0.063 –0.148***   
 (–5.96) (–5.88) (–0.68) (–2.94)   
fdi_sq 0.000***  –0.005    
 (4.02)  (–1.05)    
Constant 48.018*** 47.889*** 48.272*** 48.411***   
 (200.67) (205.60) (143.66) (156.63)   
Observations 376 376 355 355   
R-squared 0.054 0.045 0.027 0.024   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fdi 4451 1.78 2.37 -28.62 9.99 
ln_initial_pcap 4434 -1.78 1.08 -4.83 0.99 
findev 4239 38.23 35.90 0.04 231.08 
gcf 4259 22.22 7.71 1.57 93.12 
trade 4345 71.62 37.83 6.32 251.13 
ILO 1-digit (Employment)      
Gini coefficient 901 49.01 8.57 16.26 83.29 
Herfindahl index 901 22.48 6.76 7.46 79.99 
OECD 2-digit (Employment)      
Gini coefficient 331 48.06 4.45 36.11 64.94 
Herfindahl index 331 11.24 1.49 9.41 19.86 
OECD 2-digit (Value added)      
Gini coefficient 460 46.00 4.87 33.53 57.70 
Herfindahl index 460 11.74 1.66 9.04 19.67 
UNIDO 3-digit (Employment)      
Gini coefficient 2250 58.60 11.12 22.22 95.36 
Herfindahl index 2250 13.23 9.45 5.98 87.72 
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Note: Present descriptive statistics for annual dataset only. Outliers have been removed and all values 
are within 10% of FDI/GDP. The diversification measures have been scaled up by 100 for consistency 
with FDI/GDP, which is also measured as a percentage.  
 
 
5.4.   Empirical Results 
The analysis begins with some global FDI and diversification trends. In addition, 
because this study uses the same datasets as Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), initially their 
model is replicated to compare the results. Finally, the results are presented using 
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 for all the datasets mentioned.  
 
5.4.1.   Trends in the FDI and Diversification Data 
It can be inferred from Figure 5.5 that the world average FDI and diversification do 
not reveal many patterns, except for the UNIDO 4-digit, which shows diversification 
only in value added shares. However, when the world average is divided into 
developing and developed countries, the pattern emerges more clearly.  
 
In particular, Figure 5.6, which relates to developing countries, demonstrates sector 
diversification in the ILO 1-digit and slightly in UNIDO 3-digit disaggregated data 
levels. However, UNIDO 4-digit data more clearly shows that the developing 
countries diversify in value added shares while employment shares concentrate in the 
manufacturing sectors. This suggests diversification across all sectors, and also 
within manufacturing sector in developing countries, as a result of FDI. 
UNIDO 3-digit (Value added)      
Gini coefficient 2139 57.91 11.46 20.30 94.68 
Herfindahl index 2139 12.88 9.46 5.39 88.78 
UNIDO 4-digit (Employment)      
Gini coefficient 819 62.04 12.27 41.63 96.43 
Herfindahl index 819 15.06 15.07 5.98 100.00 
UNIDO 4-digit (Value added)      
Gini coefficient 759 64.18 13.06 5.21 98.78 
Herfindahl index 759 8.56 9.04 2.25 60.29 
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Conversely, the developed countries in Figure 5.7 are observed to remain stable over 
time, except for some variation noted in the UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated data level. 
This case shows the opposite of the developing countries: value added is decreasing 
diversification. What does this mean? It means that developed countries diversify in 
employment shares. In addition, the graphs in Figure 5.7 shows that developed 
countries do not diversify in the broad sectors of the economy neither at the 1- nor 2- 
digit levels, but some evidence of diversification is revealed in the manufacturing 
sector at the 4-digit disaggregated level. However, developing countries are found to 
be diversifying across the board as well as within the manufacturing sector.  
 
These graphs confirm the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3, that developed 
countries are considered already diversified (Koren and Tenreyro, 2007, Cuberes and 
Jerzmanowski, 2009) while developing countries, through various factors including 
FDI, are encouraged to diversify their economies at the broader sectoral level. 
However, the literature discussed in Chapter 2 still claimed strong evidence of 
sectoral linkages in developed countries in the manufactruing sector, and this may be 
the reason for the diversifying effect noted in the manufacturing sector of the 
developed countries in Figure 5.6. In additon, it is also noted in the theoretical 
chapters of this thesis that sectoral linkages are mostly captured at higher 
disaggargated data levels and within the manufacturing sector. Consistent with this, it 
is noted from Figures 5.5 to 5.7 that some patterns of sector diversification as a result 
of FDI are exposed at the most disaggareted data level, the 4-digit level, and in the 
manufacturing sector. This variation is noted after the surge in FDI in the year 2000 
onwards.  
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Figure 5.5: World FDI and Diversification Trends   
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Figure 5.6: FDI in Developing Countries and Diversification Trends 
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Figure 5.7: FDI in Developed Countries and Diversification Trends 
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5.4.2.   Replicating the Model of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) 
The results of the replication of Imbs and Wacziarg’s (2003) model are presented in 
Table 5.12. To some extent, the results obtained in this study were consistent with 
theirs but not for all datasets. This could be due to this study using more countries in 
each dataset and more years than Imbs and Wacziarg did. For example, Imbs and 
Wacziarg included UNIDO 3-digit data with 1,556 observations and 67 countries in 
their study, while this study includes more than 2,000 observations and more than 
130 countries. The same is found for OECD 2-digit data, where they considered only 
14 OECD countries, while this study almost doubles their sample. In addition, this 
study includes four more countries in the ILO 1-digit data sample than them. 
 
Table 5.12: Replication of Imbs and Wacziarg’s (2003) Model using Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
                              denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Variables Employment   Value added   
  Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl 
Panel A. ILO 1-digit data 
Income –0.011** –0.013***     
  (–2.18) (–3.12)     
Income2 0.0003** 0.0003***     
  (2.43) (2.84)     
Observations 989 989     
No. of countries 68 68     
Panel B. OECD 2-digit data 
Income –0.002 –0.002*** –0.001 –0.001* 
  (–1.18) (–3.92) (–0.27) (–1.82) 
Income2 0.00002 0.00001*** 0.00002 0.00002* 
  (1.22) (3.32) (1.10) (2.04) 
Observations 390 390 519 519 
No. of countries 27 27 29 29 
Panel C. UNIDO 3-digit Data 
Income 0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.000 
  (0.59) (0.89) (0.63) (–0.30) 
Income2 –0.00001 –0.00001 –0.00001 0.00001 
  (–0.47) (–1.01) (–0.85) (0.05) 
Observations 2,695 2,695 2,469 2,469 
No. of countries 147 147 131 131 
Panel D. UNIDO 4-digit data 
Income 0.001 –0.003 –0.002 –0.004 
  (0.64) (–1.33) (–0.84) (–1.25) 
Income2 –0.00002 0.00005 0.00004 0.00007 
  (–0.81) (1.24) (0.97) (1.37) 
Observations 871 871 803 803 
No. of countries 98 98 83 83 
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5.4.3.   Effect of FDI on Sector Diversification 
5.4.3.1.   Benchmark Results 
Table 5.13 adds FDI to the Imbs-Wacziarg model above. In this sense, the model 
captures the impact of FDI on diversification over and above what is predicted by the 
level of development. From the outset, the table documents significant evidence of 
sector diversification across broad sectors of the economy, i.e., at the ILO 1-digit 
disaggregated data level, and within the manufacturing sector at the 4-digit 
disaggregated level. However, when sub-sampled, it is noted that these effects 
basically belong to the developing countries. No robust evidence of sector 
diversification is found in the OECD 2-digit disaggregated level or in the UNIDO 3-
digit disaggregated data level. This chapter reveals that only developing countries 
diversify as a result of FDI at certain disaggregation levels.  
 
5.4.3.1.1.   Across All Sectors (ILO 1-Digit and OECD 2-Digit Data) 
We now discuss our findings in more detail. Results are presented using annual, five-
year average and cross-sectional datasets, labelled as Panels A, B and C, 
respectively. Further, results are reported for the world sample (first column) as well 
as for the country sub-groups by income (subsequent columns). They are not 
reported for low-income countries, which had insufficient observations. However, 
this sort of sub-grouping could not be done for the OECD dataset (see Table 5.14), 
which includes mostly high-income countries, except for six developing countries. 
For the robustness check on developed countries, these six developing countries are 
excluded from this dataset to verify if the results still hold for the developed 
countries. Given this, a caveat is issued on the small sample size of this dataset. 
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Table 5.13 reports the results of ILO 1-digit aggregated data across nine broad 
sectors. As demonstrated in Panels A and B, this dataset did not show any significant 
effect of sector diversification in the short- and medium-runs respectively. However, 
there is evidence of significant sector diversification in this dataset as a result of FDI 
in the long run (see Panel C) using the Gini coefficient measure of diversification, 
and also confirming this using the Herfindahl index. The significance of this effect is 
noted in the world samples (see the first column); robust across both measures of 
diversification and significant at the 1% level. The world sample, when sub-grouped 
by income, reveals that this effect emerges from the developing countries, with a 
robust effect also from the middle-income countries. A 1% increase in FDI increases 
sector diversification by approximately 2% along the Gini index within the 99% 
confidence interval (see Table 5.13, Panel C, Columns 4 and 8). There is no evidence 
of sector diversification noted for the developed countries in this dataset. This 
finding also confirms the scatterplot on this dataset and the pattern observed in 
Figure 5.6 in the developing countries sample, especially the downward movement 
of the ILO Gini and Herfindahl measures with an increase in FDI over time. 
 
Table 5.14 reports the results of OECD 2-digit disaggregated data for both 
employment and value added shares across 17 broad sectors of the economy. It is 
noted that the sign of the FDI coefficient in the employment shares results is 
negative, while for value added shares it has a positive sign. Moreover, relative to the 
FDI coefficients in Table 5.13 for ILO 1-digit data, and in particular with the 
developing countries, the magnitudes of the OECD countries FDI coefficients are 
found to be mostly insignificant and smaller in all the Panels from A-C and in all 
columns. 
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The different signs of employment and value added shares may be due to the type of 
FDI sector: labour or capital-intensive. As noted in Chapter 2, labour-intensive and 
capital-intensive sectors do not have similar effects on sectoral linkages (see 
Kippenberg, 2005, Suyanto et al. 2012). For instance, Kippenberg’s (2005) study 
revealed that labour-intensive sectors were influenced by FDI, but capital-intensive 
sectors were influenced by trade. This could be one possible reason for why value 
added shares (capital-intensive) do not diversify as a result of FDI, while 
employment shares (labour-intensive) do. In a similar vein, Suyanto et al (2012) 
showed backward linkages in the garment manufacturing sector (labour-intensive) 
and a negative effect on the electronic manufacturing sector (capital-intensive). 
 
In Panel A, the Herfindahl index measure is positive and significant at 1% level, 
however this result does not hold for the Gini measure. In the similar vein, in Panel 
B, the baseline result of the employment shares using Gini coefficient is found to be 
negative and significant in the medium run but the results are not robust using the 
Herfindahl index. Also no significant results are obtained in Panel C for the cross-
sectional dataset.  
 
Recalling the scatterplots of this dataset presented earlier in this chapter, a U-shaped 
relationship was noted between FDI and diversification. Hence, a quadratic model 
was also estimated for this dataset; however, the results remained insignificant. 
Figure 5.7 also demonstrated a stable relationship between FDI and diversification 
on average, in the OECD dataset.  
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This finding is in line with the theoretical discussions in Chapter 3, where it was 
argued that the developed countries already have diversified economies, and the 
margin in which they can become more diversified is relatively smaller. Across the 
broad sectors, only the developing countries were found to be diversifying as a result 
of FDI.  
 
5.4.3.1.2.   Manufacturing Sector (UNIDO 3- and 4-Digit Data) 
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 present the results for employment shares and value added 
shares for the manufacturing sector at the 3-digit disaggregation level. There is no 
empirical evidence of a significant effect of FDI on sector diversification in these 
datasets. Even the graphs presented in Figures 5.5–5.7 did not provide many clues on 
the FDI–diversification relationship in this particular dataset. The developing 
countries show slight downward movement over time, but the variation is not much, 
as noted for the 4-digit graphs.  
 
One of the plausible reasons for the absence of diversification from the UNIDO 3-
digit disaggregated data is the availability of these data between 1970 and 2000. It is 
noted from the discussion on the evolution of multinationals in Chapter 1 that the 
surge of FDI was only observed in the early years of 2000. This era was marked by 
acceleration in world FDI inflows, reaching the world time peaks in 2007.  
 
Another reason for this dataset not being able to capture the effects of diversification 
could be the higher level of disaggregated data. It is noted from Chapters 2 and 3 that 
when data are disaggregated, they capture the effect of sectoral linkages; and this 
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disaggregation could be by industry, as mentioned by Kippenberg (2005) and 
Suyanto et al. (2012), or by digits, as mentioned by Pack and Paxson (1999).  
 
Pack and Paxson (1999) argued that the inter-sectoral movement of labour occurs at 
a greater degree of sector disaggregation. This argument also holds for the findings 
in this chapter, especially for the manufacturing sector. The graphic illustrations of 
the UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated data from Figures 5.5 to 5.8 show this in the world 
sample and also within both country sub-groups. Again, the graphs show that the 
developing countries are diversifying within the manufacturing sector in value added 
shares.  
 
This argument also holds empirically in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 which present the 
results for the manufacturing sector at the 4-digit data disaggregation level on 
employment and value added shares, respectively. Particularly, in this dataset, some 
conclusions could be drawn on FDI’s effect on sector diversification in the 
manufacturing sector. For instance, Table 5.19 (see Panel A) shows a significant 
effect of FDI on sector diversification in low-income countries in the short run, and 
the results hold not only for both measures of diversification, but also for both 
employment and value added shares (see Table 5.18, Panel A). A 1% increase in FDI 
increases sector diversification by more than 1% (inconsistency in magnitudes 
between Gini and Herfindahl measures in this case) at 10% significance level for 
employment shares but at 1% significance level for the value added shares in the 
annual dataset (see Table 5.17, Panel A, Columns 4 and 8). It is noted that in the 
employment shares results, over the 5-year average, there is strong sector 
concentration noted within the low-income countries at 1% level, whereas 1% 
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increase in FDI decreases sector diversification by 7.493% along the Gini index, 
(again, this result is inconsistent in magnitude with the Herfindahl measure) at 1% 
level of significance (see Table 5.17, Panel B, Column 4). 
 
Low-income countries, which are a sub-set of the developing countries, are found to 
be diversifying, but yet no evidence of this is found for the developed countries. 
Similarly, over the long run, middle-income countries belonging to the broader 
category of developing countries are found to be diversifying. This result is also 
robust across both measures of diversification. It is noted that the magnitude of FDI’s 
effect on sector diversification in the manufacturing sector, particularly for the 
middle-income countries, is stronger in the long run compared to the ILO 1-digit 
results (see Table 5.17 in Panel C, Columns 5 and 10). In this case, a 1% increase in 
FDI increases sector diversification to approximately 3–4% along the Gini index. 
This finding is also in line with the theory that the manufacturing sector generates 
greater sectoral linkages relative to other sectors of the economy (Romer, 1986; 
1990; Guillaumonh, 1999; UNCTAD, 2001b; Zhang, 2003) compared with the 
aggregate ILO 1-digit results, and this occurs in the long run. The overall results 
from the manufacturing sector in particular are concluded to be very case-specific in 
sign, magnitude and significance level across diversification measures, sector sizes 
and country sub-groups.  
 
5.4.3.2.   Robustness Analysis  
One of the ways of conducting robustness checks on the results of this chapter is 
using alternative measure of diversification, the Herfindahl index. In addition, 
models are tested with and without controls. Particularly for developing countries, 
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the EAP and LAC regions are excluded to check if the results still hold, and that 
results are not driven by the EAP region, which is the highest FDI region, and the 
LAC region, which has highest number of countries of the developing countries sub-
group.  
 
The World Bank classifies countries by geographical regions as follows: EAP, ECA, 
MENA, Southern Asia, NA, SSA, LAC and Western Europe.  
 
For developed countries, due to the limited sample size, an alternative dataset was 
used, comprised of OECD countries. It should also be noted that some developing 
countries (Mexico, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, Korea and Slovakia) 
are members of OECD. For robustness check purposes, these countries were 
excluded and a caveat was issued for the small sample.  
 
5.4.3.2.1.   Across All Sectors (ILO-1 Digit Data)  
Table 5.19 reports the results of the ILO 1-digit disaggregated data after excluding 
the EAP and LAC regions. It is noted that the results of Table 5.13 still hold. After 
dropping the EAP region, the significance level is not affected, but the exclusion of 
LAC countries has changed the level of significance from 1% to 10%, and the 
magnitude of the FDI coefficient is also lower after excluding the LAC region. 
However, the results are still significant in both cases.  
 
In addition, Table 5.20 reports the results with and without the controls for both 
country sub-groups, including the world sample. It is noted from the results that after 
adding the controls, the magnitude of FDI for the world sample gets stronger, but 
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slightly weakens for the developing countries group. However, the results are still 
significant only for the developing countries at the 1% level of significance.  
 
Democracy is also included in the model, and the results confirm Cuberes and 
Jerzmanowski’s (2009) finding that democracy affects sector diversification because 
non-democratic nations have high barriers to entry for new firms, affecting foreign 
investment. Including democracy in the model affects FDI, and expectedly the results 
become insignificant.  
 
5.4.3.2.2.   Manufacturing Sector (UNIDO 4-Digit) 
The results of the robustness check for the 4-digit disaggregated data in the 
manufacturing sector are reported for the low-income and middle-income countries 
in Tables 5.21 and 5.22, respectively.  
 
From Table 5.21 it can be noted that after excluding the two regions, the results do 
not hold for low-income countries for the employment shares in the short run, while 
the value added results are still significant. Similarly, the results in Table 5.22 for the 
middle-income countries only hold for the employment shares and not for the value 
added shares. Hence, low-income countries diversify in value added shares, while 
middle-income countries diversify in employment shares.  
 
The findings from this chapter could not explain the variation in the 4-digit 
disaggregated data shown in Figures 5.5–5.7, although there is an indication that 
employment shares and value added shares may not result in consistent results. 
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Hence, some further investigation is needed, particularly in the manufacturing sector, 
where general conclusions could not be drawn from the case-specific results.  
 
5.5.   Chapter Summary 
This chapter explored the relationship between FDI and sector diversification across 
all the sectors of the economy with comparison to the manufacturing sector. The 
justification for choosing the manufacturing sector is that this sector experiences a 
greater linkage effect as a result of FDI, as noted in the literature (UNCTAD, 2001b). 
This relationship was explored in the short, medium and long run, using annual, five-
year average and cross-sectional datasets, respectively. Further, various levels of 
disaggregated data were used at the sectoral level (sectoral shares data). Data were 
obtained from four different datasets (ILO 1-digit, OECD 2-digit, UNIDO 3-digit 
and UNIDO 4-digit) using employment and value added shares. The Gini coefficient 
was used as the base measure, while the Herfindahl index was used for an alternative 
measurement.  
 
From the above discussions on the findings from this chapter, it could be concluded 
that FDI has a direct effect on sector diversification across broad sectors of the 
economy. This effect is more pronounced in developing countries. Overall, this study 
is the first to conduct empirical research on such a large number of countries to 
explore the effects of FDI on sector diversification. Thus so far, this effect has only 
been theorised by scholars and renowned institutions such as the World Bank. 
However, this research has confirmed this effect empirically and found robust 
evidence of sector diversification as a result of FDI. Therefore, FDI should be 
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promoted and highly encouraged, especially in the developing countries, which can 
benefit from sector diversification.  
 
Some case-specific results were noted, particularly in the manufacturing sector; 
hence, no clear and general conclusion can be made on this sector. Although this 
chapter has demonstrated the direct effect of FDI on sector diversification across the 
broad sectors at the 1-digit aggregated data level, some results remain inconclusive. 
The next question is that whether for these case-specific results are there any national 
facilitators that can channel sector diversification resulting from FDI. Hence, the next 
chapter explores the two national channels that are believed to facilitate sector 
diversification: labour and capital market development.  
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Table 5.13: ILO 1-Digit Results (Employment Shares) 
 
Note: Output suppressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. Due to insufficient observation from low-
income countries, their results are not reported. Annual and 5-year average results are obtained using Equation 5.1, and cross-
sectional results are obtained using Equation 5.2.  
 
 
Table 5.14: OECD 2-Digit Results (Employment and Value Added Shares) 
Note: Output suppressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.  Controls include initial ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. OECD countries are mostly high-income 
countries with only a few developing countries as members. Therefore, the sample is not further sub-grouped. Robustness check 
was done only on developed countries (excluding developing countries) and a caveat issued on the small size of this dataset. 
Annual and 5-year average results are obtained using Equation 5.1 and cross-sectional results are obtained using Equation 5.2. 
 
 
  Gini  Herfindahl 
 World 
sample 
Sub-samples World 
sample 
Sub-samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
Variables All 
countries 
Developing 
 
Developed 
 
Middle-
income 
 
 All 
countries 
Developing 
 
Developed 
 
Middle-
income 
 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi -0.055 -0.037 -0.158 -0.035  0.034 0.053 0.053 0.053  
 (-0.76) (-0.49) (-1.25) (-0.37)  (0.70) -0.014 -0.014 -0.014  
Observations 851 523 328 444  851 523 328 444  
No. of countries 59 39 20 33  59 39 20 33  
Panel B. 5-year average 
fdi 0.007 -0.055 1.093** -0.132  0.148 0.133 0.273 0.128  
 (0.05) (0.015) (2.13) (-0.97)  (0.85) (0.72) (1.55) (0.76)  
Observations 216 147 69 124  216 147 69 124  
No. of countries 61 41 20 35  61 41 20 35  
Panel C. Cross-sectional 
fdi -2.423*** -1.983*** -0.952 -2.247***  -1.964*** -1.491** -0.744 -2.247***  
 (-4.85) (-3.30) (-0.83) (-3.66)  (-3.88) (-2.13) (-1.24) (-3.66)  
No. of countries 64 44 20 36  64 44 20 36  
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Common Time 
effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-specific 
time trend 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
 Employment Value added 
Variables Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All  
countries 
Only  
developed 
  
All  
countries 
Only  
developed  
 
All  
countries 
Only  
developed  
 
All  
countries 
Only  
developed  
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 0.058 0.049 0.031* 0.030* 
 (-0.66) (-0.57) (-1.46) (-1.18) (1.40) (1.06) (1.99) (1.76) 
Observations 328 249 328 249 454 391 454 391 
No. of countries 25 18 25 18 27 20 27 20 
Panel B. 5-year Average  
fdi -0.128** -0.144* -0.026 -0.029 0.129 0.060 0.029 -0.003 
 (-2.35) (-1.98) (-1.35) (-1.38) (0.72) (0.27) (0.53) (-0.05) 
Observations 88 66 88 66 108 90 108 90 
No. of countries 25 18 25 18 27 20 27 20 
Panel C. Cross-sectional  
fdi -0.054 -0.210 0.154 -0.153 0.154 1.707 0.141 0.490 
 (-0.08) (-0.28) (0.64) (-1.05) (0.89) (1.10) (0.70) (0.86) 
No. of countries 25 18 25 18 27 20 27 20 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific time 
trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5.15: UNIDO 3-Digit Results (Employment Shares) 
Note: Output suppressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.  Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. Annual and 5-year average results are obtained 
using Equation 5.1 and cross-sectional results are obtained using Equation 5.2. Robustness check of results is done using the 
Herfindahl index, an alternative measure to diversification.  
 
Table 5.16: UNIDO 3-Digit Results (Value Added Shares) 
Note: Output suppressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.  Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. Annual and 5-year average results are obtained 
using Equation 5.1 and cross-sectional results are obtained using Equation 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
sample 
Sub-samples World 
sample 
Sub-samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables All 
countries 
Developing 
 
Developed 
 
Low-
income 
 
Middle-
income 
 
All 
countries 
Developing 
 
Developed 
 
Low-
income 
 
Middle-
income 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 0.002 0.028 -0.013 0.060 0.022 -0.012 -0.005 -0.023 -0.047 0.017 
 (0.02) (0.34) (-0.20) (0.23) (0.32) (-0.18) (-0.06) (-0.60) (-0.17) (0.35) 
Observations 2018 1401 617 442 959 2018 1401 617 442 959 
No. of countries 125 98 27 37 61 125 98 27 37 61 
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi 0.068 0.112 -0.062 2.573 0.088 -0.134 -0.189 0.003 -2.926 -0.081 
 (0.47) (0.54) (-0.43) (0.65) (0.46) (-1.19) (-1.34) (0.05) (-1.14) (-0.75) 
Observations 456 327 129 111 216 456 327 129 111 216 
No. of countries 122 95 27 34 61 122 95 27 34 61 
Panel C. Cross-sectional 
fdi -0.771 -0.674 1.269 -0.741 -0.517 -0.064 0.053 0.410 -0.084 0.094 
 (-1.62) (-1.56) (0.87) (-1.17) (-0.85) (-0.15) (0.11) (0.96) (-0.18) (0.12) 
No. of countries 138 111 27 45 66 138 111 27 45 66 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific 
time trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
sample 
Sub-samples World 
sample 
Sub-samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Low-
income 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Low-
income 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 0.011 0.017 -0.012 -0.076 0.072 -0.069 -0.118 0.079 -0.193 -0.111 
 (0.14) (0.21) (-0.08) (-0.92) (0.67) (-1.05) (-1.59) (0.91) (-1.38) (-1.05) 
Observations 1942 1343 599 439 904 1942 1343 599 439 904 
No. of countries 113 86 27 33 53 113 86 27 33 53 
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi 0.020 0.016 -0.141 -0.408 0.051 -0.178 -0.270 -0.002 -1.098 -0.073 
 (0.09) (0.06) (-0.40) (-0.58) (0.21) (-1.01) (-1.33) (-0.01) (-1.13) (-0.41) 
Observations 442 315 127 110 205 442 315 127 110 205 
No. of countries 115 88 27 34 54 115 88 27 34 54 
Panel C. Cross-sectional 
fdi -1.057 -0.512 2.498 -0.646 -0.518 0.535 1.208 0.668 1.335 0.923 
 (-1.57) (-0.94) (1.08) (-0.95) (-0.66) (0.67) (1.57) (0.46) (1.41) (0.91) 
No. of countries 125 98 27 37 61 125 98 27 37 61 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific 
time trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5.17: UNIDO 4-Digit Results (Employment Shares) 
           Note: Output suppressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%        
          level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade.  Annual and 5-year average results are obtained using  
         Equation 5.1 and cross-sectional results are obtained using Equation 5.2.  
 
Table 5.18: UNIDO 4-Digit Results (Value Added Shares) 
         Note: Output suppressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10%     
         level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade.  5-year average had insufficient data for low-income countries.  
       Annual and 5-year average results are obtained using Equation 5.1 and cross-sectional results are obtained using Equation 5.2.  
 Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
sample 
Sub-samples World 
sample 
Sub-samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Low-
income 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Low-
income 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi -0.008 0.032 -0.231 -1.444* 0.009 -0.205 -0.188 -0.150 -3.591* -0.025 
 (-0.07) (0.37) (-0.60) (-2.04) (0.12) (-1.14) (-0.88) (-1.01) (-1.90) (-0.39) 
Observations 775 519. 256 174 345 775 519 256 174 345 
No. of countries 85 64 21 25 39 85 64 21 25 39 
Panel B. 5-year average 
fdi -0.237 0.217 -2.236 7.493*** -0.244 0.059 0.259 -0.918 3.903*** 0.048 
 (-0.62) (0.76) (-1.33) (2.97) (-1.04) (0.20) (0.61) (-0.93) (3.45) (0.12) 
Observations 228 162 66 58 104 228 162 66 58 104 
No. of countries 86 65 21 26 39 86 65 21 26 39 
Panel C. Cross-sectional 
fdi -1.425 -1.066 2.044 0.447 -3.907*** -0.469 -0.276 0.099 -0.479 -4.628** 
 (-1.42) (-0.89) -1.010 (0.25) (-3.75) (-0.28) (-0.14) (0.07) (-0.20) (-2.51) 
No. of countries 93 72 21 29 43 93 72 21 29 43 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common Time 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific 
time trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
sample 
Sub-samples World 
sample 
Sub-samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Low-
income 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Low-
income 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 0.056 0.066 0.025 -2.654*** 0.133 -0.085 -0.131 0.670 -1.237*** -0.089 
 (0.70) (0.72) (0.11) (-5.62) (1.45) (-0.54) (-1.39) (1.30) (-3.88) (-0.98) 
Observations 728 460 268 143 317 728 460 268 143 317 
No. of 
countries 
76 54 22 19 35 76 54 22 19 35 
Panel B. 5-year average 
fdi -0.602 0.191 -4.939  0.300 0.364 0.255 2.970  0.229 
 (-0.64) (0.31) (-1.66)  (0.49) (0.43) (0.66) (1.01)  (0.61) 
Observations 208 138 70  94 208 138 70  94 
No. of 
countries 
76 54 22  34 76 54 22  34 
Panel C. Cross-sectional 
fdi -2.762*** -1.199 -1.578 -0.513 -1.405 -1.353 -0.181 -1.313 3.445 -1.698* 
 (-2.69) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-0.13) (-1.31) (-1.63) (-0.21) (-0.88) (1.32) (-1.90) 
No. of 
countries 
80 58 22 21 37 80 58 22 21 37 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-
specific time 
trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5.19: Robustness Check ILO 1-Digit Cross-Sectional Baseline Result: Dropped 
EAP and LAC Regions (Employment Shares) – Gini Only 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5.20: ILO 1-Digit Robustness Check with and Without Controls (Employment 
Shares) – Gini Only 
 World sample Developing countries Developed countries 
Variables Without 
controls 
With controls Without 
controls 
With controls Without 
controls 
With controls 
fdi -1.645*** -2.423*** -2.077*** -1.983*** -1.034 -0.952 
 (-2.94) (-4.85) (-3.43) (-3.30) (-0.70) (-0.83) 
ln_initial_pcap  -5.647***  -8.109***  4.553 
  (-3.20)  (-4.58)  (1.47) 
initial_findev  -0.026  -0.168**  0.038* 
  (-0.66)  (-2.07)  (1.89) 
initial_gcf  -0.115  0.164  -0.205 
  (-0.77)  (1.40)  (-1.53) 
initial_trade  0.045**  0.014  0.039 
  (2.11)  (0.43)  (1.41) 
No. of countries 65 64 45 44 20 20 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Table 5.21: Robustness Check for Annual UNIDO 4-Digit Manufacturing Sector (Low-
Income Countries): Dropped EAP and LAC Regions (Gini Only) 
 Low-income countries 
 Employment Value added 
Variables Dropped EAP 
region 
Dropped LAC 
region 
Dropped 
EAP region 
Dropped LAC 
region 
fdi -1.453 -1.353 -2.497*** -2.145*** 
 (-1.65) (-1.65) (-4.35) (-4.69) 
ln_initial_pcap -5.804* -5.884 8.430 7.005 
 (-1.85) (-1.70) (1.22) (1.19) 
initial_findev -0.073 -0.123** 0.067 -0.076 
 (-0.80) (-2.31) (0.75) (-1.41) 
initial_gcf -0.121 -0.180* -0.030 -0.353*** 
 (-1.09) (-1.81) (-0.16) (-3.11) 
initial_trade -0.065* -0.023 -0.034 -0.036* 
 (-1.73) (-1.10) (-0.55) (-1.85) 
No. of countries 149 159 122 125 
No. of countries 22 22 17 17 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Common time effects YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific time trend YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Within 
EAP 
Dropped EAP region Within 
LAC 
Dropped LAC region 
Variables All 
countries 
World 
sample 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
 All 
countries 
World 
sample 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
 
fdi -6.174* -2.331*** -2.010*** -0.924  -2.116*** -1.607* -1.117* -0.093  
 (-3.32) (-4.56) (-3.23) (-0.76)  (-4.93) (-1.98) (-1.88) (-0.08)  
ln_initial_pcap 2.164 -5.276** -7.760*** 5.384*  -2.988* -5.857*** -8.121*** 5.512  
 (0.82) (-2.59) (-4.00) (1.82)  (-1.76) (-2.75) (-3.20) (1.53)  
initial_findev -0.014 -0.021 -0.164* 0.037*  0.058 -0.024 -0.493*** 0.069**  
 (-0.32) (-0.43) (-1.74) (1.97)  (0.78) (-0.47) (-4.51) (2.98)  
initial_gcf -0.556 -0.124 0.101 -0.090  -0.217** -0.194 0.510** -0.301  
 (-1.00) (-0.77) (0.92) (-0.63)  (-2.24) (-0.71) (2.55) (-1.56)  
initial_trade 0.235* 0.045* 0.027 0.033  0.028 0.059 -0.114* 0.056*  
 (4.03) (1.96) (0.75) (1.27)  (1.16) (1.10) (-2.10) (1.87)  
Observations 9 55 38 17  24 40 21 19  
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS  
CHAPTER FIVE 
127 
 
 
Table 5.22: Robustness Check for Cross-Sectional Manufacturing Sector (Middle-
Income Countries): Dropped EAP and LAC Regions (Gini Only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Middle-income countries 
 Employment Value added 
Variables Dropped EAP region Dropped LAC region Dropped EAP region Dropped LAC region 
fdi -4.077*** -4.077*** -1.396 -1.396 
 (-3.69) (-3.69) (-1.03) (-1.03) 
ln_initial_pcap -3.003* -3.003* -2.846 -2.846 
 (-1.87) (-1.87) (-0.95) (-0.95) 
initial_findev -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.505** -0.505** 
 (-3.70) (-3.70) (-2.45) (-2.45) 
initial_gcf -0.308* -0.308* 0.221 0.221 
 (-1.86) (-1.86) (0.86) (0.86) 
initial_trade 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.141** 0.141** 
 (5.92) (5.92) (2.50) (2.50) 
Observations 38 38 30 30 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method YES YES YES YES 
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CHAPTER 6: HOW DOES FDI AFFECT DIVERSIFICATION? THE ROLE 
OF LABOUR AND CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
6.1.   Introduction 
The previous chapter found some significant empirical evidence of sector 
diversification as a result of FDI; however, the results remain rather case-specific. 
Results were compared across the broad sectors of the economy to the manufacturing 
sector. Results were also compared at 1- digit aggregated and 2-digit disaggregated 
data at the broad sectoral level, and at 3- and 4-digits within the manufacturing 
sector. Further, results were compared using two different measures of sector size: 
employment shares and value added shares. The Gini coefficient was used as a 
baseline measure of diversification; with an alternative measure of the Herfindahl 
index to cross-check the findings.  
 
At the broad sectoral level, robust significant results were found at the ILO 1-digit 
aggregated data level only for the developing countries. Developed countries were 
found not to be diversifying across the broad sectors of the economy, and this finding 
was also confirmed by the OECD 2-digit disaggregated data, which mainly include 
industrialised nations. 
 
Within the manufacturing sector, no evidence of sector diversification was found at 
the UNIDO 3-digit disaggregated level, however, at the 4-digit disaggregated level, 
there was some case-specific evidence of sector diversification in low-income 
countries (reflected in value added shares) in the short run, and in middle-income 
countries (reflected in employment shares) in the long run. Overall, evidence of 
sector diversification was found in developing countries. Although robust results 
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were found at the ILO 1-digit disaggregated data level, the results for the 
manufacturing sector remained rather inconclusive.  
 
From these findings, a natural question that arises is whether there are any specific 
channels through which FDI may affect diversification. Given the panel data on 
which this thesis is based, the said mechanisms can be investigated through the 
interaction of FDI with other national indicators. The two channels that are the focus 
of this chapter are: labour and financial markets development.  
 
This investigation is motivated by the creation effect of new sectors to support the 
MNCs and the deepening effect on existing sectors, as mentioned in Chapter 4. Both 
entail demand of additional factors of production, that is, labour and capital to meet 
the quality and quantity input requirements of foreign firms. As illustrated in Figure 
5.1 in Chapter 5, one of the ways to fulfil this is by drawing labour and capital from 
the idle labour/capital pool of the host economy. Another way is through the 
movement of labour and capital to the productive or expanding sectors of the 
economy. This process is called the labour/capital reallocation effect, and results in 
the redistribution of productive labour and capital across the sectors. This factor 
redistribution across the sectors of the economy is conceptualised as sector 
diversification in this thesis.  
 
This chapter focuses on the reallocation effect arising from FDI and reflected to 
sector diversification. The effect of employing new labour and capital has been 
explored to a great extent in the FDI-growth literature. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
FDI reduces unemployment and injects new capital into the host economy (Moosa, 
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2002). However, the reallocation effect has been explored less in this context. In 
addition, the effect of FDI on sector diversification through these two channels has 
yet not been explored. Therefore, this research fills this gap in the literature by 
exploring the reallocation effect of FDI’s interaction with labour market regulations 
(LMR) and the effect of well-developed financial markets on sector diversification.  
 
Sectoral reallocation of labour and capital implies the movement of labour and 
capital from one sector to another. In addition, the literature covered in Chapter 4 
suggests that highly regulated and rigid labour market discourages local 
entrepreneurship because of the high costs involved in the hiring and firing of 
employees. FDI may not be able to facilitate labour movements in this environment. 
Similarly, if there are fewer credit facilities or limited access to borrowing for 
businesses, it is less likely that local firms will expand. Barriers to local firm 
development hinder the development of the suppliers sectors, which could result in 
fewer sectoral linkages and therefore less sector diversification as a result of FDI. 
Thus, highly regulated labour markets and less developed capital markets are 
considered barriers to sector diversification, and in these economies, FDI’s ability to 
create diversification may be limited.  
 
This chapter explores the influence of the interaction of FDI with labour and capital 
markets on sector diversification, and this is examined at various levels of 
disaggregated data (as in Chapter 5). This chapter also explores FDI’s effect on 
sector diversification across two different diversification measures (Gini coefficient 
and Herfindahl index) and the two different measures of sector size (employment and 
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value added). As in the previous chapter, the results for the broad sectors of the 
economy are compared to those of the manufacturing sector.  
 
The key findings of this chapter are as follows: First, developing countries diversify 
from the interaction effect of FDI and LMR at the 1-digit aggregated level in the long 
run. Second, for OCED countries at the 2-digit disaggregated level, no significant 
effect was found from the interaction of FDI, LMR, and financial markets. The 
findings in this chapter across the broad sectors of the economy are consistent with 
the findings in Chapter 5, where only developing countries were found to be 
significantly diversifying. However, this chapter’s contribution is that it empirically 
establishes that this effect is channelled through flexible LMR in developing 
countries. Third, the effects in the manufacturing sector are captured at the 4-digit 
disaggregated level. Robust evidence from both employment and value added shares 
suggests that the manufacturing sector diversifies from FDI’s interaction with the 
well-developed financial markets, and this was also noted in the 3-digit 
disaggregated level in the long run. However, this result shows that FDI has a greater 
direct effect on sector diversification compared with its interaction with the financial 
market. Due to data limitations, sub-grouping was not possible for the developing 
countries. However, the results for the developed countries were found to be 
consistent with those of the world sample. Finally, marginal effects of FDI’s 
influence on sector diversification conditional to the level of LMR and financial 
development is higher for the manufacturing sector. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 presents the empirical model 
and the estimation method. Section 6.3 provides details on data, followed by a 
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discussion of the empirical results in Section 6.4. The concluding summary of this 
chapter is presented in Section 6.5.  
 
6.2.   Model and Estimation Method 
Similar to Chapter 5, OLS and fixed effects estimation methods are also used for 
panel and cross-section data, respectively. Equations 6.1 and 6.2 are the two models 
used to carry out analysis in panel and cross-sectional datasets, respectively. These 
models have been extended from those used in Chapter 5 by adding the interaction 
terms to FDI and by controlling for any new employment and capital to capture the 
reallocation effect.  
  
Equation 6.1: Panel Data Model 
divit = α + β1 fdiit-1 + β2 lmrit-1 + β3 findevit-1 + β4 fdiit-1 × lmrit-1 + β5 fdiit-1 × findevit-1 
+ β6 ln_labourit-1 + β7 ln_kit-1 + β8 ln_initial_pcapit + β9 gcfit-1 + β10 tradet-1 + γt + μi + 
δ + εit; 
  
where div is the diversification measure for country i in period t,  fdi represents 
lagged FDI, lmr represents the lagged LMR index, findev represents the lag of 
financial market development, for which domestic credit to private sector is used as a 
proxy. The main variables of interest on the right hand side are lagged FDI, and its 
interactions with LMR and financial market development, i.e.,  fdi × lmr and  fdi × 
findev respectively. To isolate the reallocation effect of FDI, employment and capital 
levels are controlled for in the model using the natural logarithm of total labour force 
ln_labour and capital stock ln_k, respectively. This practice is based on the idea that 
CHAPTER SIX 
133 
 
FDI would facilitate diversification by either introducing new employment or capital 
stock, or by facilitating the re-allocation of existing labour and capital. 
 
Consistent with the previous chapter, three time-varying controls applied in this 
model are natural logarithm of initial GDP per capita ln_initial_pcap  lagged values 
of trade openness trade and domestic investment gcf, for which gross capital 
formation is used as a proxy   
In addition, the μ  values denote a full set of country dummies, and the γ  values 
denote a full set of common time effects that capture common shocks to (common 
trends) in the diversification measures of all countries. δ is the country-specific time 
trend, which is the time pattern of data for each country, and ε is an error term, 
capturing all other omitted factors for all i and t.  
 
Equation 6.2 below is used to analyse cross-sectional data. Instead of using lagged 
values as in Equation 6.1, Equation 6.2 uses initial values to address endogeneity in 
the model. Otherwise, the explanation of all variables in Equation 6.1 applies to the 
variables in Equation 6.2. 
 
Equation 6.2: Cross-Country Model 
divit = α + β1 fdii + β2 initial_lmri + β3 initial_findevi + β4 fdii × initial_lmri + β5 fdii 
× initial_findevi + β6 initial_ln_labouri + β7 initial_ln_ki + β8 ln_initial_pcapi + 
β9initial_gcfi + β10 initial_tradei + γt + μi + δ + εit; 
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6.2.1.   Different Samples 
Sub-sampling of countries is done in the same way as in Chapter 5 (see Section 
5.2.1).  
 
6.2.2.   Endogeneity  
The discussions on endogeneity in Chapter 5 also apply to this chapter (see Section 
5.2.2.).  
 
6.2.3.   Multicollinearity 
Using the correlation matrix in Table 6.1, no multicollinearity was detected among 
the explanatory variables in the model.  
Table 6.1: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables 
Note: Correlation matrix is presented from annual dataset only and all significant at 1% level. Number of observations in italics.  
 
 
6.3.   Data 
6.3.1.   Diversification 
The dependent variable, diversification measures, remains the same as in Chapter 5. 
The Gini coefficient is used as the baseline measure, and the Herfindahl index is used 
as an alternative measure.  
  fdi lmr findev ln_initial_pcap gcf trade ln_labour ln_k  
fdi 1.0000         
  4519         
lmr 0.155 1.000        
 1472         
findev 0.070 0.1248 1.000       
  4306 1416 4306       
ln_initial_pcap 0.0506 -0.1425 0.5822 1.000      
  4306 1471 4298 4507      
gcf 0.1524 -0.0130 0.1719 0.2110 1.0000     
  4330 1455 4155 4319 4330     
trade  0.3235 0.1299 0.0562 0.1633 0.3289 1.0000    
  4402 1461 4230 4391 4302 4402    
ln_labour -0.0711 -0.0410 0.2196 -0.0458 -0.0401 -0.5648 1.000  
 4383 1471 4186 4379 4200 4270 4383  
ln_k -0.1738 -0.0874 0.5560 0.5922 0.0811 -0.3881 .06573 1.000 
 3013 1284 2954 3004 3011 3001 2947 3013 
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6.3.2.   Independent Variables  
The main variables of interest in this chapter are FDI and the two channels it 
interacts with, that is, FDI’s interaction with LMR (fdi * lmr) and financial 
development (fdi * findev).  
 
6.3.2.1.   FDI/GDP 
Following Chapter 5 and standard practice in the literature, net FDI inflows as a 
proportion to GDP are employed. This variable has been discussed thoroughly in 
Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.2).  
 
6.3.2.2.   Labour Market Regulations (LMR) 
LMR index is used as the baseline index to measure the rigidness of labour markets 
across countries over time. It is sourced from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Dataset constructed by Gwartney et al. (2011a). These data were officially published 
in Economic Freedom of the World: 2011 Annual Report (Gwartney et al., 2011b). 
The index ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 indicate the most flexible labour market. 
This index is constructed with six sub-components as follows: (1) Hiring regulations 
and minimum wage, (2) Hiring and firing regulations, (3) Centralised collective 
bargaining, (4) Mandated cost of hiring/hours regulations, (5) Mandated cost of 
worker dismissal and (6) Conscription.  
 
The advantage of using data from Gwartney et al. (2011a) is that they had LMR data 
available for feasible panel estimation. An important limitation of the data was that 
there were insufficient observations on LMR for most developing countries. In this 
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case, straight-line interpolation has been used to fill the missing observations. It is 
conceivable that LMR would change along a straight line, and therefore, this practice 
of interpolation should be acceptable. 
 
6.3.2.3.   Financial Development 
Following the standard practice in the literature, domestic credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP is used to measure the level of development of financial markets 
of a country. The credit facilities include loans, purchase of non-equity securities, 
trade credits and other accounts receivables. The data are sourced from the World 
Bank (2009).  
 
6.3.3.   Other Controls  
Consistent with Chapter 5, this chapter also uses the natural logarithm of initial GDP 
per capita, lagged domestic investment and lagged trade openness as the time-
varying controls, including common time effects and country-specific time-trend (see 
Section 5.3.3 for details of each of these control variables). In addition to these, to 
capture the reallocation effect, the model controls for new employment and capital 
using the variables total labour force and physical capital, respectively (see the 
respective argument above for inclusion of these variables in the model).  
 
6.3.3.1.   Total Labour Force 
Total labour force data are sourced from the World Bank (2009) and defined as:   
people aged 15 and older who supply labour for the production of goods 
and services during a specified period. The total labour force includes both 
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employed and unemployed people. …labour force includes the armed 
forces, the unemployed and first-time job seekers, but excludes 
homemakers and other unpaid caregivers, and workers in the informal 
sector.  
These data were transformed using the natural logarithm. 
 
6.3.3.2.   Physical Capital Stock  
Physical capital stock data are not readily available for most countries, except for a 
few developed countries whose government agency or central bank collects these 
data. Hence, it was calculated for all countries in our dataset using the perpetual 
inventory method. The formula for this method is Kt = (1 – δ) Kt-1 + It, where Kt is 
the physical capital stock for current year, δ is the assumed depreciation rate, Kt-1 is 
the physical capital stock of the previous year, and is It the gross fixed capital 
formation of the current year. First, initial physical capital stock is calculated using 
Solow’s model I/ (δ +g), where I is investment for time t, delta (δ) is the depreciation 
rate, and g is growth in investment for the corresponding period. This approach is 
widely used in the cross-country literature. 
 
Following Hall and Jones (1999), gross fixed capital formation (constant 2000 US$) 
data from WDI are used as investment (sourced from the World Bank [2009]). The 
World Bank (2009) defines gross fixed capital formation as ‘land improvements (e.g. 
fences, ditches, drains); plant, machinery and equipment purchases; and the 
construction of roads, railways, schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. In addition, acquisitions of 
valuables are also considered capital formation’.  
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To calculate physical capital stock, the depreciation rate is assumed to be at the rate 
of 6% across all forms of capital (e.g. buildings, equipment) and is constant over 
time. I and δ values are known, hence the growth rate is calculated using the 
geometric rate of investment g = (It / I0)(1/t) – 1, where It is the latest investment for a 
country (e.g. in 2007), I0 is the earliest investment for that country (e.g. in 1970), and 
t is the number of investment observations for each country (for how many years the 
data are available; e.g. if there are 5 observations for Belize, then t = 5. Thus, 
depreciation is considered for a 5-year period from 1970 to 1974). To smooth out the 
cyclical effect of investment, the mean of one third of observations is taken. For 
example, if Belgium had 30 observations for investment, then one third of 30 is 10, 
thus the first 10 investment observations are averaged and substituted for I. To obtain 
the initial capital stock the following formula is used: K0 = average I / (δ + g). Once 
initial capital is calculated for each country, investment flows are added to this stock 
for each period using the formula: Kt = (1 - δ) Kt-1+ It.   
 
6.3.4.   Other Variables 
For the cross-sectional data, the robustness check is done using two alternative 
measures of LMR, since these indices are available only at cross-country level. One 
of these is the ELI and the other is the REI.  
 
6.3.4.1.   Employment Laws Index (ELI) 
The ELI is an alternative measure of LMR, and provided by Botero et al. 2004. This 
measure is available for 85 countries, where the index ranges from 0 to1 at the cross-
country level. It is composed using the average of: (1) alternative employment 
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contracts; (2) cost of increasing hours worked; (3) cost of firing workers; and (4) 
dismissal procedures. Botero et al. (2004) use the inverse interpretation of this index 
to Gwartney et al. (2011a), where 0 is the most flexible. Botero’s (2004) data, known 
in the literature as the ELI, have been widely used in flexible labour market 
literature. The World Bank also uses their methodology to calculate the REI, which 
ranges from 0 to 100 and carries the same interpretation as that of Botero et al. 
(2004). 
 
6.3.4.2.   Rigidity of Employment Index (REI) 
Sourced from the World Bank’s (2010) Doing Business Dataset, the REI is also used 
as an alternative index for LMR at the cross-country level. According to the World 
Bank (2010), the REI measures the regulation of employment, specifically the hiring 
and firing of workers, and the rigidity of working hours. This index is the average of 
three sub-indices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index, and a 
difficulty of firing index. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating regulations that are more rigid. This index is also interpreted the opposite 
way to the baseline index, LMR. 
 
6.3.5.   Measuring Short-, Medium- and Long-Run Effects  
This also remains the same as in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.3.5). 
 
6.3.6.   Influential Analysis 
Following the scatterplots and influential analysis from Chapter 5, this chapter also 
carries out all analysis within 10% of FDI/GDP. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description Source 
LMR Constructed with six sub-components: 
(1) hiring regulations and minimum 
wage, (2) hiring and firing regulations, 
(3) centralised collective bargaining, 
(4) mandated cost of hiring/hours 
regulations, (5) mandated cost of 
worker dismissal and (6) conscription. 
Gwartney et al. (2011) 
ELI The average of (1) alternative 
employment contracts, (2) cost of 
increasing hours worked, (3) cost of 
firing workers, and (4) dismissal 
procedures. 
Botero et al. (2004) 
REI Average of three sub-indices: the 
difficulty of hiring index, the rigidity 
of hours index, and the difficulty of 
firing index. 
World Bank (2010) 
Labour Total labour force. World Bank (2009) 
Capital Physical capital. World Bank (2009) variable, 
gross fixed capital formation 
was used to calculate this 
variable 
 
Table 6.3 reports the descriptive statistics for only the new variables in this Chapter 
compared to Chapter 5. All those variables repeated in this chapter from the previous 
chapter, refer to Table 5.11 for their descriptive statistics.  
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics (Annual and Cross-Sectional) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        Note: The REI and ELI are from cross-sectional data.  
 
6.4.   Empirical Results 
6.4.1.   Across All Sectors (ILO 1-Digit and OECD 2-Digit Data) 
Table 6.4 presents the results of ILO 1-digit aggregated data and shows significant 
evidence of labour reallocation. It is noted that in the short and medium runs (see 
Panels A and B, respectively), developed countries diversify through the channel of 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lmr 1472 5.375 1.523 2.3 9.4 
ln_k 4383 14.964 1.769 10.373 20.459 
ln_k  3013 25.293 2.255 18.373 30.824 
REI 123 28.991 16.874 0 77 
ELI 80 .490 .191 .148 .828 
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LMR; however, this finding does not hold for the Herfindahl measure. In addition, 
the world sample is found to be diversifying through the financial development 
channel, and this finding is found to be robust with the Herfindahl index (see Table 
6.4, Panel B, Columns 3 and 7). However, due to insufficient data, the results for the 
different country samples, particularly for the developing countries could not be 
obtained. Therefore, we cannot generalise this result from Panel B to any country 
group. 
 
In addition, Table 6.4 also gives evidence of statistically significant effect on sector 
diversification through FDI’s interaction with the initial LMR using ILO 1-digit data, 
particularly in the long run (38-year period) at 5% level of significance for 
developing countries (see Table 6.4, Panel C, Columns 2 and 6). The diversifying 
effect is captured by the significant coefficients of the interaction terms, which 
indicate that FDI’s total effect depends on the level of initial LMR. With the 
inclusion of the interaction terms, that is, initial LMR and initial financial 
development with FDI, the marginal effect of FDI on sector diversification is 
2.107%.4 
 
Table 6.5 presents the results of OECD 2- digit disaggregated data. Again, as noted 
in Chapter 5, there is also no statistical evidence of sector diversification in the 2-
digit data through any of the mentioned channels.  
 
                                                 
4 Calculated using the coefficients of FDI and its interaction coefficients with average initial LMR and 
initial financial development (from Table 6.4, Panel C, Column 1) using the formula: β1 + (β4 × 
average initial_lmr) + (β1 × average initial_findev). The plus and minus signs depend on the sign of 
the coefficients. 
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One of the key finding from the above discussions is that the sectors of the 
developing countries seem to diversify because of FDI in the long run. The 
facilitating channel for this effect is flexible labour markets. One of the plausible 
reasons for this effect in developing countries is that multinationals invest in 
developing countries mostly because of the low cost of resources, especially the low 
cost of labour. This means that in this case, the investment would be in labour-
intensive sectors. Therefore, such an investment would be associated with structural 
change through the movement of labour from one sector to other. As argued by 
Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007), rigid labour regulations make the labour 
reallocation process more challenging, and the lack of free movement of labour 
affects productivity, which eventually affects sector diversification. Hence, as 
revealed empirically through this study, FDI affects sector diversification conditional 
to flexible labour markets in developing countries at the ILO 1-digit aggregated data 
level in the long run.  
 
At the broader sectoral level, there is still no sign of sector diversification in 
developed countries including OECD countries at the 2-digit disaggregated data 
level. Hence, as argued in earlier chapters, developed economies may already have 
diversified across all the broad sectors of the economy and optimally allocated their 
labour stock.  
 
6.4.2.   Manufacturing Sector (UNIDO 3- and 4-Digit Data) 
Table 6.6 presents the results for the manufacturing sector at the 3-digit data 
disaggregated level for both employment and value added shares. Due to insufficient 
data, the results for developing countries could not be provided. No evidence of 
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sector diversification was found in short or medium runs (see Table 6.6, Panels A 
and B) in the 3-digit disaggregated data. However, there is evidence of sector 
diversification through the financial development channel in the value added shares 
for the world sample in the long run (see Table 6.6, Panel C, Columns 5 and 7), but 
this result is not observed in developed countries (note we have insufficient data for 
developing countries in this case). Since results could not be obtained for the 
developing countries, it cannot be concluded if this effect emerges from the 
developing countries. However, it could be inferred that financial development plays 
a role in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Table 6.7 presents the results for the manufacturing sector at the 4-digit 
disaggregated data level for both measures of sector size, employment and value 
added. There are also insufficient data in this dataset, and because of this, results 
could not be obtained for the short run. As in Chapter 5, robust evidence of FDI’s 
effect on sector diversification is found at a greater disaggregated data level, that is, 
at 4-digit disaggregated data rather than at the 3-digit level for the manufacturing 
sector. However, sector diversification as a result of FDI is conditional on the 
development of financial markets in the developed countries in the medium run. This 
result is robust across both measures of diversification and for both sector sizes. 
Except for the Gini coefficient in value added shares, FDI increases sector 
diversification through the channel of financial development, and this result is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect of FDI on sector 
diversification within the manufacturing sector is 7.421%, conditional on the level of 
LMR and financial development. 
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Compared to the finding from ILO-1 digit aggregated data that sectors diversify in 
the long run (38-year time frame), the manufacturing sector diversifies in the 
medium run (5-year average). Developed countries are already diversified, and are 
well equipped with resources and sectors; therefore, these countries may not take as 
much time as developing countries to diversify. In addition, it is also noted that the 
marginal effect is also much higher in the manufacturing sector, which may be 
allowing it to diversify faster than other sectors, in particular, the developing 
countries.  
 
The findings in this chapter confirm the hypothesis developed in Chapter 4 that 
FDI’s effect on sector diversification is conditional to flexible labour markets and 
well-developed financial markets. This hypothesis was formulated from the theory 
that rigid, labour-regulated countries and poor financially developed countries are 
barriers to sectoral linkages. For example our 1-digit findings are consistent with the 
arguments of Robson (2003) that entrepreneurs in rigid labour-regulated countries 
find it costly to do business because of the high costs of hiring (Ardagna and Lusardi, 
2008), maintaining (Paes de Barros and Corseuil, 2004; Ahsan and Pagés, 2009), and 
firing employees (Eslava et al., 2004). Lack of confidence in local business 
development is likely to breed weak supplier sectors. As highlighted in the literature 
chapters of this thesis, under-developed supplier sectors have weak sectoral linkages 
and, therefore, less sector diversification.  
 
In addition, the ILO 1-digit finding also confirms McMillan and Rodrik’s (2011) 
argument that FDI brings structural change to the economy and labour adjusts to 
these changes. Given that existing labour in the economy are already controlled for 
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in our models, this result can be interpreted as labour reallocation from (probably) 
the inefficient sectors of the economy to the productive ones as a result of FDI. In 
addition, also confirming the arguments of Greenway et al. (2000) that there may be 
a mismatch is skills with the current job to a job offered by the multinationals or 
even better pay with the foreign firms, whereby labour reallocation takes place. 
Further our result of FDI-induced structural change through labour reallocation 
contrasts with Wacziarg and Wallack’s (2004) study, which found insignificant and 
negative trade-induced movement of labour across the ILO 1-digit aggregated level.  
 
Further, our 4-digit manufacturing sector result confirms the hypothesis in Chapter 4 
that financial development plays a crucial role in inter-sectoral linkages resulting 
from FDI. This finding is consistent with the arguments of Alfaro et al. (2004a), 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005b), Alfaro (2003) and Alfaro et al. (2010), hence 
associated with greater sector diversification. It is noted that the marginal effect of 
FDI on sector diversification conditional to LMR and financial development is much 
higher for the manufacturing sector compared to diversification across the broader 
sectors of the economy (see UNCTAD, 2001b for the argument on sectoral linkages 
for the manufacturing sector in this case). As said before, developed countries are 
already diversified at the broader sector level. However, the results from this study 
show that they are experiencing sector diversification at least within the 
manufacturing sector through their development financial market. 
 
 One of the reasons for the financial development channel to be significant within the 
manufacturing sector and especially for the developed countries could be the 
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investment in capital-intensive industries that would require the need for heavy 
funding to setup and operate.  
 
On the contrary, Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) found almost no indication of any 
structural change as a result of trade at the UNIDO 3-digit disaggregated data level 
manufacturing sectors. However, the reallocation effect was empirically found to be 
captured as a result of FDI, conditional to flexible LMR and strong financial 
development. From these findings, it could be concluded that the sector 
diversification effect is again captured at a higher level of disaggregated data. 
Developed countries were found to be diversifying as a result of FDI, conditional on 
well-established and developed financial markets while the developing countries 
through less rigidity labour market regulations.  
 
6.4.3.   Robustness Analysis 
The robustness check for the ILO 1-digit aggregated data is carried out using the 
alternative measures of LMR, which are only available at cross-country level for the 
world sample and the sub-samples of developing and developed countries. As noted 
earlier, these alternative measures of LMR are measured in the opposite way as the 
LMR index that is used as the baseline index in this study (see Section 6.3.4.) 
Therefore, their coefficient is expected to have a positive sign to indicate 
diversification, opposite to the negative sign of the LMR index. The two alternative 
measures are REI and ELI, and their results are presented in Table 6.8 in Panels A 
and B, respectively. It is noted that both indices are statistically significant at the 5% 
level for the interaction term of FDI and initial LMR, across both measures of 
diversification. The magnitudes of these differ from those of the LMR index, which 
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could be because each of these is constructed using different sub-components (see 
Table 6.2). However, this result is statistically significant only for developing 
countries.  
 
In addition, Table 6.9 shows the results with and without controls, for the Gini 
coefficient only. The result is again found to be statistically significant in both cases, 
and also for the Herfindahl index. Due to space constraints, the results of the 
Herfindahl measure are not presented, but are found to be robust with and without 
control for the ILO 1-digit aggregated data.  
 
Alternative measures of LMR could not be used for the UNIDO 4-digit results 
because, as mentioned above, these measures are only available at the cross-country 
level. However, the UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated results for the manufacturing 
sector are found to be robust across both measures of diversification and across both 
sector sizes. With and without controls, the results differed because of the panel 
nature of the data, which also needed to control for factors such as year effects and 
country-specific time trends.  
  
6.5.   Chapter Summary 
The fundamental finding of this chapter is that FDI’s interaction with initial LMR 
diversifies in the developing countries across broad sectors of the economy at the 1-
digit aggregated data level in the long run. Within the manufacturing sector, there is 
evidence of sector diversification from the interaction effect between FDI and 
financial markets. The marginal effect of FDI on sector diversification conditional on 
the level of LMR and financial development is higher for the manufacturing sector. 
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The drawback of this chapter was the unavailability of the LMR data for developing 
countries. Following the findings from both Chapters 5 and 6, the next chapter 
disaggregates the FDI data by the four most mentioned motives of MNCs, and 
explores their effects on sector diversification.  
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Table 6.4: ILO 1-Digit Results (Employment Shares) 
 
Note: The table presents estimates of Equation 6.1 using annual and 5-year average data in Panels A and B, respectively. 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
Controls include ln_initial_pcap, gcf and trade, ln_labour and ln_k. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
sample 
Sub- 
samples 
Sub- 
samples 
Sub- 
samples 
World 
sample 
Sub- 
samples 
Sub- 
samples 
Sub- 
samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Middle-
income 
countries 
Panel A. Annual         
fdi  1.421** 0.708 3.347  0.604 0.422 0.798  
 (2.23) (1.27) (1.59)  (1.34) (0.67) (0.90)  
fdi * lmr -0.237* -0.076 -0.574*  -0.082 -0.018 -0.132  
 (-1.89) (-0.65) (-1.82)  (-0.94) (-0.16) (-0.91)  
fdi * findev -0.001 0.001 -0.003  -0.000 0.000 -0.003  
 (-0.44) (0.48) (-0.50)  (-0.34) (0.15) (-1.36)  
Observations 110 49 61  110 49 61  
No. of countries 32 15 17  32 15 17  
Panel B. 5-year average 
fdi  4.516***  4.520***  1.020*  1.023**  
 (3.87)  (3.98)  (2.03)  (2.18)  
fdi * lmr -0.523***  -0.549***  -0.098  -0.116  
 (-3.44)  (-3.27)  (-1.32)  (-1.45)  
fdi * findev -0.016***  -0.011  -0.007***  -0.004  
 (-3.02)  (-1.58)  (-3.25)  (-1.07)  
Observations 79  58  79  58  
No. of countries 28  16  28  16  
Panel C. Cross-sectional 
fdi  0.701 4.575 1.474 3.099 5.010 12.183** -0.411 7.218* 
 (0.29) (1.13) (0.84) (0.87) (1.20) (2.13) (-0.54) (2.01) 
fdi * lmr -0.681* -1.151** -0.533* -0.790* -1.180* -1.891** -0.083 -1.090** 
 (-1.89) (-2.16) (-2.40) (-1.75) (-1.92) (-2.33) (-0.89) (-2.67) 
fdi * findev 0.064 -0.008 0.029 -0.038 0.058 -0.092 0.021* -0.100 
 (1.58) (-0.07) (1.51) (-0.47) (0.84) (-0.51) (2.43) (-1.39) 
Observations 55 37 18 31 55 37 18 31 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific time 
Trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.5: OECD 2-Digit Results (Employment and Value Added Shares) 
 
Note: The table presents estimates of Equation 6.1 using 5-year and 10-year average UNIDO 4-digit data. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Controls include 
ln_initial_pcap, gcf and trade, ln_labour and ln_k. 
 
  
 Employment Value added 
Variables Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All  
OECD 
countries 
Only  
developed 
countries 
All  
OECD 
countries 
Only 
developed 
countries 
All  
OECD 
countries 
Only 
developed 
countries 
All  
OECD 
countries 
Only 
developed 
countries 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi  0.062 0.031 0.006 0.015 0.019 0.147 0.020 0.062 
 (1.13) (0.32) (0.33) (0.59) (0.26) (0.66) (0.78) (0.95) 
fdi * lmr -0.011 -0.008 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.019 -0.003 -0.007 
 (-1.40) (-0.58) (-0.56) (-0.85) (-0.32) (-0.61) (-0.71) (-0.77) 
fdi * findev -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001* 0.0001*** 
 (-0.49) (-0.21) (-0.14) (-0.73) (1.18) (1.67) (1.78) (3.66) 
Observations 183 134 183 134 213 169 213 169 
No. of countries 25 18 25 18 27 20 27 20 
Panel B. 5-year average 
fdi  -0.241 0.167 -0.071 -0.016 0.504 0.679 0.125 0.197 
 (-0.66) (0.43) (-0.91) (-0.17) (0.70) (0.93) (0.61) (0.94) 
fdi * lmr -0.006 -0.058 0.002 -0.006 -0.137 -0.127 -0.038 -0.039 
 (-0.07) (-1.05) (0.10) (-0.32) (-1.12) (-1.09) (-1.06) (-1.11) 
fdi * findev 0.002 -0.0001 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0001 0.0004 -0.000 
 (0.48) (-0.02) (1.30) (0.78) (0.28) (0.02) (0.26) (-0.08) 
Observations 77 63 77 63 101 88 101 88 
No. of countries 25 18 25 18 27 20 27 20 
Panel C. Cross-sectional  
fdi  1.058 -0.550 1.063 -0.209 2.797 1.470 -0.194 -0.106 
 (0.37) (-0.12) (1.11) (-0.27) (0.82) (0.28) (-0.18) (-0.07) 
fdi * lmr -0.652 -0.153 -0.328* -0.006 0.034 0.756 0.224 0.388 
 (-1.34) (-0.24) (-2.07) (-0.06) (0.06) (0.74) (1.08) (1.38) 
fdi * findev 0.047** 0.018 0.018*** 0.001 -0.025 -0.040 -0.010 -0.015 
 (2.64) (0.76) (3.46) (0.32) (-1.25) (-1.14) (-1.49) (-1.84) 
Observations 25 18 25 18 27 20 27 20 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific time 
trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.6: UNIDO 3-Digit Results (Employment and Value Added Shares) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimates of Equation 6.1 using 5-year and 10-year average UNIDO 4-digit data. Robust 
 t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
Controls include ln_initial_pcap, gcf and trade, ln_labour and ln_k. 
 
  
 Employment Value added 
Variables Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 World 
sample 
Sub- 
samples 
World 
sample  
Sub- 
samples 
World 
sample 
Sub- 
samples 
Sub- 
samples 
Sub- 
samples 
 All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi  -0.349 -0.361 -0.107 -0.115 -0.448 -0.448 -0.092 -0.092 
 (-0.72) (-0.74) (-0.87) (-0.94) (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.41) (-0.41) 
fdi * lmr 0.083 0.085 0.014 0.016 0.090 0.090 0.008 0.008 
 (0.79) (0.81) (0.50) (0.55) (0.53) (0.53) (0.16) (0.16) 
fdi * findev 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (1.68) (1.64) (1.30) (1.23) (0.46) (0.46) (0.86) (0.86) 
Observations 129 96 129 96 123 91 123 91 
No. of countries 39 21 39 21 38 20 38 20 
Panel B. 5-year average 
fdi  -1.360 -1.550* -0.135 -0.169 -0.847 -1.156 0.168 0.083 
 (-1.68) (-1.85) (-0.68) (-0.83) (-0.68) (-0.89) (0.36) (0.18) 
fdi * lmr 0.102 0.125 0.029 0.029 0.059 0.073 -0.015 -0.006 
 (1.13) (1.56) (1.32) (1.60) (0.49) (0.58) (-0.30) (-0.13) 
fdi * findev 0.012* 0.014* 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.013 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.75) (1.86) (0.58) (0.79) (0.96) (1.12) (-0.06) (0.10) 
Observations 126 99 126 99 123 96 123 96 
No. of countries 38 21 38 21 38 21 38 21 
Panel C. Cross-sectional  
fdi  0.504 2.887 -0.339 -0.461 0.352 4.322 -1.225 0.403 
 (0.24) (1.05) (-0.20) (-0.26) (0.15) (1.62) (-0.85) (0.27) 
fdi * lmr -0.264 -0.383 -0.073 0.050 -0.193 0.002 0.362 -0.032 
 (-0.80) (-1.29) (-0.29) (0.35) (-0.52) (0.01) (1.57) (-0.20) 
fdi * findev -0.022 -0.028 -0.010 -0.009 -0.030** -0.072 -0.029** -0.018 
 (-1.47) (-0.51) (-0.73) (-0.34) (-2.09) (-1.43) (-2.28) (-0.79) 
Observations 99 25 99 25 95 25 95 25 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.7: UNIDO 4-digit Results (Employment and Value Added Shares) 
Note: The table presents estimates of Equation 6.1 using 5-year and 10-year average UNIDO 4-digit data. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Controls include 
ln_initial_pcap, gcf and trade, ln_labour and ln_k. 
 
 
 
Table 6.8: Robustness Check for ILO 1-Digit Developing Countries using Alternative 
Measures of LMR (Employment Shares) 
Variables Gini Herfindahl 
 All  
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All  
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Panel A. Using Rigidity of Employment Index 
fdi -3.537** -5.049** -3.454* -0.519 -2.196 -1.549** 
 (-2.23) (-2.34) (-2.31) (-0.21) (-0.56) (-2.80) 
rei -0.170** -0.222** -0.061 -0.126 -0.129 -0.018 
 (-2.11) (-2.27) (-0.94) (-1.21) (-0.79) (-0.55) 
initial_findev -0.065 -0.365* 0.044 -0.019 -0.453 0.020 
 (-1.30) (-1.84) (0.93) (-0.37) (-1.37) (1.17) 
fdi * rei 0.065* 0.111** 0.041 0.042 0.087 0.008 
 (1.99) (2.77) (1.20) (0.93) (1.23) (0.93) 
fdi * findev 0.060 0.085 0.039 0.041 0.125 0.024* 
 (1.61) (0.62) (1.29) (0.75) (0.47) (2.49) 
Observations 52 35 17 52 35 17 
Panel B. Using Employment Laws Index 
fdi -2.331 -6.069 -3.848 0.336 -1.571 -1.635 
 (-1.04) (-1.47) (-1.68) (0.13) (-0.38) (-1.68) 
labour_index -6.029 -34.185* -3.910 -0.700 -29.233 -1.200 
 (-0.65) (-1.91) (-0.81) (-0.06) (-1.58) (-0.45) 
initial_findev -0.089 -0.409 0.038 -0.049 -0.095 0.027 
 (-1.50) (-1.48) (0.58) (-0.71) (-0.26) (0.79) 
fdi *lab 3.889 13.774** 2.070 3.560 15.470** 1.035 
 (0.87) (2.29) (0.47) (0.64) (2.48) (0.42) 
fdi * findev 0.030 -0.052 0.050 -0.029 -0.311 0.018 
 (0.50) (-0.35) (0.57) (-0.36) (-1.47) (0.38) 
Observations 41 24 17 41 24 17 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Note: This table presents estimates of Equation 6.2 using cross-sectional ILO 1-digit data. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, 
gcf and trade, ln_labour and ln_k. rei is Rigidity of Labour Index. labour_index is Employment Laws Index. 
 
 
 Employment Value added 
Variables Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 World 
sample 
Sub- 
samples 
World 
sample  
Sub- 
samples 
World 
sample 
Sub- 
samples 
World 
sample  
Sub- 
samples 
 All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Panel A. 5-year Average     
fdi  -29.012*** -29.012** -13.674*** -13.674** -43.959** -43.959** 2.252 2.252 
 (-3.25) (-2.80) (-3.13) (-2.69) (-2.71) (-2.36) (0.64) (0.56) 
fdi * lmr 5.489*** 5.489** 2.827*** 2.827** 6.813* 6.813* 1.269* 1.269 
 (3.21) (2.76) (3.35) (2.88) (2.04) (1.78) (1.94) (1.69) 
fdi * findev -0.077** -0.077* -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (-2.28) (-1.96) (-3.42) (-2.94) (-0.08) (-0.07) (-8.08) (-7.04) 
Observations 61 47 61 47 60 49 60 49 
No. of countries 30 17 30 17 28 17 28 17 
Panel B. Cross-Sectional      
fdi  2.897 11.265* 0.744 3.481 1.320 6.249 -1.104 -0.756 
 (0.98) (2.30) (0.19) (0.97) (0.40) (0.81) (-0.49) (-0.24) 
fdi * lmr -0.926* -0.728 -0.383 -0.298 -0.699 -0.957 -0.064 -0.112 
 (-1.92) (-1.49) (-0.65) (-0.88) (-1.21) (-1.50) (-0.24) (-0.29) 
fdi * findev 0.005 -0.095 0.038 -0.037 -0.016 0.023 -0.003 -0.014 
 (0.11) (-1.34) (0.58) (-0.72) (-0.44) (0.18) (-0.09) (-0.23) 
Observations 75 20 75 20 69 21 69 21 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common time effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-specific time 
trend 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6.9: ILO 1-Digit Results with and Without Controls (Employment Shares) – Gini 
Only 
 All Countries Developing Countries Developed Countries 
Variables Without 
controls 
With  
controls 
Without 
controls 
With  
controls 
Without 
controls 
With  
controls 
fdi 1.708 0.701 4.432 4.575 -2.747 1.474 
 (0.57) (0.29) (0.83) (1.13) (-1.77) (0.84) 
initial_lmr 2.226** 2.173** 3.817** 3.758** -0.200 0.478 
 (2.56) (2.12) (2.58) (2.35) (-0.44) (1.32) 
initial_findev -0.021 -0.044 -0.170 -0.140 0.017 0.037 
 (-0.35) (-0.73) (-1.09) (-0.65) (0.46) (1.14) 
fdi * lmr -0.812** -0.681* -1.160* -1.151** 0.101 -0.533* 
 (-2.18) (-1.89) (-1.88) (-2.16) (0.42) (-2.40) 
fdi * findev 0.052 0.064 0.023 -0.008 0.062** 0.029 
 (1.26) (1.58) (0.22) (-0.07) (2.94) (1.51) 
initial_ln_labour 4.729*** 1.673 3.897*** 1.018 0.185 -3.498 
 (4.65) (1.09) (2.82) (0.50) (0.12) (-0.90) 
initial_ln_k -4.516*** -0.967 -3.372** -0.092 -0.496 2.362 
 (-4.84) (-0.62) (-2.50) (-0.04) (-0.31) (0.68) 
ln_initial_pcap  -6.528***  -7.007**  -1.493 
  (-2.70)  (-2.50)  (-0.47) 
initial_gcf  0.092  0.255*  -0.457* 
  (0.70)  (1.96)  (-2.34) 
initial_trade  0.020  0.030  -0.045 
  (0.43)  (0.40)  (-0.90) 
Observations 55 55 37 37 18 18 
Controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Note: The table presents estimates of Equation 6.2 using cross-sectional ILO 1-digit data. Robust  
t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap,  gcf and trade, ln_labour and ln_k. 
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CHAPTER 7: HOW DOES FDI AFFECT DIVERSIFICATION? THE ROLE 
OF MULTINATIONALS’ MOTIVES 
7.1.   Introduction 
The findings from Chapter 5 indicated that the effect of FDI on sector diversification 
may not be direct, particularly in the manufacturing sector. The effect could be 
channelled through some facilitators, like flexible labour markets and well-developed 
financial markets, as discussed in Chapter 6. An alternative channel through which 
FDI may affect diversification is the four most-mentioned motives of MNCs: natural-
resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and assert-seeking FDI, as 
highlighted by Dunning paradigm. In this case FDI is no longer treated as 
homogenous. 
 
To explain these motives in the simplest way, the question is: what factors attract the 
investor to another country? For instance, why does a US company invest in India, 
and vice-versa? One can argue that a US company invests in India to take advantage 
of cheap labour to lower their cost of production, or simply to get access to the 
Indian market. Conversely, an Indian company may invest in the US to access the 
US market, or possibly to learn technology from US firms and take advantage of the 
intangible assets of US companies. In literature, this is explained through theories on 
the motives of multinationals investing in other countries, and it is argued that the 
entry of multinationals has an effect on the economic structure of the economy, 
leading to some redistribution of labour and capital from one sector of the economy 
to the other. 
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In Chapter 4, the motives were defined by Cohen (2007) in the following way. 
Natural-resource-seeking FDIs are investments in another country in a search for 
natural resources like gold and minerals. Market-seeking investments target 
especially larger markets for products. Efficiency-seeking investments look for low-
cost production in host countries, and one of the main costs considered is the low 
cost of labour in investing. Finally, asset-seeking investments are received mostly by 
industrialised countries to acquire upgraded knowledge and technology to broaden 
and improve production. 
 
In addition, the literature in Chapter 4 suggests that each of these motives of FDI 
does not have the same effect on sectoral linkages as a result of FDI in the host 
economy. The literature claims that efficiency- and market-seeking FDIs establish 
greater linkages with local firms due to being embedded in the local economy. It is 
also noted in the discussions in Chapter 4 that the manufacturing sector experiences 
greater linkages effect than the primary or tertiary sectors (see UNCTAD, 2001b). In 
addition, the sectoral linkages effects are captured as more disaggregated data (see 
Kippenberg 2005; Suyanto et al. 2012) and especially the mobility of labour takes 
place in sectors ‘closer’ to their sector of origin, where workers can easily transfer 
their skills. Therefore, based on the FDI-linkages literature in Chapter 4, efficiency-
seeking FDI measured by low labour cost is hypothesised to be significant in 
developing countries, while market-seeking FDI is hypothesised as significant for 
developed countries. Further, efficiency-seeking FDI is hypothesised to be reflected 
in employment shares, while market-seeking FDI might be seen in value added 
shares datasets. It is important to note that no empirical test has been carried out to 
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see the effect of each of the motives of FDI on a host economy’s sector 
diversification. Therefore, this chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
The key findings from this chapter are that sector diversification occurs in the 
manufacturing sector when FDI is disaggregated by the motives of multinationals. 
Developed countries are found to diversify as a result of market-seeking FDI they 
receive, while developing countries diversify owing to efficiency-seeking FDI. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 7.2 presents the empirical model 
and the estimation method. Section 7.3 provides details on data. Section 7.4 presents 
the discussions on the empirical results, which is followed by the concluding section, 
7.5. 
 
7.2.   Model and Estimation Method 
Consistent with the earlier two questions, OLS and panel fixed-effects estimation 
methodologies are used in this chapter with the same dataset that was discussed fully 
in Chapter 5 to estimate Equation 7.1. All outliers discussed in Chapter 5 are 
excluded from the analysis in cases where net FDI inflows are limited to 10% of 
GDP.  
 
Equation 7.1—Panel Data Model 
divit = α + β1 fdiit-1  + β2 ln_popit + β3 eff_wageit-1 + β4 prim_prodit + β5 ln_patentit+  
β6 fdiit-1 × ln_popit + β7 fdiit-1 ×  eff_wageit  + β8 fdiit-1 ×  prim_prodit  + β9 fdiit-1 ×  
ln_patentit  + β10 ln_initial_pcapit + β11findevit-1  + β12gcfit-1  + β13tradet-1  + γt + μi + 
δ + εit; 
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where div is the diversification measure for country i in period t. The variables of 
interest on the right-hand side are the lagged FDI fdiit-1 and its interactions with log 
of population ln_pop which proxies market-seeking FDI, efficiency wage eff_wage  
(average wage per worker/labour productivity, or the cost of labour on each 
additional unit of output) which is a proxy for efficiency-seeking FDI, primary 
production as a percentage of total merchandise exports  prim_prod  which is a proxy 
for natural-resource seeking FDI, and the natural log of patent applications for both 
residents and non-residents  ln_patent  used as a proxy for asset-seeking FDI. 
 
In addition, as in the previous chapters, the model controls for five other factors that 
influence sector diversification. These include the log of initial real GDP per capita  
ln_initial_pcap, lag of financial development findev, trade openness trade, and 
domestic investment gcf. Further, μ denotes a full set of country dummies and γ 
denotes a full set of common-time effects that capture common shocks (common 
trends) in the diversification measures of all countries,  δ for the country-specific 
time trend, which eliminates the time pattern of left- and right-hand side variables for 
each country, and ε as an error term for all i and t. 
 
Equation 7.2 – Cross-sectional Model 
Equation 7.2 is used to estimate long-run relationships using cross-sectional data. All 
the explanations of the variable in Equation 7.1 hold for Equation 7.2: 
divi = α + β1 fdii  + β2 ln_popi + β3 eff_wagei + β4 prim_prodi + β5 ln_patenti+  β6 fdii 
× ln_popi + β7 fdii ×  eff_wagei  + β8 fdii ×  prim_prodi + β9 fdii ×  ln_patenti  + β10 
ln_initial_pcapi + β11 initial_findevit-1  + β12 initial_gcfit-1  + β13 initial_tradeit-1  + β14 
initial_polityit-1  + γt + μi + δ + εit; 
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7.2.1.   Different Samples 
The sub-sampling of countries is conducted in a similar way to Chapter 5.  
 
7.3.   Data 
7.3.1.   Diversification 
The dependent variables and diversification measures are consistent with the 
previous two chapters. The Gini coefficient is used as the baseline measure, while the 
Herfindahl index is used as its alternative.  
 
7.3.2.   Independent Variables 
7.3.2.1.   FDI/GDP 
Following chapters 5 and 6, net FDI is shown as a ratio to GDP. This variable has 
been discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3.2.). 
 
7.3.2.2.   Population 
A generally accepted proxy for market potential of a country is its population. 
According to the World Bank (2009), total population counts for all residents 
regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled 
in the country of asylum. The data used was sourced from the World Bank (2009), 
and a natural log of population was considered to normalise this data. 
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7.3.2.3.   Efficiency Wage/Unit Labour Cost 
According to Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), the efficiency wage of the manufacturing 
sector is used as a proxy for efficiency-seeking FDI. This measure is an index 
derived from the ratio of average wage per worker relative and labour productivity 
(average output per worker). Efficiency wage is denominated in labour productivity, 
based on the real cost in US dollars, because multinational enterprises ensure that a 
lower wage is not compensated for by reduced labour productivity or an overvalued 
currency. Efficiency wage is calculated using UNIDO’s (2003a) and (2009) data on 
wages and salaries, output and total employees for the manufacturing sector. The 
values of wages and salaries are divided by a GDP deflator to convert them into real 
wages. It is to note that the efficiency wage calculated from the manufacturing sector 
is employed for all datasets including ILO 1-digit and OECD 2-digit datasets. 
 
7.3.2.3.1.   Wages and Salaries 
UNIDO (2003b, p. 30) defines wages and salaries as: 
payments in cash or in kind to the employees in the manufacturing sector at 3- 
and 4-digits disaggregated data levels respectively. The payments include: (a) 
direct wages and salaries; (b) remuneration for time not worked; (c) bonuses 
and gratuities; (d) housing allowances and family allowances paid directly by 
the employer; and (e) payments in kind. Employers’ contributions to 
employees’ social security, pension, insurance and termination pay are excluded 
from this. 
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7.3.2.3.2.   Output 
According to UNIDO (2003b, pp. 30–31), output covers activities of an industrial 
nature and comprises: 
(a) the value of all products of the establishment; (b) the net change between the 
beginning and the end of the reference period in the value of work in progress 
and stocks of goods to be shipped in the same condition as received; (c) the 
value of industrial work done or industrial services rendered to others; (d) the 
value of goods shipped in the same condition as received less the amount paid 
for these goods; and (e) the value of fixed assets produced during the period by 
the unit for its own use. 
 
7.3.2.3.3.   Number of Employees 
UNIDO (2003b, p. 30) defines employees as: 
[the] total number of persons who worked in or for the establishment during the 
reference year. However, homeworkers are excluded. The concept covers 
working proprietors, active business partners and unpaid family workers as well 
as employees. 
 
7.3.2.4.   Primary Production 
The share of primary production of total merchandise exports is calculated by 
excluding manufactures exports (manufactures/exports) and ores and metals exports 
(ores/exports) as a percentage of total merchandise exports and is used as a proxy for 
natural-resourcing seeking FDI in this study. Manufactures/exports and ores/exports 
data are sourced from the World Bank (2009) and defined as follows: 
(1) Manufactures/exports—comprising commodities in SITC sections 5 
(chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), 
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and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), excluding division 68 (non-
ferrous metals). 
(2) Ores/exports—comprising commodities in SITC sections 27 (crude fertilizer, 
imports only), exports of division 56 and crude minerals (excluding coal, 
petroleum and precious stones), 28 (metalliferous ores and metal scrap) and 
68 (non-ferrous metals).  
 
7.3.2.5.   Patent  
The data on patents are sourced from the World Bank (2009), which defines patents 
as ‘exclusive rights for an invention that provides protection for the invention to the 
owner of the patent for a limited period, generally 20 years’. The natural log of the 
sum of residents’ and non-resident’s patent applications are used as a proxy for asset-
seeking FDI. 
 
7.3.3.   Other Controls 
Consistent with Chapter 5, this chapter also uses initial GDP per capita, lagged 
financial development, lagged domestic investment, lagged trade and lagged 
democracy score as time-varying controls, including common-time effects and 
country-specific time-trend in the panel data model, as noted in Equation 7.1. Lagged 
values are replaced with initial values of the controls variables for the cross-sectional 
data model, as noted in Equation 7.2. 
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7.3.4. Alternative Proxies for FDI Motives 
Alternative proxies for FDI motives were used for natural-resource-seeking, market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking FDIs. 
 
7.3.4.1.   Natural-Resource-Seeking FDIs 
Following Asiedu and Lien (2011), fuel as a share of total merchandise exports is 
used as an alternate proxy for resource-seeking FDI, and this data is sourced from the 
World Bank (2009). A model was run excluding primary production data, because it 
can be argued that metals undergo some form of processing from its raw form into 
metals. 
 
7.3.4.2.   Market-Seeking FDIs 
Another standard practice in the literature is to use real GDP as a proxy for market-
seeking FDIs.  
 
7.3.4.3.   Efficiency-Seeking FDIs 
The average wage per worker is used as a proxy for efficiency-seeking FDI and 
defined as wage per worker in real US dollars divided by the total number of 
employees. This calculates the cost of hiring an employee in the host country. The 
data on wages and employees have been sourced from UNIDO (2003a; 2009). The 
definitions of wages and salaries and employees have been defined in sections 
7.3.2.3.1. and 7.3.2.3.1. respectively. 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics (Annual Dataset) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln_pop 4516 15.763 1.868 10.600 20.999 
eff_wage (UNIDO 3-digit) 2008 0.126 0.050 0.005 0.304 
eff_wage (UNIDO 4-digit) 631 0.123 0.063 0.005 0.766 
prim_prod 3536 51.847 30.212 1.085 99.994 
ln_patent 2567 6.559 2.599 0 13.031 
ln_gdp 4386 23.312 2.298 17.514 30.069 
wage_worker (UNIDO 3-digit) 2015 5.286 2.749 0.157 26.352 
wage_worker (UNIDO 4-digit) 635 4.604 2.163 0.578 24.809 
fuel_exp 3435 15.392 26.520 0 99.789 
Note: Present descriptive statistics are for the annual dataset only. Outliers have been removed and all values within 
10 % FDI/GDP. The diversification measures have been scaled up by 100 to be consistent with FDI, which is also 
measured as a percentage. wage_worker is average wage per worker. fuel_exp is share of fuel in total export.  
 
 
 
Table 7.2: Summary of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description Source  
fdi Net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP World Bank (2009) 
ln_pop Natural log of population World Bank (2009) 
Wages and salaries Total wages and salaries in manufacturing UNIDO (2003a; 2009) 
Employees Total number of employees in manufacturing UNIDO (2003a; 2009) 
Output Total output in manufacturing UNIDO (2003a; 2009) 
prim_prod Primary production as a percentage of exports World Bank (2009) 
ln_patent Number of application (residents + non-residents) World Bank (2009) 
Fuel Fuel as a share of exports World Bank (2009) 
GDP Real GDP World Bank (2009) 
ln_initial_pcap Level of GDP per capita (US$) Heston et al. (2009) 
findev Domestic credit to private sector % of GDP  World Bank (2009) 
gcf Gross Capital Formation % of GDP World Bank (2009) 
trade  Trade % of GDP World Bank (2009) 
 
 
 
7.4.   Empirical Results 
Chapter 5 presented some evidence of sector diversification particular to the 
manufacturing sector and no evidence of it in developed countries. For most of the 
insignificant coefficients otherwise, the signs were negative as expected. In Chapter 
6, when FDI was evaluated through the channels of labour markets regulations and 
well-established financial development, some conclusions were drawn. 
 
The further development of the model from Chapter 5 through to chapters 6 and 7 
signalled that FDI, standing alone, is not able to capture the greater effects of sector 
diversification, predominantly for the developed countries and the manufacturing 
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sector. Hence, this chapter unfolds more empirical insights as a result of FDI when 
disaggregated by the motives of multinationals.  
 
7.4.1.   Benchmark Results 
7.4.1.1.   Across All Sectors (ILO 1-Digit and OECD 2-Digit Data) 
Table 7.3 reports the results of the ILO 1-digit aggregated data. As indicated by 
insignificantly estimated coefficients for FDI, there is no evidence of sector 
diversification noted in short run (Panel A) and medium run (Panel B). However, in 
the long run (see Panel C) developed countries’ sectors are diversifying as a result of 
market- and natural-resource-seeking FDIs in the long run. Market-seeking FDIs 
have larger effects than the natural-resource-seeking FDIs for developed countries as 
seen through the coefficients of the relevant interaction terms, and both are 
statistically significant. As the literature highlights, natural-resource-seeking FDIs 
have a linkage effect on the host economy, resulting in less sector diversification. It 
should be noted that this type of FDI was common before the 1970s. This is a 
plausible explanation for the effect from resource-seeking FDIs having very small 
magnitude. In addition, still rich in natural resource countries continue to receive 
foreign investments; however, investments in natural-resource-endowed industries 
have limited opportunities for vertical linkages, due to the use of continuous 
production process and the capital intensity of operations. Therefore, they are not 
strongly embedded in the local economy (Narula and Guimón, 2010). 
 
For example, Middle-Eastern, Latin American (such as Brazil), Caribbean and South 
African countries continue to receive foreign company investment in natural 
resources; however, these are normally export-based. Rich in natural resource 
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countries are suffering from ‘resource curse’ syndrome and do not have other 
established sectors to support the quality and quantity needs of foreign firms. 
Because such countries receive good money from their natural resources, they do not 
feel the need to develop any other sector. The literature suggests that resource-
seeking FDIs are highly capital based and do not incur much spillover from FDIs 
into the local economy. 
 
ILO 1-digit data also provide evidence of sector concentration due to asset-seeking 
FDIs in developed countries over a 38-year period. This  finding is consistent with 
the theoretical explanation that asset-seeking FDI is said to be asset augmenting and 
not asset exploiting, and this type of FDI takes place in mostly industrially advanced 
countries (Dunning 1994). In addition, the plausible explanation for sector 
concentration and not diversification in this case is because foreign firms invest in 
superior technology countries, mostly through mergers and acquisitions, to learn 
more about advanced technology. These types of investments do not result in any 
direct production and sourcing of locals; therefore, contact with local firms is limited 
to the firm that provides knowledge to the merging firm.  
 
The results for ILO 1-digit are robust across both measures of diversification for the 
developed countries. It was noted from the findings in Chapter 5 that there was no 
evidence of sector diversification within the most aggregated data for developed 
countries across all sectors of the economy, though robust significant evidence was 
found for the developing countries (direct effect) in this dataset. However, FDI, when 
disaggregated by motives, shows evidence of sector diversification for developed 
(indirect effects) countries across all sectors of the economy. 
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Again, as noted from the findings in Chapter 5, developed countries do not have a 
direct diversification effect across all sectors of the economy, given that developed 
countries already have diversified economies. However, this effect is only evident 
within a small magnitude, either through a facilitating channel like financial 
development in Chapter 6, or when interacted with the motives of the multinationals 
in this Chapter.  
 
Table 7.4 presents the results of the OECD 2-digit disaggregated data and, as found 
in chapters 5 and 6, there is no statistically significant evidence of sector 
diversification in this dataset though any of the discussed FDI motives. This finding 
is consistent throughout the three questions of this thesis, and also conforms to the 
graphical illustration of this dataset in Figure 5.7 for OECD countries. This finding 
also confirms the findings of Bitzer et al. (2008), who did not discover any evidence 
of backward and forward linkages explicitly in the OECD as a result of FDI.  
 
7.4.1.2.   Manufacturing Sector (UNIDO 3- and 4-Digit Data) 
Consistent with the other two questions of this thesis, the effect of FDI motives on 
sector diversification is captured, again, at a higher disaggregated level, using the 
UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated data and for the manufacturing sector.  
 
The key findings of this chapter are that market-seeking FDI diversifies developed 
countries and efficiency-seeking FDI diversifies developing countries in the 
manufacturing sector. Because the main finding of this chapter lies within the 
UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated data, discussions will start with these data, followed by 
the UNIDO 3-digit results. 
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Table 7.7 reports the findings of the UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated data that 
developed countries are diversifying as a result of market-seeking FDI in the short 
run (see Table 7.7, Panel A, Columns 3 and 7) by levelling employment shares, and 
this result is robust across both diversification measures. The coefficient of the direct 
effect of FDI is noted to be positive (concentrating) and significant at a 5% level of 
significance, while its interaction with population, which is a proxy for market-
seeking FDI, has a negative sign (diversification) at 1% level of significance. The 
signs and levels of significance across both measures of diversification are consistent 
in this case. The marginal effect of FDI on sector diversification in manufacturing 
sector, conditional to FDI motives, is 1.302%. It is interesting to note that this result 
is reflected in the employment shares measure.  
 
Another key finding from this chapter and is that efficiency-seeking FDI diversifies 
the sectors of the developing countries. Table 7.8 reports the results of UNIDO 4-
digit disaggregated data for value added shares and, as noted in Panel A, Columns 2 
and 6, the coefficient of the direct effects of FDI on sector diversification for 
developing countries sub-sample is positive and significant at a 10% significance 
level. However, FDI’s interaction with efficiency wage, which is a proxy for 
efficiency-seeking FDI, is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level of 
significance for both measures of diversification. The magnitude of this interaction 
term (efficiency-seeking FDI) is much stronger compared to the market-seeking FDI 
for developed countries. However, the marginal effect of FDI on sector 
diversification conditions to the motives of the multinationals is 0.177%. 
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The above two findings empirically confirm hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4  
Chapter 4 that market- and efficiency-seeking FDIs, due to being more embedded in 
the local economy, diversify the sectors of the host economy and particularly the 
manufacturing sector. It also confirms from the theory and reflected in the empirical 
findings from this chapter that efficiency-seeking FDI occurs mainly in developing 
countries to take advantage of cheap factors of production, which are mainly labour 
and raw materials. Conversely, market-seeking FDI occurs mainly in developed 
countries, and in the last decade is also occurring in large developing countries, such 
as India and China. Efficiency-seeking FDI occurs through vertical integration, 
where one stage of production is moved offshore and produced in cheap labour 
countries, while market-seeking FDI involves horizontal integration, where the 
whole setup is replicated in another country, which may involve the actual 
production of the goods or selling them in the local market. 
 
Further, these two main findings of this chapter is also confirmed in the  graphical 
illustrations in figures 5.5 to 5.7 and recalling the discussions that UNIDO 4-digit 
disaggregated data for the manufacturing sector showed variation in sector 
diversification as a result of FDI. Figure 5.6 demonstrates that the manufacturing 
sector diversifies, reflected in value added shares in developing countries (see ‘value 
added shares are decreasing the sector concentration as FDI increases’ in the graph). 
Conversely, Figure 5.7 shows opposite to what it shows for the developed countries 
(see ‘employment shares are decreasing the sector concentration as FDI increases’ in 
the graph).  
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Thus, it is confirmed from the above that the market-seeking FDI equalises the 
employment shares, while efficiency-seeking FDI equalises the value added shares. 
Why such differentiation across the measures of sector size? 
 
Efficiency-seeking FDI, as mentioned earlier, has a vertical nature of production 
integration in the host country. Therefore, these types of investors are not seen as 
rivals to domestic firms and do not have a direct interest in the local clientele. There 
is greater fragmentation of production processes in efficiency-seeking FDI types, and 
this fragmentation can take place in different countries. Efficiency-seeking FDI 
moves into actual production at one stage of production, and results in value being 
added, as noted in Chapter 4.  
 
World Trade Organisation (1998) reports give example of an American car 
production this 30% of the value of a US car is invested in South Korea for 
assembly, 17.5% in Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5% in 
Germany for design, 4% in Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% in 
marketing and advertising services in UK and 1.5% in Ireland and Barbados for data 
processing—this is production process fragmentation. Hence, efficiency-seeking FDI 
has the feature of adding value to the local economy, while suppliers also add value 
by producing the input to covert the product to the next stage. Many developing 
countries, especially Asian countries like Malaysia, China, India and Thailand, have 
benefitted remarkably from this type of FDI in sectors such as electronics and 
automobiles that involve manufacturing. 
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In contrast, market-seeking foreign firms can carry out production in other countries 
and only sell it in the host country. This is the case when the market-seeking host is a 
developed country (as is the case in this study). Therefore, the results of 
diversification are not reflected in value being added but in employment shares in the 
manufacturing sector. This is the reason that developing countries’ FDI motivation 
has a higher coefficient, because developing countries are in the catching-up stage of 
diversification with developed countries. 
 
Another reason for market-seeking effect to be found in employment shares may be 
that market-seeking FDI has a ‘market-stealing’ effect because of its feature of 
horizontal integration of production. Such MNCs act more like competitors to the 
local firms, and with their superior technology the MNCs push out of business the 
local firms that are not capable to compete with foreign firms. In order to protect 
their knowledge, foreign firms tend to pay their employees higher than domestic 
firms to prevent employee job turnover. This is one reason that market-seeking FDI 
effects are reflected in the employment shares. When domestic firms go out of 
business, employees usually relocate to other sectors, as it is difficult to transfer 
skills across sectors. This movement of labour usually takes place takes place in 
sectors ‘closer’ to their sector of origin (Pack and Paxson) as noted in Chapter 4 
discussions.  
 
Pack and Paxson (1999) support their argument by giving the example that labourers 
may easily switch from one manufacturing sector to the other, but it is difficult for 
this to occur across sectors. For instance, a worker from mining and quarrying would 
find it difficult to move to the forestry or fishing industry. Conversely, within the 
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manufacturing sector a worker is able to change from manufacturing rubber products 
to plastic products. One of the reasons for this is the requirements of a semi-skilled 
labour force for the manufacturing industry. Another possible explanation could be 
that data is too aggregated at 1- and 2-digit levels, so the effect of diversification 
becomes insignificant with data that is too aggregated, and the number of sectors also 
reduces as data is aggregated. 
 
The competition effect by market-seeking FDIs still maintains linkages with local 
industries that are suppliers of the inputs. Though foreign firms can be quite selective 
with their requirement for inputs, technology transfers take place in domestic 
supplier firms. Foreign firms also provide training, including to suppliers of quality 
controls. However, the technology transfer effect does not occur in a developed 
country context because the technology gap between the foreign investor is so small 
technology spillover does not occur. Similarly, it is noted that developed countries 
are already diversified economies and so the effect of diversification will be smaller 
in developed rather than developing countries. This can be one of the possible 
explanations for efficiency-seeking FDI having more effects than market-seeking 
FDI, because developing countries mostly experience efficiency-seeking FDI and 
developed countries experience market-seeking FDI. 
 
However, the marginal effect is noted higher in the developing countries. this is 
possibly because of the nature of FDI. As noted in the theoretical discussions (see 
UNCTAD 2001B) that market oriented FDI has a greater linkages effect than export 
oriented FDI. Usually it is noted that efficiency-seeking FDI (developing countries) 
produce in the host country but the final product is exported to clientele countries or 
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back to the home country. Whereas, for market-seeking FDI, it is possible that the 
product is actually produced and distributed in the host country therefore, it has 
grater linkages effect. Since market-seeking FDI affects developed countries, the 
overall marginal effect of this country group on sector diversification is larger than 
the efficiency-seeking FDI in developing countries.  
 
A note of cautiousness is put forward, as one may argue that efficiency-seeking FDI 
may also occur in advanced industrialised nations (Barrell and Pain, 1997). By the 
same token, market-seeking FDI may also occur in developing countries, like China 
and India. However, empirically, these arguments are not proven in this study in the 
manufacturing sector, as market-seeking FDI has a significant effect on sector 
diversification only in developed countries and the latter in developing countries. 
The counter argument is that the amount of such type of FDI that is market-seeking 
in developing countries and efficiency-seeking in developed countries may not be 
sufficient enough to affect sector diversification significantly. 
 
7.4.2.   Further Robustness Analysis 
Further robustness checks of the results were undertaken to ensure that the results 
were not driven by factors such as regions, data disaggregation, sub-periods and 
disinvestments. Further checks, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, were made by 
using alternative measures of diversification and alternative measures of the motives 
of FDI (natural-resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking). It was 
also ensured that the results held when controlled for country-fixed effects, other 
time-varying controls, common-time effects and country-specific time trends. For 
value added shares, robustness checks were carried out on the UNIDO 3-digit 
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disaggregated data, and UNIDO 4-digit disaggregated data was used for employment 
shares—results are reported in tables 7.9 and 7.10 respectively. 
 
7.4.2.1.   Excluding Regions 
To confirm that results are not driven by any of the regions, regressions were run by 
dropping each region at a time. The results are reported in Panel A of tables 7.9 and 
7.10. All regions are dropped because this result is significant for developing 
countries, and this set of countries is found in all regions. It should be noted that 
Latin American countries diversify quicker than other regions—that is, within 5% 
FDI/GDP. Beyond 5%, Latin American countries are no longer significant, although 
the signs of coefficients are still negative (diversifying). Hence, Latin American 
countries diversify earlier than other regions at 5% FDI/GDP level.  
 
Developed countries are smaller in number. Some regions do not include them in 
their sample. Therefore, only three regions—EAP, MENA and NA—are excluded. It 
is noted from the results in both tables that efficiency-seeking FDI diversifies the 
developing countries, while market-seeking FDI diversifies the developed countries. 
The magnitudes across the results are similar and equally significant. 
 
7.4.2.2.   Data Disaggregation 
Panel B in both tables reports results using another level of disaggregated data, that 
is, at 3-digit disaggregated data. Results are found to be consistent. The discussion of 
this was conducted when discussing the baseline results above. 
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7.4.2.3.   Use of Alternative Measures of Diversification 
Consistent results were obtained across all three measures of diversification in Panel 
C of both tables. However, as mentioned earlier, the magnitudes of the coefficients 
vary across these measures. This is possibly by definition of each measure and based 
on the way each is calculated. 
 
7.4.2.4.   Sub-Period (1982 to 2000) 
The sub-period data was conducted only for UNIDO 3-digit data. Results are 
reported in Table 7.9 (see Panel D). UNIDO 4-digit data begins from 1980, while 
UNIDO 3-digit data begins from 1970. In order to ensure 3-digit results were not 
driven by 1970 observations, these were excluded. UNIDO 4-digit data is a split of a 
benchmark sample. Because these two datasets involve data disaggregation by 
splitting, data disaggregation does not affect the manufacturing sector.  
 
7.4.2.5.   Removing Disinvestments 
All disinvestment, meaning negative FDI, was excluded from the regressions and 
results held. See Panel E for employment shares in Table 7.9, and Panel D for value 
added shares in Table 7.10. 
 
7.4.2.6.   Alternative FDI Motives 
Alternatives diversification and FDI motives have different definitions, so the 
information they capture is not identical. Results held in most of the following (see 
Panel F in Table 7.9 and Panel E in Table 7.10): 
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(i) Fuel as a share of total merchandise exports as an alternative proxy for 
natural-resource-seeking FDI. In addition, results held when ores/exports 
were excluded from primary exports, because metal and ores might 
involve some level of processing. To clear this doubt, regressions were 
run without including ores/exports in primary exports. Due to space 
limitation, this result is not reported in the tables. 
(ii) Lagged real GDP as alternative market-seeking FDI and results held. 
(iii) Wage per worker used as alternative efficiency-seeking FDI. In all cases, 
results held except for Table 7.9, where it is assumed that wage per 
worker to some extent captures labour skills. Under this circumstance, 
developed countries were found to be significant instead of developing 
countries. The correlations for both variables when checked revealed 
essentially weaker correlation between efficiency wage and wage per 
worker than the rest of the alternative pairs of proxies. However, as 
widely mentioned in many empirical and theoretical studies, foreign firms 
normally do not compromise quality on low labour cost and so they 
consider low wage relative to productivity when investing in low labour 
cost countries. 
 
7.4.2.7.   Restricting the Model 
Finally, it is shown that results held when country-fixed effects, other time-varying 
controls, common-time effects and country-specific time trends were added to the 
model. There is a diversification effect from FDI motives and it is statistically 
significant at mostly 1% level. The magnitudes are fairly consistent in all these 
specifications. 
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7.5.   Chapter Summary 
It is clear from the findings of this chapter that FDI cannot be treated as a 
homogeneous activity when analysing its effect on sector diversification. In addition, 
it has been empirically proven that each type of FDI has a different effect on sector 
diversification via different channels of employment and value being added. Further, 
developed countries do not have a direct effect on sector diversification as a result of 
FDI, but it is channelled through other areas, like financially developed or market-
seeking FDI. The overall finding was that, in the manufacturing sector, efficiency-
seeking FDI diversifies sectors in developing countries, which are reflected in the 
value added shares, while developed countries diversify in employment shares 
through market-seeking FDI. 
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 Table 7.3: ILO 1-digit Results (Employment Shares) 
 Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
VARIABLES All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi -1.645** -1.923** -0.638 -1.547*  0.926* 0.330 1.341 0.316  
 (-2.53) (-2.64) (-0.19) (-1.83)  (1.92) (0.41) (1.25) (0.34)  
fdi * ln_pop 0.078 0.054 0.128 0.013  -0.074* -0.029 -0.046 -0.033  
 (1.45) (0.57) (0.45) (0.15)  (-1.91) (-0.44) (-0.81) (-0.55)  
fdi * eff_wage -1.446 -1.253 2.923 -0.771  -2.992** -3.157 -1.569 -3.538  
 (-0.89) (-0.25) (0.63) (-0.17)  (-2.19) (-0.81) (-0.75) (-0.97)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.007*** 0.011** 0.003 0.010**  0.006*** 0.007 0.001 0.008*  
 (2.90) (2.59) (0.28) (2.26)  (3.12) (1.64) (0.27) (1.81)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.017 0.090 -0.260 0.134  0.042 0.005 -0.047 0.019  
 (0.33) (0.73) (-1.38) (1.09)  (1.22) (0.07) (-1.27) (0.25)  
Observations 538 255 283 223  538 255 283 223  
No. of Countries 44 26 18 22  44 26 18 22  
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi 0.778 -3.536 6.988 -11.230  1.534 1.036 4.594** -5.711 
 (0.09) (-0.32) (0.74) (-1.30)  (0.18) (0.09) (2.60) (-0.50) 
fdi * ln_pop -0.445 -0.012 -0.217 0.113  -0.345 -0.100 -0.319 0.033 
 (-0.87) (-0.02) (-0.21) (0.19)  (-0.77) (-0.13) (-1.24) (0.05) 
fdi * eff_wage 1.442 -1.619 -14.919 -3.868  -3.960 -7.594 -7.593 -5.627 
 (0.15) (-0.13) (-0.83) (-0.43)  (-0.46) (-0.50) (-1.22) (-0.80) 
fdi * prim_prod 0.037 0.025 0.015 0.047  0.032 0.019 0.004 0.030 
 (1.63) (1.09) (0.40) (1.52)  (1.47) (0.77) (0.26) (1.23) 
fdi * ln_patent 0.654* 0.360 -0.094 1.045**  0.406 0.032 0.190 0.580 
 (1.89) (0.74) (-0.08) (2.10)  (1.17) (0.07) (0.54) (1.06) 
Observations 154 93 61 79  154 93 61 79 
No. of Countries 46 29 17 25  46 29 17 25 
Panel C. Cross-Sectional 
fdi -32.207** -10.877 12.725 -30.432  -39.885 -0.539 6.780 -33.126  
 (-2.40) (-0.40) (1.58) (-0.76)  (-1.58) (-0.01) (1.98) (-1.12)  
fdi * ln_pop 1.903** 0.039 -2.255*** 2.945  2.064 -0.616 -0.971** 3.163  
 (2.22) (0.02) (-4.84) (1.03)  (1.42) (-0.22) (-3.30) (1.48)  
fdi * eff_wage 32.945* 8.834 48.435* -32.734  26.320 -1.986 16.435 -35.510  
 (1.75) (0.44) (2.42) (-0.56)  (0.94) (-0.05) (1.91) (-0.75)  
fdi * prim_prod -0.019 0.060 -0.061** 0.025  0.017 0.000 -0.034* 0.015  
 (-0.51) (0.94) (-2.81) (0.30)  (0.34) (0.00) (-2.46) (0.30)  
fdi * ln_patent -0.374 0.840 2.180** -3.148*  0.312 2.059 0.872** -2.996*  
 (-0.62) (1.14) (3.64) (-1.85)  (0.40) (1.70) (3.06) (-2.14)  
Observations 56 36 20 28  56 36 20 28  
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Common-Time Effects YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Specific Time Trends YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. The world sample is sub-grouped by income 
(developing, developed, middle-income and low-income countries). Low-income countries did not have sufficient observations 
to conclude results. Cross-sectional data did not have country-fixed effects, time effects and country-specific time trends. It only 
includes all controls. Annual and 5-year-average results were obtained using Equation 7.1 and cross-sectional results were 
obtained using Equation 7.2. 
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Table 7.4: OECD 2-digit Results (Employment and Value Added Shares) 
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. OECD countries are mostly high-income 
countries with only a few developing countries as members. Therefore, the sample was not sub-grouped. The robustness check 
was conducted only on developed countries (excluding developing countries). Cross-sectional data did not have country-fixed 
effects, time effects and country-specific time trends. It only includes all controls. Annual and 5-year-average results were 
obtained using Equation 7.1 and cross-sectional results were obtained using Equation 7.2. 
  
 Employment Value added 
VARIABLES Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All 
OCED 
Countries 
Only 
Developed 
Countries 
All 
OCED 
Countries 
Only 
Developed 
Countries 
All 
OCED 
Countries 
Only 
Developed 
Countries 
All 
OCED 
Countries 
Only 
Developed 
Countries 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi -1.303 -1.591 -0.162 -0.230 2.584 2.281 0.680 0.605 
 (-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.24) (-0.32) (1.43) (1.17) (0.98) (0.82) 
fdi * ln_pop 0.050 0.157 -0.005 0.030 -0.301** -0.294* -0.083 -0.080 
 (0.24) (0.45) (-0.11) (0.37) (-2.14) (-1.97) (-1.54) (-1.41) 
fdi * eff_wage -0.501 -5.447 -0.285 -1.266 -0.499 0.174 0.616 0.792 
 (-0.14) (-1.36) (-0.25) (-0.81) (-0.11) (0.03) (0.50) (0.59) 
fdi * prim_prod 0.009 0.009** 0.002 0.003** -0.006 -0.006 -0.003*** -0.003** 
 (1.31) (2.31) (1.63) (2.45) (-1.14) (-1.12) (-2.88) (-2.87) 
fdi * ln_patent 0.054 -0.033 0.031 -0.014 0.294** 0.300** 0.075** 0.075* 
 (0.48) (-0.12) (0.95) (-0.21) (2.83) (2.58) (2.11) (1.92) 
Observations 90 76 90 76 209 199 209 199 
No. of Countries 16 12 16 12 19 16 19 16 
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi     26.617 26.617 4.399 4.399  
     (1.57) (1.50) (1.07) (1.02)  
fdi * ln_pop     -2.274 -2.274 -0.368 -0.368  
     (-1.72) (-1.65) (-1.14) (-1.09)  
fdi * eff_wage     -65.433* -65.433* -13.374 -13.374  
     (-2.07) (-1.99) (-1.42) (-1.37)  
fdi * prim_prod     0.026* 0.026* 0.004 0.004  
     (1.98) (1.90) (1.05) (1.01)  
fdi * ln_patent     2.527* 2.527* 0.455 0.455  
     (2.08) (1.99) (1.52) (1.46)  
Observations     57 51 57 51  
No. of Countries     20 16 20 16  
Panel C. Cross-Sectional 
fdi -23.258 -67.713 -2.211 -7.632 24.797 13.070 11.318* 2.893 
 (-0.71) (-1.47) (-0.31) (-1.74) (1.44) (0.50) (2.00) (0.39) 
fdi * ln_pop 1.382 3.209 0.097 0.091 -1.468 -1.256 -0.739 -0.294 
 (0.68) (0.80) (0.21) (0.24) (-0.95) (-0.65) (-1.46) (-0.53) 
fdi * eff_wage 43.043 220.486 1.734 35.533 30.193 73.803 3.351 14.526 
 (0.88) (3.00) (0.15) (5.08) (1.34) (0.77) (0.40) (0.54) 
fdi * prim_prod -0.035 -0.148 -0.009 -0.027 -0.022 -0.068 0.002 -0.016 
 (-1.08) (-2.38) (-1.04) (-4.51) (-0.76) (-0.95) (0.19) (-0.80) 
fdi * ln_patent -0.475 -1.409 0.089 0.205 -0.434 -0.092 0.030 0.045 
 (-0.36) (-0.45) (0.28) (0.69) (-0.32) (-0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Observations 22 17 22 17 24 19 24 19 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Common-Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country-Specific Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 7.5: UNIDO 3-digit Results (Employment Shares) 
 Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
VARIABLES All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 2.201** 2.725 -1.000 1.948  1.375* 2.092* -0.331 1.415  
 (2.17) (1.65) (-0.74) (1.11)  (1.89) (1.85) (-0.69) (1.30)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.099 -0.176 0.164 -0.122  -0.079* -0.164** 0.059 -0.115  
 (-1.43) (-1.53) (1.08) (-0.92)  (-1.77) (-2.18) (1.24) (-1.45)  
fdi * eff_wage -1.547 0.524 -4.534 1.005  -1.974 -0.300 -1.185 -0.419  
 (-0.75) (0.16) (-1.24) (0.32)  (-1.20) (-0.11) (-1.20) (-0.17)  
fdi * prim_prod -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  
 (-1.10) (-0.63) (-1.35) (-0.77)  (-0.52) (-0.60) (-1.19) (-0.19)  
fdi * ln_patent -0.021 0.039 -0.069 0.027  0.036 0.119** -0.042 0.096  
 (-0.33) (0.50) (-0.50) (0.31)  (0.79) (2.04) (-1.02) (1.50)  
Observations 1,094 646 448 513  1,094 646 448 513  
No. of Countries 75 53 22 38  75 53 22 38  
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi 1.530 0.975 8.296* 0.855  1.383 1.825 2.986** 3.025  
 (0.55) (0.29) (2.06) (0.22)  (0.84) (0.80) (2.76) (1.39)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.030 -0.028 -0.571* -0.152  -0.053 -0.061 -0.206** -0.269  
 (-0.14) (-0.09) (-1.88) (-0.38)  (-0.41) (-0.33) (-2.60) (-1.29)  
fdi * eff_wage 0.510 6.919 -11.269 11.354**  -1.921 -2.684 -3.805 -0.944  
 (0.11) (1.27) (-1.05) (2.04)  (-0.53) (-0.44) (-1.23) (-0.19)  
fdi * prim_prod -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008  
 (-0.56) (-0.76) (-0.70) (-0.10)  (0.09) (0.00) (0.21) (1.28)  
fdi * ln_patent -0.117 -0.115 0.321 0.095  -0.048 -0.093 0.106** 0.161  
 (-0.68) (-0.41) (1.63) (0.25)  (-0.57) (-0.58) (2.14) (0.86)  
Observations 287 192 95 141  287 192 95 141  
No. of Countries 81 59 22 40  81 59 22 40  
Panel C. Cross-Sectional 
fdi 10.297 13.856 -0.795 -2.352  9.605 11.702 7.505 -17.289  
 (1.24) (1.64) (-0.04) (-0.17)  (0.90) (0.88) (1.54) (-1.10)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.895 -1.158** -0.412 -0.613  -0.730 -0.878 -0.750 0.783  
 (-1.60) (-2.05) (-0.21) (-0.56)  (-1.00) (-0.97) (-1.85) (0.60)  
fdi * eff_wage 2.402 -12.066 56.794 16.420  -3.198 -11.653 11.435 -8.818  
 (0.22) (-1.10) (0.90) (0.62)  (-0.27) (-0.83) (0.76) (-0.36)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.034** 0.053*** -0.114 0.048  0.027 0.042** -0.019 0.049  
 (2.41) (4.00) (-1.25) (1.18)  (1.63) (2.03) (-1.01) (1.10)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.274 0.421* 0.253 1.033  0.156 0.142 0.428 0.399  
 (1.09) (1.92) (0.19) (1.19)  (0.53) (0.42) (1.58) (0.36)  
Observations 101 77 24 47  101 77 24 47  
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Common-Time 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Specific 
Time Trends 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.  Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. The world sample is sub-grouped by income 
(developing, developed, middle-income and low-income countries). Low-income countries did not have sufficient observations 
to conclude results. Cross-sectional data did not have country-fixed effects, time effects and country-specific time trends. It only 
includes all controls. Annual and 5-year-average results were obtained using Equation 7.1 and cross-sectional results were 
obtained using Equation 7.2. 
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Table 7.6: UNIDO 3-digit Results (Value Added Shares) 
 Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
VARIABLES All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 3.428** 3.660 -2.846 4.198  2.182** 1.682 0.666 2.333  
 (2.08) (1.39) (-0.88) (1.18)  (2.22) (0.97) (0.63) (1.01)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.170 -0.183 0.342 -0.217  -0.134** -0.074 -0.008 -0.120  
 (-1.42) (-0.95) (1.15) (-0.84)  (-2.08) (-0.65) (-0.09) (-0.76)  
fdi * eff_wage -11.289** -13.295** -5.081 -15.448**  -8.178*** -10.794** -2.782 -11.884**  
 (-2.49) (-2.23) (-0.62) (-2.42)  (-2.97) (-2.61) (-1.24) (-2.66)  
fdi * prim_prod -0.000 0.003 -0.014 0.005  0.001 0.003 -0.006 0.003  
 (-0.09) (0.53) (-1.35) (0.86)  (0.40) (0.82) (-1.71) (0.89)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.131 0.107 -0.139 0.132  0.141** 0.082 0.019 0.110  
 (1.31) (0.79) (-0.53) (0.79)  (2.51) (1.15) (0.27) (1.16)  
Observations 1,074 633 441 502  1,074 633 441 502  
No. of Countries 70 49 21 36  70 49 21 36  
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi -2.927 -3.126 -2.170 -3.195  1.964 1.842 -0.607 2.068  
 (-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.30) (-0.60)  (0.82) (0.70) (-0.25) (0.66)  
fdi * ln_pop 0.270 0.281 0.256 0.257  -0.089 -0.100 0.133 -0.143  
 (0.76) (0.71) (0.44) (0.62)  (-0.43) (-0.43) (0.73) (-0.49)  
fdi * eff_wage 2.023 1.763 6.677 2.164  -5.686 -6.822 -1.801 -5.864  
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.35) (0.15)  (-1.09) (-0.93) (-0.26) (-0.74)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.003 0.006 -0.013 0.010  0.003 0.006 -0.005 0.008  
 (0.22) (0.44) (-0.51) (0.79)  (0.46) (0.87) (-0.57) (1.00)  
fdi * ln_patent -0.190 -0.243 -0.293 -0.213  0.027 0.047 -0.137 0.098  
 (-0.87) (-0.70) (-0.63) (-0.58)  (0.20) (0.22) (-1.05) (0.35)  
Observations 282 187 95 138  282 187 95 138  
No. of Countries 76 54 22 37  76 54 22 37  
Panel C. Cross-Sectional 
fdi 6.617 13.019 14.159 -9.055  4.580 11.696 15.600 -9.448  
 (0.68) (1.44) (0.34) (-0.57)  (0.50) (1.13) (0.73) (-0.67)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.516 -0.951 -1.043 0.660  -0.134 -0.606 -1.127 0.620  
 (-0.76) (-1.47) (-0.32) (0.55)  (-0.21) (-0.85) (-0.75) (0.58)  
fdi * eff_wage 9.592 -17.522 2.530 -8.934  -11.345 -31.063* 1.977 -17.503  
 (0.55) (-1.06) (0.02) (-0.26)  (-0.69) (-1.72) (0.04) (-0.64)  
fdi * prim_prod -0.008 0.030 -0.065 0.013  -0.013 0.013 -0.010 0.018  
 (-0.37) (1.23) (-0.39) (0.30)  (-0.58) (0.46) (-0.14) (0.41)  
fdi * ln_patent -0.024 0.195 0.574 -0.552  -0.169 -0.023 0.339 -0.188  
 (-0.08) (0.67) (0.27) (-0.58)  (-0.52) (-0.07) (0.38) (-0.21)  
Observations 95 71 24 44  95 71 24 44  
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Common-Time 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Specific 
Time Trends 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.  Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. The world sample is sub-grouped by income 
(developing, developed, middle-income and low-income countries). Cross-sectional data did not have country-fixed effects, 
time effects and country-specific time trends. It only includes all controls. Annual and 5-year-average results were obtained 
using Equation 7.1 and cross-sectional results were obtained using Equation 7.2. The robustness check of results was made 
using the Herfindahl index, an alternative measurement of diversification. 
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Table 7.7: UNIDO 4-digit Results (Employment Shares) 
VARIABLES Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 4.361 -1.458 51.651** -2.559  2.021 0.912 20.505** 1.559  
 (1.01) (-0.51) (2.27) (-1.05)  (1.15) (0.53) (2.79) (0.87)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.403 0.075 -4.663*** 0.184  -0.164 -0.120 -1.861*** -0.115  
 (-1.40) (0.42) (-3.07) (1.16)  (-1.45) (-1.07) (-3.68) (-0.90)  
fdi * eff_wage -5.603 0.592 -6.853 0.421  -1.408 2.326 -1.153 -1.024  
 (-0.93) (0.13) (-1.75) (0.13)  (-0.55) (0.90) (-0.89) (-0.41)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.016 0.002 0.007 -0.002  0.002 -0.002 -0.010 -0.004  
 (1.53) (0.32) (0.10) (-0.30)  (0.42) (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.89)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.266 0.030 2.641*** -0.030  0.087 0.136 1.094*** 0.093  
 (1.54) (0.31) (3.89) (-0.28)  (1.21) (1.48) (4.34) (0.83)  
Observations 320 191 129 139  320 191 129 139  
No. of Countries 42 28 14 20  42 28 14 20  
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi 27.672 41.363***    5.552 9.090**    
 (1.42) (4.04)    (0.61) (2.39)    
fdi * ln_pop -2.346 -4.008***    -0.607 -1.085***    
 (-1.65) (-5.06)    (-0.97) (-3.40)    
fdi * eff_wage -25.900 -28.339**    -7.441 -10.980**    
 (-1.30) (-2.05)    (-0.70) (-2.06)    
fdi * prim_prod 0.078 0.209***    0.042 0.089***    
 (1.30) (9.43)    (1.44) (6.11)    
fdi * ln_patent 1.396 2.910***    0.458 0.953***    
 (1.59) (6.81)    (1.10) (3.92)    
Observations 115 80    115 80    
No. of Countries 47 33    47 33    
Panel C. Cross-Sectional 
fdi -7.204 -9.064  -19.321  -34.314 -57.876**  -103.929*  
 (-0.60) (-0.56)  (-0.97)  (-1.60) (-2.18)  (-1.87)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.255 0.044  0.637  2.367 3.632**  7.657  
 (-0.26) (0.03)  (0.37)  (1.66) (2.14)  (1.66)  
fdi * eff_wage 26.542 22.839  67.724***  50.479 73.886  129.272  
 (1.33) (0.96)  (3.18)  (1.31) (1.50)  (1.62)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.046 0.081  0.002  -0.004 0.071  -0.093  
 (1.10) (1.64)  (0.04)  (-0.07) (0.94)  (-0.57)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.600 0.166  -0.248  -1.934 -2.112  -5.045  
 (0.71) (0.17)  (-0.21)  (-1.45) (-1.63)  (-1.41)  
Observations 58 42  28  58 42  28  
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Country-Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Common-Time 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Country-Specific 
Time Trends 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
0% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. The world sample is sub-grouped by income 
(developing, developed, middle-income and low-income countries). Cross-sectional data did not have country- fixed effects, 
time effects and country-specific time trends. It only includes all controls. Annual and 5-year-average results were obtained 
using Equation 7.1 and cross-sectional results were obtained using Equation 7.2. The robustness check of results was made 
using the Herfindahl index, an alternative measurement of diversification. 
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Table 7.8: UNIDO 4-digit Results (Value Added Shares) 
VARIABLES Gini Herfindahl 
 World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples World 
Sample 
Sub-Samples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Middle-
income 
Countries 
 
Panel A. Annual 
fdi 2.071 8.047* 14.336 5.006  -9.237 5.106 2.033 5.655  
 (0.29) (1.72) (1.41) (1.00)  (-1.46) (1.39) (0.25) (1.47)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.352 -0.551* -1.369 -0.323  0.624 -0.307 -0.450 -0.307  
 (-0.79) (-2.01) (-1.57) (-1.14)  (1.48) (-1.64) (-0.71) (-1.52)  
fdi * eff_wage -0.599 -15.269* 8.122 -10.797  2.923 -14.354* 18.535*** -16.002*  
 (-0.11) (-1.81) (0.96) (-1.09)  (0.58) (-2.03) (3.23) (-2.06)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.022 0.010 -0.024 0.005  0.011 0.007 -0.051** 0.004  
 (1.19) (0.75) (-0.55) (0.39)  (0.69) (0.84) (-2.24) (0.53)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.403* 0.299 0.842 0.188  -0.227 0.134 0.417 0.100  
 (1.87) (1.24) (1.36) (0.99)  (-0.95) (1.20) (1.21) (1.07)  
Observations 328 191 137 135  328 191 137 135  
No. of Countries 43 29 14 21  43 29 14 21  
Panel B. 5-year Average 
fdi 16.524 -144.604***    -4.667 -36.407***    
 (0.43) (-12.41)    (-0.21) (-5.07)    
fdi * ln_pop -1.636 9.981***    -0.211 2.084***    
 (-0.58) (11.39)    (-0.14) (3.86)    
fdi * eff_wage -9.014 365.950***    26.492 121.009***    
 (-0.34) (15.84)    (1.57) (8.50)    
fdi * prim_prod 0.035 -0.311***    0.049 -0.045*    
 (0.45) (-8.31)    (0.92) (-1.95)    
fdi * ln_patent 1.050 -5.521***    0.489 -1.077***    
 (0.79) (-9.71)    (0.59) (-3.07)    
Observations 114 76    114 76    
No. of Countries 47 32    47 32    
Panel C. Cross-Sectional 
fdi -7.204 -9.064  -19.321  -34.314 -57.876**  -103.929*  
 (-0.60) (-0.56)  (-0.97)  (-1.60) (-2.18)  (-1.87)  
fdi * ln_pop -0.255 0.044  0.637  2.367 3.632**  7.657  
 (-0.26) (0.03)  (0.37)  (1.66) (2.14)  (1.66)  
fdi * eff_wage 26.542 22.839  67.724***  50.479 73.886  129.272  
 (1.33) (0.96)  (3.18)  (1.31) (1.50)  (1.62)  
fdi * prim_prod 0.046 0.081  0.002  -0.004 0.071  -0.093  
 (1.10) (1.64)  (0.04)  (-0.07) (0.94)  (-0.57)  
fdi * ln_patent 0.600 0.166  -0.248  -1.934 -2.112  -5.045  
 (0.71) (0.17)  (-0.21)  (-1.45) (-1.63)  (-1.41)  
Observations 58 42  28  58 42  28  
Controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Fixed 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Common-Time 
Effects 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Country-Specific 
Time Trend 
YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively.  Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. The world sample is sub-grouped by income 
(developing, developed, middle-income and low-income countries). Low-income countries did not have sufficient observations 
to conclude results. Cross-sectional data did not have country-fixed effects, time effects and country-specific time trends. It only 
includes all controls. Annual and 5-year-average results were obtained using Equation 7.1 and cross-sectional results were 
obtained using Equation 7.2. The robustness check of results was made using the Herfindahl index, an alternative measurement 
of diversification. 
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Table 7.9: Robust Results for the Manufacturing Sector: Developing Countries (Value 
Added) 
Panel A: UNIDO 3-Digit—Excluding Regions (Only Gini Measurement) 
VARIABLES EAP ECA MENA SA WE SSA LAC NA 
fdi * pop -0.347 -0.286 -0.736** -0.328 -0.369* -0.461* -0.152 -0.369* 
 (-1.31) (-1.24) (-2.50) (-1.38) (-1.70) (-1.93) (-0.74) (-1.70) 
fdi * eff_wage -16.991** -19.245*** -24.351*** -17.499** -17.285** -16.940** -11.532* -17.285** 
 (-2.29) (-2.82) (-2.79) (-2.59) (-2.58) (-2.45) (-2.00) (-2.58) 
fdi * prim_prod -0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.018* -0.001 
 (-0.08) (0.20) (0.48) (-0.20) (-0.21) (-0.39) (-1.83) (-0.21) 
fdi * ln_patent 0.221 0.115 0.405** 0.180 0.214 0.283 0.134 0.214 
 (1.31) (0.73) (2.31) (1.06) (1.34) (1.61) (0.68) (1.34) 
Observations 538 556 515 555 612 537 359 612 
No. of Countries 43 43 42 45 49 41 31 49 
Panel B: UNIDO 4-Digit—Alternative Data Disaggregation Level 
 Whole Sample Sub-Samples 
 Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl  
 All 
Countries 
All 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
  
fdi * pop -0.352 -0.352 -0.551* -1.369 -0.307 -0.450   
 (-0.79) (-0.79) (-2.01) (-1.57) (-1.64) (-0.71)   
fdi * eff_wage -0.599 -0.599 -15.269* 8.122 -14.354* 18.535***   
 (-0.11) (-0.11) (-1.81) (0.96) (-2.03) (3.23)   
fdi * prim_prod 0.022 0.022 0.010 -0.024 0.007 -0.051**   
 (1.19) (1.19) (0.75) (-0.55) (0.84) (-2.24)   
fdi * ln_patent 0.403* 0.403* 0.299 0.842 0.134 0.417   
 (1.87) (1.87) (1.24) (1.36) (1.20) (1.21)   
Observations 328 328 191 137 191 137   
No. of Countries 43 43 29 14 29 14   
Panel C: UNIDO 3-Digit—Alternative Diversification Measurements  
fdi * pop -0.170 -0.134** -0.183 0.342 -0.074 -0.008   
 (-1.42) (-2.08) (-0.95) (1.15) (-0.65) (-0.09)   
fdi * eff_wage -11.289** -8.178*** -13.295** -5.081 -10.794** -2.782   
 (-2.49) (-2.97) (-2.23) (-0.62) (-2.61) (-1.24)   
fdi * prim_prod -0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.006   
 (-0.09) (0.40) (0.53) (-1.35) (0.82) (-1.71)   
fdi * ln_patent 0.131 0.141** 0.107 -0.139 0.082 0.019   
 (1.31) (2.51) (0.79) (-0.53) (1.15) (0.27)   
Observations 1,074 1,074 633 441 633 441   
No. of Countries 70 70 49 21 49 21   
Panel D: UNIDO 3-Digit—Sub-Period (1982-2000) 
fdi * pop -0.332* -0.116 -0.439*** 0.199 -0.112 0.003   
 (-1.97) (-1.22) (-2.76) (0.64) (-1.23) (0.05)   
fdi * eff_wage -12.143*** -6.417*** -19.399*** -2.042 -12.579*** 0.342   
 (-3.31) (-3.21) (-3.00) (-0.18) (-3.50) (0.13)   
fdi * prim_prod 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.010 0.005 -0.005*   
 (0.22) (1.07) (1.03) (-0.99) (1.48) (-1.75)   
fdi * ln_patent 0.209* 0.130** 0.260 -0.067 0.071 0.013   
 (1.92) (2.52) (1.68) (-0.40) (1.02) (0.34)   
Observations 446 446 261 185 261 185   
No. of Countries 53 53 36 17 36 17   
fdi * pop -0.202 -0.135** -0.247 0.398 -0.046 -0.002   
 (-1.50) (-2.02) (-1.30) (1.33) (-0.39) (-0.02)   
fdi * eff_wage -10.701** -7.466*** -10.412* -5.249 -9.662** -2.973   
 (-2.42) (-2.81) (-1.82) (-0.63) (-2.45) (-1.30)   
fdi * prim_prod 0.007 0.004 0.014** -0.010 0.008* -0.005   
 (1.18) (1.34) (2.16) (-0.93) (1.94) (-1.38)   
fdi * ln_patent 0.234** 0.181** 0.285* -0.169 0.142 0.012   
 (2.05) (2.32) (1.89) (-0.65) (1.39) (0.17)   
Observations 1,009 1,009 580 429 580 429   
No. of Countries 70 70 49 21 49 21   
Panel F: UNIDO 3-Digit—Alternative FDI Motives (only Gini Measurement) 
 Natural-Resource-Seeking Market-Seeking Efficiency-Seeking  
Substituted with: (Fuel/Exports) (ln_gdp_1) (wage per worker)   
 Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
  
fdi * pop -0.205 0.476* -0.742*** 0.272 -0.102 0.175   
 (-1.01) (1.86) (-2.98) (0.90) (-0.77) (0.66)   
fdi * eff_wage -13.309** -8.061 -13.365** -4.688 -0.032 -0.608***   
 (-2.12) (-1.29) (-2.42) (-0.57) (-0.40) (-8.32)   
fdi * prim_prod 0.004 -0.015 0.002 -0.013 0.001 -0.020***   
 (0.69) (-1.43) (0.41) (-1.15) (0.16) (-3.06)   
fdi * ln_patent 0.054 -0.202 0.450*** -0.109 0.093 -0.008   
 (0.39) (-0.77) (2.86) (-0.41) (0.78) (-0.04)   
Observations 634 441 633 440 622 442   
No. of Countries 48 21 49 21 49 22   
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. Results estimated using Equation 7.2. 
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Table 7.10: Robust Results for the Manufacturing Sector: Developed Countries 
(Employment Shares) 
Panel A: UNIDO 4-Digit—Excluding Regions (Only Gini Measurement)  
VARIABLES EAP MENA NA       
fdi * pop -4.178** -4.323*** -4.342***       
 (-2.58) (-3.67) (-3.98)       
fdi * eff_wage 1.744 -0.079 -6.835       
 (0.07) (-0.02) (-1.52)       
fdi * prim_prod -0.065 0.027 0.034       
 (-0.97) (0.56) (0.50)       
fdi * ln_patent 2.437** 2.734*** 1.720**       
 (3.06) (4.47) (2.51)       
Observations 105 109 115       
No. of Countries 11 12 13       
Panel B: UNIDO 3-Digit—Alternative Data Disaggregation Level  
 Whole Sample Sub-Samples   
 Gini Herfindahl Gini Herfindahl   
 All 
Countries 
All  
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
   
fdi * pop -0.099 -0.079* -0.176 0.164 -0.164** 0.059    
 (-1.43) (-1.77) (-1.53) (1.08) (-2.18) (1.24)    
fdi * eff_wage -1.547 -1.974 0.524 -4.534 -0.300 -1.185    
 (-0.75) (-1.20) (0.16) (-1.24) (-0.11) (-1.20)    
fdi * prim_prod -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001    
 (-1.10) (-0.52) (-0.63) (-1.35) (-0.60) (-1.19)    
fdi * ln_patent -0.021 0.036 0.039 -0.069 0.119** -0.042    
 (-0.33) (0.79) (0.50) (-0.50) (2.04) (-1.02)    
Observations 1,094 1,094 646 448 646 448    
No. of Countries 75 75 53 22 53 22    
Panel C: UNIDO 4-Digit—Alternative Diversification Measurements   
fdi * pop -0.403 -0.164 0.075 -4.663*** -0.120 -1.861***    
 (-1.40) (-1.45) (0.42) (-3.07) (-1.07) (-3.68)    
fdi * eff_wage -5.603 -1.408 0.592 -6.853 2.326 -1.153    
 (-0.93) (-0.55) (0.13) (-1.75) (0.90) (-0.89)    
fdi * prim_prod 0.016 0.002 0.002 0.007 -0.002 -0.010    
 (1.53) (0.42) (0.32) (0.10) (-0.45) (-0.45)    
fdi * ln_patent 0.266 0.087 0.030 2.641*** 0.136 1.094***    
 (1.54) (1.21) (0.31) (3.89) (1.48) (4.34)    
Observations 320 320 191 129 191 129    
No. of Countries 42 42 28 14 28 14    
Panel D: UNIDO 4-Digit—Removed Disinvestments (Negative FDIs) 
fdi * pop -0.442 -0.137 0.152 -6.579*** -0.054 -2.529***    
 (-1.44) (-1.28) (0.79) (-5.77) (-0.46) (-5.60)    
fdi * eff_wage -5.731 -1.115 4.224 -1.990 4.083 0.634    
 (-0.81) (-0.38) (0.50) (-0.38) (0.91) (0.29)    
fdi * prim_prod 0.017 0.000 -0.001 -0.059 -0.005 -0.033    
 (1.49) (0.09) (-0.17) (-1.03) (-1.38) (-1.69)    
fdi * ln_patent 0.310 0.025 -0.136 3.482*** 0.006 1.382***    
 (1.41) (0.35) (-0.82) (8.41) (0.05) (7.54)    
Observations 304 304 182 122 182 122    
No. of Countries 42 42 28 14 28 14    
Panel E: UNIDO 4-Digit—Alternative FDI Motives (only Gini Measurement)  
 Natural-Resource-Seeking Market-Seeking Efficiency-Seeking   
Substituted with: (Fuel/Exports) (ln_gdp_1) (wage per worker)    
 Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
Developing 
Countries 
Developed 
Countries 
   
fdi * pop -0.159 -6.069*** -0.039 -4.844*** 0.095 -3.823**    
 (-0.91) (-12.57) (-0.11) (-6.42) (0.78) (-3.01)    
fdi * eff_wage -8.230* 0.633 -4.878 -1.186 -0.032 0.665    
 (-1.85) (0.13) (-1.09) (-0.30) (-0.55) (0.88)    
fdi * prim_prod -0.002 -0.111*** 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.013    
 (-0.22) (-4.48) (0.76) (0.07) (0.40) (0.18)    
fdi * ln_patent 0.090 3.515*** 0.084 3.265*** 0.053 2.183***    
 (1.11) (14.93) (0.52) (7.36) (0.55) (3.74)    
Observations 186 125 182 125 183 119    
No. of Countries 28 13 28 13 29 12    
Note: Output supressed. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. Controls include ln_initial_pcap, findev, gcf and trade. Results estimated using Equation 7.2. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
The effect of FDI eventually leading to economic growth is perceived as a blessing 
for the host economy; however, this growth does not occur in all cases. This is a 
highly researched area by scholars in the FDI literature. On one end, at the macro-
level, the effects of FDI are bestowed with mixed repercussions and presented with 
highly disputed conclusions. However, the other end, at the micro-level, which is 
often augmented in the productivity of local firms, has, to some extent, reached 
consensus in finding a positive vertical spillover effect on local firms through the 
channel of backward and forward linkages. This channel is broadly believed to be the 
crux of FDI’s stimulation of sector development and diversification of the host 
economy. 
 
The resurgence of sector diversification—a concept borrowed from the portfolio 
argument of finance literature, in economics—has attracted wide interest from 
academics after the failure of the import-substitution strategy in the early 1980s. 
Sector diversification is favoured for a number of reasons in academic and policy 
circles because it spreads the risk of over-relying on only a few specialised sectors in 
the economy, which is particularly important during economic crises. In addition, 
sector diversification reduces volatility in the economic growth of countries, protects 
rich natural resource–based countries from the syndrome of resource curse, and 
supports the Engel effects in the host economy. 
 
As highlighted earlier, FDI is broadly assumed to affect sector diversification 
through its linkages channel; however, there is an absence of empirical evidence of 
this on a relatively large number of countries, though an exceptional study is that of 
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Barry and Kearney (2006) on the Irish manufacturing sector. This thesis aims to fill 
these gaps by merging the two strands of literature—FDI and diversification. Within 
this framework, this thesis attempted to answer the following three questions: i) 
What is the direct effect of FDI on sectoral diversification?, ii) How do domestic 
labour and capital market development moderate this relationship?, and iii) How do 
multinationals’ motives mediate the effect of FDI on sector diversification? 
 
Each of the aforementioned questions compares FDI’s effect on sector 
diversification, across the broad sectors of the economy, with the manufacturing 
sector, in short-, medium- and long-run effects (using annual, 5-year average and 
cross-sectional data respectively), at the stated levels of disaggregated data (1-, 2-, 3- 
and 4-digit level). This is done using the Gini coefficient as the baseline measure of 
diversification and the Herfindahl index as the alternative measure. It is undertaken 
across two different measures of sector size: employment and value added shares. 
While these effects are explored for the world sample, a further analysis is 
undertaken on different country sub-samples, grouped by income, following the 
World Bank’s categorisation of developing, developed, low-income and middle-
income countries. 
 
This study is built on the model and dataset used by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). 
Using an unbalanced panel of 165 countries from the year 1970 to 2007, this thesis 
employs OLS (for cross-sectional data) and panel fixed effects (for annual and 5-year 
averages panel data) methodologies on four different data sets. These data sets were 
obtained from the ILO (2009), OECD (2009) and UNIDO (2003a and 2009) at 1-, 2-, 
3- and 4-digits of disaggregated levels.  
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The key findings from the first question are that: at the broad sectoral level, 
statistically significant results are found at ILO 1-digit disaggregated level only for 
developing countries in the long run; developed countries do not diversify across the 
broad sectors of the economy—a finding that is also confirmed by the OECD 2-digit 
disaggregated data, which mainly comprises of industrialised nations. Within the 
manufacturing sector, no evidence of sector diversification is found at the UNIDO 3-
digit disaggregated level. Finally, at the 4-digit disaggregated level, there is some 
evidence of sector diversification in low-income countries (reflected in value added 
shares) in the short run, and middle-income countries (reflected in employment 
shares) in the long run. This case-specific outcome led to the second research 
question, in which two national indicators—labour market regulations and financial 
development—are used to explore whether these channels facilitate sector 
diversification through FDI. 
 
The key findings from the second question are that: again, developing countries 
diversify through the channel of flexible labour market regulations at the 1-digit 
aggregated level in the long run. Again, no evidence is found for developed 
countries, which is also confirmed by the OECD 2-digit disaggregated data. 
Therefore, the finding across the broad sectors of the economy is consistent with the 
findings of the first question, in which only developing countries are found to be 
significantly diversifying at the ILO 1-digit aggregated level. Further, robust 
evidence is found within the manufacturing sector at the 4-digit disaggregated level 
using both employment and value added shares suggesting that developed countries 
diversify through the channel of strong financial market development in the medium 
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run. The marginal effects of FDI’s influence on sector diversification, conditional on 
the level of LMR and financial development is higher for the manufacturing sector.  
 
They key finding from the final question is that, when FDI is not homogenous and is 
further disaggregated by multinationals’ motives, captures more insights of FDI’s 
impact within the manufacturing sector. This was particularly evident at the 4-digit 
disaggregation within the manufacturing sector. It is concluded from this question 
that developed countries diversify significantly through market-seeking FDI, and the 
results are significant for the employment shares in the short run. On the other hand, 
developing countries diversify through efficiency-seeking FDI, also in the short run, 
and the results are found significant for the value added shares.  
 
Overall, it is concluded that the findings are consistent with the theory that developed 
countries are already diversified (see Koren and Tenreyro, 2007, Cuberes and 
Jerzmanowski, 2009). The findings are also in line with the conclusion of Javorcik 
(2004) that vertical linkages are indeed important to boost the potential for benefits 
from inward FDI, particularly in less industrialised transition economies. Therefore, 
the OECD dataset, in particular, did not yield any effect of sector diversification as a 
result of FDI. 
 
Another consistent finding is that the manufacturing sector yields the greater effects 
of sectoral linkages, and, subsequently, sector diversification, than any other sector 
of the economy. However, this effect is conditional on factors such as labour market 
regulations; financial development; and, more particularly, the motives of 
multinationals. 
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The empirical findings in this chapter statistically confirm that FDI influences sector 
diversification; however, this is highly dependent on factors such as levels of labour, 
capital markets and motives of FDI. In terms of policy implications, based on the 
findings of this thesis, FDI can be highly encouraged for the sake of the economic 
benefits of sector diversification. While developed countries are already said to be 
diversified, more attention can be paid to developing countries, particularly the 
manufacturing sector, where more efficiency-seeking FDIs should be encouraged. In 
addition, these countries should reconsider the rigidness of their labour market 
regulations. 
 
This thesis has explored the effect of FDI on sector diversification through various 
dimensions and through a broad sample of countries and sectors; however, like many 
other studies, it has limitations. Despite our restrictive approach which includes panel 
fixed effects estimation, sample splits based on income groups, and controlling for 
country-specific time trends, which would address omitted variables and spurious 
relationships, future research can adopt more formal methods to address the issue of 
endogeneity for the purposes of obtaining a casual interpretation of results. In 
addition, a foreign company may have more than one motive—that is, a combination 
of the ‘right type’ of investments in the host country. These aspects were not 
considered in this thesis. Further, exploring the FDI country of origin and mode of 
entry into the host country might contribute to increased sector diversification, and 
could be further explored. 
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